IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
ARTHUR HYATT, No. 87907-3-I Respondent, DIVISION ONE v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION MICHAEL A. OWENS; and ANGELO TSOUKALAS,
Appellants.
HAZELRIGG, C.J. — Michael Owens and Angelo Tsoukalas, representing
themselves, seek reversal of the trial court’s summary judgment order that quieted
title in favor of Arthur Hyatt based on adverse possession and awarded attorney
fees and costs to Hyatt. Because Owens and Tsoukalas failed to demonstrate a
genuine issue of material fact as to the elements of adverse possession in the trial
court or establish on appeal that the trial court otherwise erred, we affirm.
FACTS
Arthur Hyatt owns and resides at real property in Bellingham near the north
shore of Lake Whatcom (Hyatt Property). Michael Owens owns the adjacent
property to the east (Owens Property). Angelo Tsoukalas resides at and claims
an interest in the Owens Property under an option to purchase agreement with
Owens. No. 87907-3-I/2
The Owens and Hyatt Properties were originally contained within a 23-acre
parcel purchased by Harold and Edna Owens in 1947. The property is naturally
divided into three sections by a creek that separates the westerly and middle
sections from each other and a cliff that separates the middle and easterly portions
from each other, becoming less steep as it extends northward. Harold and Edna
Owens occupied the middle section, Harold’s brother Ted Owens occupied the
area west of the creek, and his other brother Louie Owens occupied the section
east of the cliff. 1
In March 1971, appellant Michael Owens obtained ownership of the easterly
section by deed from his grandparents Harold and Edna. Correction deeds with
differing legal descriptions were recorded in April 1971 and September 1978.
1 Harold’s brother’s given names are Edward and Louis; however, they are also referred to
as Ted and Louie in the record.
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Owens subdivided the easterly section into three lots via the “Owens Short Plat,”
recorded in December 1978 based on the legal description in the 1978 correction
deed. In 1983, Hyatt and his business partners purchased the remainder of the
westerly and middle sections. The property was subdivided, and in 1984, Hyatt
acquired title by deed to the parcel between the creek and the cliff and has resided
there continuously ever since. Owens continues to own the westernmost lot, but
he has not lived there since 1984.
Tsoukalas began residing at the Owens Property in 2011. In January 2018,
a survey obtained by Tsoukalas showed that the cliff and its northern extension lay
entirely within the legal boundary of the Owens Property. At issue in this case is
the wedge-shaped strip of forested land located between the cliff and the legal
description of the boundary line between the Owens and Hyatt Properties
(Disputed Area).
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In March 2018, Hyatt, through counsel, filed a complaint against Owens and
Tsoukalas seeking to quiet title to the Disputed Area based on adverse
possession, mutual recognition and acquiescence, and other causes of action.
Hyatt asserted that the parties have always observed the cliff and its northward
extension as the true boundary between the properties. Hyatt further asserted that
he has continuously used and occupied the Disputed Area from 1983 through the
present, maintaining it in a manner consistent with the land’s character in a manner
that was open, notorious, actual, uninterrupted, and hostile for more than the ten-
year statutory period. Hyatt sought an order to quiet title in his favor, an award of
attorney fees and costs, and a permanent injunction to prohibit Tsoukalas from
entering or using the Disputed Area.
Owens answered the complaint through counsel and Tsoukalas answered
pro se. Neither defendant pleaded any counterclaims or cross claims. Over the
next several years, the parties engaged in settlement discussions that proved
fruitless. Counsel for Owens and Hyatt eventually withdrew, leaving all parties pro
se.
In October 2024, Tsoukalas moved for a cease-and-desist order to prevent
Hyatt from tampering with the boundary stakes and to order him to pay for their
replacement. In November 2024, Tsoukalas moved for a cease-and-desist order
to compel Hyatt to stop blocking him from entering the Disputed Area and to stop
lighting fires in the Disputed Area.
