Arthur Lee Adams v. Keith Schroeder, et al.

• Court: District Court, D. Kansas
• Decided: March 20, 2026
• Docket: 5:26-cv-03053
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS

ARTHUR LEE ADAMS,

Plaintiff,

v. CASE NO. 26-3053-JWL

KEITH SCHROEDER, et al.,

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

Plaintiff Arthur Lee Adams is hereby required to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why this action should not be dismissed due to the deficiencies in Plaintiff’s Complaint that are discussed herein. I. Nature of the Matter before the Court Plaintiff brings this pro se civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff is in custody at the Reno County Jail in Hutchinson, Kansas. The Court granted Plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis. Plaintiff’s claims relate to his state criminal proceedings. Plaintiff claims that his home was raided on November 7, 2022, by the Reno County Sheriff’s Office. (Doc. 1, at 2.) He claims that the warrant/affidavit failed to show probable cause and “appeared to be written post hoc.” Id. As Count I, Plaintiff alleges an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 3. He also claims that his Fifth Amendment rights were violated when he was not given the opportunity to confront his accusers at his August 2025 trial. Id. at 4. As Count II, he alleges a due process violation based on suborning perjury. Id. at 3. He also alleges a speedy trial violation based on it taking three years (from October 7, 20221 to August 11, 2025) to get to trial. Id. at 5. As Count III, Plaintiff alleges Brady violations and argues that evidence was withheld at his criminal trial. Id. at 6. Plaintiff claims that he made these things known on the record during court proceedings. Id. at 7. Plaintiff names as defendants: Keith Schroeder, Reno County District Judge; and Brian

Eugene Koch, Reno County District Attorney. For relief, Plaintiff seeks to have his state criminal case dismissed, $800,000 in damages, and to have a review done of cases prosecuted by Defendants to determine if there were civil rights violations. Id. at 7. II. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints The Court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or an officer or an employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint or portion thereof if a plaintiff has raised claims that are legally frivolous or malicious, that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1)–

(2); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) (where a plaintiff proceeds in forma pauperis the Court is required to “dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that—. . . (B) the action or appeal— (i) is frivolous or malicious; (ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted; or (iii) seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from suit.”). “To state a claim under § 1983, a plaintiff must allege the violation of a right secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States, and must show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law.” West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988) (citations omitted); Northington v. Jackson, 973 F.2d 1518, 1523 (10th Cir. 1992). A court

1 Although Plaintiff references October 7, 2022, he alleges that the raid occurred on November 7, 2022. As set forth below, his criminal case was filed on November 14, 2022. liberally construes a pro se complaint and applies “less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007). In addition, the court accepts all well-pleaded allegations in the complaint as true. Anderson v. Blake, 469 F.3d 910, 913 (10th Cir. 2006). On the other hand, “when the allegations in a complaint, however true, could not raise a claim of entitlement to relief,” dismissal is appropriate. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550

U.S. 544, 558 (2007). A pro se litigant’s “conclusory allegations without supporting factual averments are insufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be based.” Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). “[A] plaintiff’s obligation to provide the ‘grounds’ of his ‘entitlement to relief’ requires “more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (citations omitted). The complaint’s “factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level” and “to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Id. at 555, 570. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has explained “that, to state a claim in federal court, a

complaint must explain what each defendant did to [the pro se plaintiff]; when the defendant did it; how the defendant’s action harmed [the plaintiff]; and, what specific legal right the plaintiff believes the defendant violated.” Nasious v. Two Unknown B.I.C.E. Agents, 492 F.3d 1158, 1163 (10th Cir. 2007). The court “will not supply additional factual allegations to round out a plaintiff’s complaint or construct a legal theory on a plaintiff’s behalf.” Whitney v. New Mexico, 113 F.3d 1170, 1173-74 (10th Cir. 1997) (citation omitted). The Tenth Circuit has pointed out that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Erickson gave rise to a new standard of review for § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) dismissals. See Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1218 (10th Cir. 2007) (citations omitted); see also Smith v. United States, 561 F.3d 1090, 1098 (10th Cir. 2009). As a result, courts “look to the specific allegations in the complaint to determine whether they plausibly support a legal claim for relief.” Kay, 500 F.3d at 1218 (citation omitted). Under this new standard, “a plaintiff must ‘nudge his claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.’” Smith, 561 F.3d at 1098 (citation omitted). “Plausible” in this context does not mean “likely to be true,” but rather refers “to the scope of the allegations in