Hyatt then moved for summary judgment. Hyatt argued that even if the
Owens family intended the boundary line to be where it is described in the 1978
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deed and as shown on the Owens Short Plat, such intent would not matter because
he has adversely possessed the Disputed Area since 1983. In support of his
motion, Hyatt submitted his own declaration that stated he has “continuously and
exclusively maintained the Disputed Area (in a way that is consistent with its
character as primarily forest land) since 1983.” Hyatt explained that his uses within
the Disputed Area include burn piles to dispose of woody debris, planting a grove
of Douglas fir trees that “covers the entire width of the Disputed Area and is about
125 feet deep,” planting other “non-harmful” trees, collecting firewood, storing
materials, and mowing a 25-foot wide strip to maintain access to the property
boundary “that is the entire width of the disputed area.” Hyatt also stated that
Owens’ “actions through the years show he believed the Disputed Area was
[Hyatt’s] land,” as Owens and his tenants “stayed completely out of the Disputed
Area,” “never maintained or used any part of the Cliff or west of there,” willingly
removed an old trailer from the Disputed Area at Hyatt’s request, and asked Hyatt’s
permission to cut three big trees at the top of the cliff. Hyatt also submitted
numerous photographs documenting his uses of the Disputed Area in support of
his motion. In addition to the relief sought in his complaint, Hyatt asked the court
to require the defendants to bear the cost of a updated survey and legal
description.
Tsoukalas moved to dismiss on the ground that Hyatt had failed to respond
to discovery and further sought to renote his previous motions and present video
evidence at the summary judgment hearing. Tsoukalas then opposed Hyatt’s
motion for summary judgment and argued that the boundary plats and 2018 survey
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were “in full agreement” as to the correct location of the boundary line and Hyatt’s
alleged use of the Disputed Area was unproven and insufficient to establish
adverse possession. In support of his motion, Tsoukalas submitted a number of
witness declarations. Daniel Gamble stated that in December 2024, Tsoukalas
hired him to cut down a dead tree and Hyatt shouted at him while he was doing
so. Tsoukalas’ fiancée Beth Toberer stated that the litigation has “taken a toll on
Angelo’s health.” David Tiller acknowledged that he had never walked on the
property but stated that he viewed a video recorded by Tsoukalas in January 2018
in which the Disputed Area appears “completely overgrown” and Hyatt can be seen
“ranting at the surveyors.” Paul Olsen stated that he lived with his stepfather Ted
Owens at the property west of the creek until 1961 and that he helped log the
property during the 1960s. Olsen also described roads running through the
properties and stated that his uncles “used these roads to visit each other as well
as various projects.” Tsoukalas also submitted several recent photographs of his
own property and the boundary.
Hyatt and Tsoukalas appeared at the summary judgment hearing held on
January 10, 2025. Owens did not appear at the hearing or otherwise respond.
Hyatt affirmed that he had served Owens with his motion. The trial court began by
denying Tsoukalas’ pending motions. After hearing argument from Hyatt and
Tsoukalas, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Hyatt and quieted
title to the Disputed Area in his favor based on both adverse possession and
mutual recognition and acquiescence. In so ruling, the trial court stated that
Tsoukalas’ evidence of recent activity was “irrelevant” because Hyatt established
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ownership of the Disputed Area by adverse possession “long before Mr. Tsoukalas
ever came on to the scene.” The trial court also awarded Hyatt attorney fees and
costs incurred in the matter from both Owens and Tsoukalas jointly and severally
under RCW 7.28.083(3) in an amount to be determined. The court declined to
order Tsoukalas to bear the cost of a survey and legal description and indicated
that it would “write in the order that the boundary line between the two properties
as described in the complaint is the cliff.” The trial court also declined to issue a
permanent injunction barring Tsoukalas from entering the Disputed Area “because
[it did not] think that was requested.”
Hyatt noted a motion for entry of judgment on an award of attorney fees and
costs totaling $28,760.29 and supported his request with affidavits from counsel.
Tsoukalas filed a response and argued that Hyatt should compensate both
defendants for property taxes paid since 1984, Owens did not receive notice of the
summary judgment hearing, Hyatt lacks credibility and failed to meet his burden to
establish adverse possession, and Tsoukalas is not liable for Hyatt’s attorney fees
as per his property contract with Owens. Owens also filed a response that
asserted he was not notified of the summary judgment hearing, disputed Hyatt’s
factual assertions regarding adverse possession, and argued he should not have
to pay attorney fees because they are “excessive” and because he is “not
personally a part of the disagreement of the disputed area that is occurring
between Tsoukalas and Hyatt.”
Hyatt, Tsoukalas, and Owens appeared at the presentation hearing on
February 21, 2025. The court stated, “[T]he only thing to determine today is
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whether the amount of attorney’s fees that are being requested are reasonable”
and entered judgment awarding Hyatt’s attorney fees and costs in the amount
requested.
Tsoukalas and Owens each timely appealed.
ANALYSIS
I. Summary Judgment
We review summary judgment orders de novo and construe all evidence
and reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Keck v. Collins, 184
Wn.2d 358, 370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015). Summary judgment is appropriate when
the record shows “no genuine issue as to any material fact” and “the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” CR 56(c). “A ‘material fact’ is one on
which the outcome of the litigation depends.” TracFone, Inc. v. City of Renton, 30
Wn. App. 2d 870, 875, 547 P.3d 902 (quoting Jacobsen v. State, 89 Wn.2d 104,
108, 569 P.2d 1152 (1977)), review denied, 3 Wn.3d 1030 (2024).
“Washington courts employ a two-step burden-shifting analysis” to evaluate
summary judgment motions. Id. First, the moving party “bears the initial burden
of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact.” Haley v. Amazon.com
Servs., LLC, 25 Wn. App. 2d 207, 216, 522 P.3d 80 (2022) (citing Young v. Key
Pharms., Inc., 112 Wn.2d 216, 225, 770 P.2d 182 (1989)). Second, if that initial
burden is met, “[t]he burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to present evidence
that an issue of material fact remains.” Id. “[M]ere allegations, denials, opinions,
or conclusory statements” do not establish a genuine issue of material fact. Int’l
Ultimate, Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co., 122 Wn. App. 736, 744, 87 P.3d
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774 (2004). Summary judgment is appropriate if reasonable persons could reach
but one conclusion from all the evidence. Vallandigham v. Clover Park Sch. Dist.
No. 400, 154 Wn.2d 16, 26, 109 P.3d 805 (2005).
As a preliminary matter, we observe that Owens and Tsoukalas appeal pro
se. While we acknowledge the difficulties of self-representation, “‘the law does not
distinguish between one who elects to conduct [their] own legal affairs and one
who seeks assistance of counsel—both are subject to the same procedural and
substantive laws.’” In re Marriage of Olson, 69 Wn. App. 621, 626, 850 P.2d 527
(1993) (quoting In re Marriage of Wherley, 34 Wn. App. 344, 349, 661 P.2d 155
(1983)). 2 We need not consider arguments that a party does not support with
references to the record, meaningful analysis, or citation to pertinent authority.
See Cowiche Canyon Conservancy v. Bosley, 118 Wn.2d 801, 809, 828 P.2d 549
(1992).
II. Adverse Possession
Tsoukalas and Owens argue that Hyatt failed to meet his burden to
establish adverse possession. 3 We disagree.
“Adverse possession requires 10 years of possession that is (1) exclusive,
(2) actual and uninterrupted, (3) open and notorious, and (4) hostile.” Herrin v.
2 Hyatt argues that the appellants’ failure to assign error precludes our review. See Emmerson v. Weilep, 126 Wn. App. 930, 939-40, 110 P.3d 214 (2005) (failure to assign error or provide argument and citations to authority required by RAP 10.3(a) precludes consideration of alleged error). However, we may consider a party’s argument where the briefing makes the nature of the challenge reasonably clear, there is no prejudice to the opposing party, and the court has not been greatly inconvenienced. In re Dependency of H.W., 34 Wn. App. 2d 819, 827-28, 572 P.3d 481 (2025); RAP 1.2(a). Applying these principles, we exercise our discretion to reach the merits of the appellants’ arguments. 3 Neither appellant challenges the trial court’s ruling that Hyatt also established ownership
of the Disputed Area via mutual recognition and acquiescence.
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O’Hern, 168 Wn. App. 305, 310-11, 275 P.3d 1231 (2012). “Title vests
automatically in the adverse possessor if all the elements are fulfilled throughout
the statutory period.” Gorman v. City of Woodinville, 175 Wn.2d 68, 72, 283 P.3d
1082 (2012). “The party claiming adverse possession must establish each
element by a preponderance of the evidence.” Teel v. Stading, 155 Wn. App. 390,
394, 228 P.3d 1293 (2010).
Here, Hyatt presented undisputed evidence establishing the elements of
adverse possession. “‘A claimant can satisfy the open and notorious element by
showing either (1) that the title owner had actual notice of the adverse use
throughout the statutory period or (2) that the claimant used the land such that any
reasonable person would have thought [they] owned it.’” Happy Bunch, LLC v.
Grandview N., LLC, 142 Wn. App. 81, 89, 173 P.3d 959 (2007) (quoting Riley v.