a complaint: if they are so general that they encompass a wide swath of conduct, much of it innocent,” then the plaintiff has not “nudged [his] claims across the line from conceivable to plausible.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (citing Twombly, 127 S. Ct. at 1974). III. DISCUSSION 1. Younger Abstention The Court may be prohibited from hearing Plaintiff’s claims under Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 45 (1971). “The Younger doctrine requires a federal court to abstain from hearing a case where . . . (1) state judicial proceedings are ongoing; (2) [that] implicate an important state interest;

and (3) the state proceedings offer an adequate opportunity to litigate federal constitutional issues.” Buck v. Myers, 244 F. App’x 193, 197 (10th Cir. 2007) (unpublished) (citing Winnebago Tribe of Neb. v. Stovall, 341 F.3d 1202, 1204 (10th Cir. 2003); see also Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). “Once these three conditions are met, Younger abstention is non-discretionary and, absent extraordinary circumstances, a district court is required to abstain.” Buck, 244 F. App’x at 197 (citing Crown Point I, LLC v. Intermountain Rural Elec. Ass’n, 319 F.3d 1211, 1215 (10th Cir. 2003)). An online Kansas District Court Records Search shows that Plaintiff’s state criminal proceedings are pending. See State v. Adams, Case No. RN-2022-CR-000764 (District Court of Reno County, Kansas) (filed November 14, 2022). The docket reflects that Plaintiff was convicted after a jury trial and is awaiting sentencing. Id. A motion to continue sentencing was filed on November 26, 2025, due to Plaintiff obtaining new counsel after the trial. Id. On December 12, 2025, the Court Services Officer filed an Adult Order to Arrest and Detain, alleging that Plaintiff violated the conditions of his bond supervision. Id. A Motion to Revoke Bond was filed by

Defendant Koch on December 15, 2025. Id. Therefore, it appears that the first and second conditions for Younger abstention would be met because Kansas undoubtedly has an important interest in enforcing its criminal laws through criminal proceedings in the state’s courts. In re Troff, 488 F.3d 1237, 1240 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[S]tate control over criminal justice [is] a lynchpin in the unique balance of interests” described as “Our Federalism.”) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 44). Likewise, the third condition would be met because Kansas courts provide Plaintiff with an adequate forum to litigate his constitutional claims by way of pretrial proceedings, trial, and direct appeal after conviction and sentence, as well as post-conviction remedies. See Capps v. Sullivan, 13 F.3d 350, 354 n.2 (10th Cir. 1993)

(“[F]ederal courts should abstain from the exercise of . . . jurisdiction if the issues raised . . . may be resolved either by trial on the merits in the state court or by other [available] state procedures.”) (quotation omitted); see Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1984) (state courts have obligation ‘to guard, enforce, and protect every right granted or secured by the constitution of the United States . . . .’”); Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 460–61 (1974) (pendant state proceeding, in all but unusual cases, would provide federal plaintiff with necessary vehicle for vindicating constitutional rights). “[T]he Younger doctrine extends to federal claims for monetary relief when a judgment for the plaintiff would have preclusive effects on a pending state-court proceeding.” D.L. v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 497, 392 F.3d 1223, 1228 (10th Cir. 2004); see also Garza v. Burnett, 672 F.3d 1217, 1220 (10th Cir. 2012) (citing Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 393 (2007)); Myers v. Garff, 876 F.2d 79, 81 (10th Cir. 1989) (directing district court to stay claim for damages). Plaintiff should show good cause why this Court should not abstain from hearing this case based on Younger. Plaintiff should also indicate whether or not he is seeking a stay of this case pending

resolution of his state court criminal proceedings. 2. Heck Bar and Habeas Nature of Claim Plaintiff seeks to have his criminal charges dismissed. Plaintiff has been convicted and is awaiting sentencing. To the extent Plaintiff challenges the validity of his conviction or sentence in his state criminal case, his federal claim must be presented in habeas corpus. “[A] § 1983 action is a proper remedy for a state prisoner who is making a constitutional challenge to the conditions of his prison life, but not to the fact or length of his custody.” Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 (1973) (emphasis added). When the legality of a confinement is challenged so that the remedy would be release or a speedier release, the case must be filed as a habeas corpus proceeding rather