Andres, 107 Wn. App. 391, 396, 27 P.3d 618 (2001)). The “hostility” element does
not require “personal animosity or adversarial intent” but, rather, use of the
property “akin to that of an owner.” Herrin, 168 Wn. App. at 311.
Hyatt attested that he has “continuously and exclusively maintained the
Disputed Area (in a way that is consistent with its character as primarily forest land)
since 1983” by planting trees, burning woody debris, cutting firewood, mowing to
maintain access, and using it as storage. He further attested that Owens and his
tenants prior to Tsoukalas always observed the cliff as the boundary line and
behaved accordingly. Thus, Hyatt’s rights in the Disputed Area vested by 1994,
long before Tsoukalas moved to the Owens Property in 2011. Tsoukalas
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presented no evidence regarding the use of the Disputed Area during the relevant
time period, so he did not establish the existence of a question of material fact.
Tsoukalas argues that the trial court erred when it disallowed the January
29, 2018 video showing the Disputed Area. He contends that this video, along
with his witness declarations and photographs, prove that Hyatt’s “questionable”
use of the Disputed Area “did not exist.” “We review de novo all trial court rulings
in summary judgment proceedings, including regarding the admissibility of
evidence.” Asphy v. State, 31 Wn. App. 2d 605, 614, 552 P.3d 325, review denied,
3 Wn.3d 1033 (2024). Relevant evidence is “evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the
action more probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence.” ER
401. “Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.” ER 402. The 2018 video
had no bearing on Hyatt’s use of the property prior to Tsoukalas’ arrival in 2011,
years after Hyatt’s rights to the property vested by adverse possession, so the trial
court did not err when it excluded it.
Tsoukalas also argues that Hyatt’s declaration and exhibits do not show use
and upkeep of the Disputed Area since 1983. He describes the Disputed Area as
a “big green jungle” that lacks buildings or structures, unlike the rest of Hyatt’s
property. However, “[w]hat constitutes possession or occupancy of property for
purposes of adverse possession necessarily depends upon the nature, character,
and locality of the property involved and the uses to which it is ordinarily adapted
or applied.” Anderson v. Hudak, 80 Wn. App. 398, 403, 907 P.2d 305 (1995).
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Although Hyatt maintained the area in a natural state, his use was sufficient to
establish adverse possession.
Tsoukalas contends that Hyatt’s factual assertions should be rejected
because he repeatedly perjured himself and, thus, is not credible. But “[a]n issue
of credibility is present only if the party opposing the summary judgment motion
comes forward with evidence which contradicts or impeaches the movant’s
evidence on a material issue,” thereby creating an issue for trial. Howell v.
Spokane & Inland Empire Blood Bank, 117 Wn.2d 619, 626, 818 P.2d 1056 (1991).
Tsoukalas did not do so. His efforts to characterize Hyatt as broadly dishonest do
not give rise to a credibility issue regarding any particular material fact. 4
Tsoukalas also contends that even if Hyatt met the elements of adverse
possession at some time in the past, the present condition of the Disputed Area
shows that he abandoned that use. He is incorrect. “When a person adversely
possesses real property for 10 years, such possession ripens into an original title.”
Nickell v. Southview Homeowners Ass’n, 167 Wn. App. 42, 50, 271 P.3d 973
(2012). Once the 10-year period is complete and title has vested, the property
owner’s rights are no longer dependent on continued adverse use. See Gorman,
175 Wn.2d at 73 (“Title acquired through adverse possession cannot be divested
by acts other than those required to transfer a title acquired by deed.”) Hyatt
obtained title to the Disputed Area by adverse possession no later than 1994, so
abandonment or cessation of use after that date would not extinguish his title.
4 The trial court found Hyatt credible, but such “‘findings of fact are superfluous in summary
judgment proceedings and carry no weight on appeal.’” TracFone, 30 Wn. App. 2d at 876 (quoting Hamilton v. Huggins, 70 Wn. App. 842, 848, 855 P.2d 1216 (1993)).
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Next, Tsoukalas asserts that the doctrine of laches bars Hyatt’s claim
because he was aware of his cause of action decades ago yet waited until 2018
to file his complaint. The equitable doctrine of laches arises from “knowledge of
existing conditions and acquiescence in them.” Felida Neighborhood Assoc. v.
Clark County, 81 Wn. App. 155, 162, 913 P.2d 823 (1996). “Laches consists of
two elements: (1) inexcusable delay and (2) prejudice to the other party from such
delay.” State ex rel. Citizens Against Tolls v. Murphy, 151 Wn.2d 226, 241, 88
P.3d 375 (2004). However, because title vests upon satisfaction of the adverse
possession requirements rather than the filing of the quiet title action, laches
generally cannot bar a claim based solely on delay of filing suit after the adverse
possession period has run. See El Cerrito, Inc. v. Ryndak, 60 Wn.2d 847, 855,
376 P.2d 528 (1962) (“When real property has been held by adverse possession
for 10 years, such possession ripens into an original title.”); Nickell, 167 Wn. App.
at 51 (plaintiff may bring adverse possession action “any time after” they have “held
possession adversely for 10 years”). Laches does not bar Hyatt’s adverse
possession claim.
Finally, Owens asserts that Hyatt’s claim that the parties agreed the cliff
was the true boundary is false. He asks us to consider his appellate brief as a
“declaration.” But under RAP 9.12, our review of an order granting summary
judgment is limited to the “evidence and issues called to the attention of the trial
court.” Because Owens did not respond or appear at the summary judgment
hearing, Owens’ assertions were never “called to the attention of the trial court.”
Accordingly, we will not consider them now. To allow otherwise “would be to
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undermine the rule that an appellate court is to engage in the same inquiry as the
trial court in reviewing an order of summary judgment.” Wash. Fed’n of State
Emps., Council 28, AFL-CIO v. Office of Fin. Mgmt, 121 Wn.2d 152, 163, 849 P.2d
1201 (1993).
Still, Owens insists that his due process rights were violated because Hyatt
failed to notify him of the summary judgment hearing. But the record contains a
certificate of mailing, declaration of service, and declaration of confirmation of
service showing that Hyatt properly served Owens at his address of record by
priority mail. In any event, the proper vehicle for such a challenge would have
been a CR 60(b) motion to vacate the summary judgment order. See CR 60(b)(1)
(“On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or the
party’s legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for . . .
[m]istakes, inadvertence, surprise, excusable neglect or irregularity in obtaining a
judgment or order.”). Because the record does not demonstrate that Owens
pursued this remedy in the trial court prior to the attorney fee hearing, we need not
consider it further. See RAP 2.5(a).
III. Boundary Line
Tsoukalas also argues that the trial court “contradicted itself” by defining the
Disputed Area as “that area approximately located between the legally
described/surveyed westerly boundary of the Owens Short Plat, and the line
formed by the crest of the 40-foot cliff, and the northwesterly extension of that cliff
line, as depicted on Exhibit 3.17 to the Verified Complaint.” He insists that Exhibit
3.17 “does not represent the crooked cliff” and this “imaginary line” is “totally
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unacceptable in surveying.” However, it is well settled that natural geographical
features control over technical measurements when conflicts arise. See Camping
Comm’n of Pac. Nw. Conf. of Methodist Church v. Ocean View Land, Inc., 70
Wn.2d 12, 15, 421 P.2d 1021 (1966) (“[T]he rule is that courses and distances
must yield to natural and ascertained objects” in determining boundary of
described property). The trial court’s legal description is sufficiently clear.
IV. Attorney Fees
A. Award of Attorney Fees in Trial Court
Tsoukalas and Owens challenge the trial court’s attorney fee award. “The
general rule in Washington is that attorney fees will not be awarded for costs of
litigation unless authorized by contract, statute, or recognized ground of equity.”
Durland v. San Juan County, 182 Wn.2d 55, 76, 340 P.3d 191 (2014). Whether a
trial court is authorized to award attorney fees is a question of law, which we review
de novo. Falcon Props., LLC v. Bowfits 1308, LLC, 16 Wn. App. 2d 1, 11, 478
P.3d 134 (2020). “When attorney fees are authorized, we will uphold an attorney
fee award unless we find the trial court manifestly abused its discretion.” Workman
v. Klinkenberg, 6 Wn. App. 2d 291, 305, 430 P.3d 716 (2018). “The trial court
abuses its discretion when its exercise of discretion is manifestly unreasonable or
based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons.” Sw. Suburban Sewer Dist. v.
Fish, 17 Wn. App. 2d 833, 838, 488 P.3d 839 (2021).
Critically here, the notice of appeal did not designate the judgment on award
of attorney fees and costs for our review. See RAP 5.3(a)(3) (requiring notice of
appeal “designate the decision or part of decision which the party wants
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reviewed”). “The scope of a given appeal is determined by the notice of appeal,
the assignments of error, and the substantive argumentation of the parties.” Clark
County v. W. Wash. Growth Mgmt. Hr’gs Rev. Bd., 177 Wn.2d 136, 144, 298 P.3d
704 (2013)). The appellants assert that the fee award was excessive, but their
arguments in briefing do not challenge the trial court’s reasonableness
determination as to the amount awarded. Thus, the propriety of the award is the
only matter at issue in this appeal. RCW 7.28.083(3) authorizes the trial court to
award reasonable attorney fees and costs to the prevailing party in an adverse
possession action “if, after considering all the facts, the court determines such an
award is equitable and just.” Hyatt prevailed on his adverse possession claim, so
the trial court had statutory authority to award fees and costs to Hyatt.
Relying primarily on the option to purchase contract between the parties,
Tsoukalas and Owens each argue that the other should be responsible for paying
the fee award. RCW 7.28.083(3) is silent on apportionment among multiple
defendants, leaving courts with discretion to determine how to allocate fee awards
when multiple parties are involved. See In re Marriage of Wixom, 190 Wn. App.
719, 728, 360 P.3d 960 (2015) (“Courts may order parties and their attorneys to
be jointly and severally liable for attorney fees.”). The record establishes that the
trial court considered whether both parties contributed to the need for litigation
when it ordered joint and several liability. Any contractual dispute between Owens
and Tsoukalas is outside the scope of this appeal.
Tsoukalas contends that the trial court inappropriately favored Hyatt by
awarding his attorney fees without requiring Hyatt to compensate both Owens and
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Tsoukalas for property taxes paid on the Disputed Area since 1983. Under RCW
7.28.083(1)(a), “[a] party who prevails against the holder of record title,” or
subsequent purchaser in an adverse possession action, may be required to
“[r]eimburse such holder or purchaser for part or all of any taxes or assessments
levied on the real property during the period the prevailing party was in possession
of the real property in question and which are proven by competent evidence to
have been paid by such holder or purchaser.” Nonetheless, this claim also fails.
It is undisputed that Tsoukalas did not pay property taxes, so he is not entitled to
seek reimbursement. Moreover, as the trial court correctly noted, the defendants
raised this matter for the first time in response to Hyatt’s motion for an award of
attorney fees and costs, so the court did not err when it declined to consider it. We
presume judges perform their functions without bias or prejudice. Jones v.
Halvorson-Berg, 69 Wn. App. 117, 127, 847 P.2d 945 (1993). Accordingly,
Tsoukalas has failed to demonstrate that the trial court judge favored any party
over others.
B. Attorney Fees on Appeal
Tsoukalas seeks an award of fees on appeal and specifically asserts that
he should be compensated for “legal advice” and “payment for all the hours [he
has] invested defending from Hyatt.” However, Tsoukalas is not the prevailing
party on appeal, so he is not entitled to fees. In any event, attorney fees are not
available to pro se litigants for their work representing themselves. See In re
Marriage of Brown, 159 Wn. App. 931, 938-39, 247 P.3d 466 (2011).
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V. Other Requests for Relief
Tsoukalas argues that the trial court erred when it “disregarded” Hyatt’s bad
behavior towards him, including his removal of boundary stakes, lighting fires
during a burn ban, and attempting to block Tsoukalas from entering the Disputed
Area. But the trial court correctly noted that Tsoukalas did not plead any
counterclaims or cross claims, so it appropriately denied Tsoukalas’ requests for
relief regarding matters outside the complaint. See CR 13 (providing for pleading
of counterclaims and cross claims). Tsoukalas also requests that the trial court
judge recuse herself from other lawsuits involving him, but such a request falls well
outside the scope of appeal and is not properly before us.
Hyatt asks this court to order Owens to pay for a survey of the cliff. But the
trial court declined to order this relief and specifically noted that a survey is
unnecessary because the cliff is the boundary. Because Hyatt does not argue that
the court erred when it so ruled, we decline his request.
Hyatt also asks this court to bar Tsoukalas from his property, including the
Disputed Area. Although Hyatt sought this relief in his complaint and in his motion
for summary judgment, he failed to cross-appeal the trial court’s denial of his
requests and we decline to reach the issue.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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