than under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the plaintiff must comply with the exhaustion of state court remedies requirement. Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 482 (1994); see also Montez v. McKinna, 208 F.3d 862, 866 (10th Cir. 2000) (exhaustion of state court remedies is required by prisoner seeking habeas corpus relief); see 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)(A) (requiring exhaustion of available state court remedies). “Before a federal court may grant habeas relief to a state prisoner, the prisoner must exhaust his remedies in state court. In other words, the state prisoner must give the state courts an opportunity to act on his claims before he presents those claims to a federal court in a habeas petition.” O’Sullivan v. Boerckel, 526 U.S. 838, 842 (1999); see Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 92 (2006); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509, 518–19 (1982). Plaintiff also seeks money damages in this case. As set forth above, Plaintiff has been convicted and is awaiting sentencing. Any request for money damages may be barred by Heck. See Heck, 512 U.S. at 482. Before a plaintiff may proceed in a federal civil action for monetary damages based upon an invalid conviction or sentence, he must show that his conviction or sentence has been overturned, reversed, or otherwise called into question. Heck, 512 U.S. 477. If

a judgment on Plaintiff’s claim in this case would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction, the claim may be barred by Heck. In Heck v. Humphrey, the United States Supreme Court held that when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 action, the district court must consider the following: whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

Id. at 487. In Heck, the Supreme Court held that a § 1983 damages claim that necessarily implicates the validity of the plaintiff’s conviction or sentence is not cognizable unless and until the conviction or sentence is overturned, either on appeal, in a collateral proceeding, or by executive order. Id. at 486–87. Plaintiff has named a state court judge and the state prosecutor as the sole defendants. Both defendants enjoy immunity from liability for damages. A state judge is absolutely immune from § 1983 liability except when the judge acts “in the clear absence of all jurisdiction.” Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 356–57 (1978) (articulating broad immunity rule that a “judge will not be deprived of immunity because the action he took was in error, was done maliciously, or was in excess of his authority . . . .”); Hunt v. Bennett, 17 F.3d 1263, 1266 (10th Cir. 1994). Only actions taken outside a judge’s judicial capacity will deprive the judge of judicial immunity. Stump, 435 U.S. at 356–57. Plaintiff alleges no facts whatsoever to suggest that the defendant judge acted outside of his judicial capacity. Plaintiff also names the state prosecutor as a defendant. Prosecutors are absolutely immune from liability for damages in actions asserted against them for actions taken “in initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976).

The Supreme Court has held that prosecutors enjoy absolute immunity “for their conduct in ‘initiating a prosecution and in presenting the State’s case,’ insofar as that conduct is ‘intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.’ ” Neighbors v. Lawrence Police Dep’t., 2016 WL 3685355, at *9 (D. Kan. July 12, 2016) (citing Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 486 (1991) (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430, 431 (1976)). “This prosecutorial immunity is limited, however, to actions that ‘involve the prosecutor’s role as advocate . . . rather than his [or her] role as administrator or investigative officer . . ..’ ” Id. (quoting Imbler, 424 U.S. at 491 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). Plaintiff’s claims concerning his criminal case fall squarely within the prosecutorial function. Plaintiff is directed to show cause why his claims

against the Defendants should not be dismissed based on judicial and prosecutorial immunity. IV. Response Required Plaintiff is required to show good cause why his Complaint should not be dismissed for the reasons stated herein. Plaintiff should also indicate if he is seeking a stay of this case pending resolution of his state court criminal proceedings. To the extent Plaintiff seeks a stay regarding his claim for money damages, he is directed to show cause why his claims against the Defendants should not be dismissed based on judicial and prosecutorial immunity. Failure to respond by the deadline may result in dismissal of this matter without further notice. IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Plaintiff is granted until April 20, 2026, in which to show good cause, in writing to the undersigned, why Plaintiff’s Complaint should not be dismissed or stayed for the reasons stated herein. IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated March 20, 2026, in Kansas City, Kansas.

S/ John W. Lungstrum JOHN W. LUNGSTRUM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE