ARTHUR FEINBERG & Another v. EAST COAST SEALCOATING, INC., & Others.
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Opinion
NOTICE: Summary decisions issued by the Appeals Court pursuant to M.A.C. Rule 23.0, as appearing in 97 Mass. App. Ct. 1017 (2020) (formerly known as rule 1:28, as amended by 73 Mass. App. Ct. 1001 [2009]), are primarily directed to the parties and, therefore, may not fully address the facts of the case or the panel's decisional rationale. Moreover, such decisions are not circulated to the entire court and, therefore, represent only the views of the panel that decided the case. A summary decision pursuant to rule 23.0 or rule 1:28 issued after February 25, 2008, may be cited for its persuasive value but, because of the limitations noted above, not as binding precedent. See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS
APPEALS COURT
23-P-1448
ARTHUR FEINBERG & another1
vs.
EAST COAST SEALCOATING, INC., & others.2
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER PURSUANT TO RULE 23.0
The plaintiffs appeal from a judgment dismissing their
complaint against defendant Kwest Enterprises, LLC (Kwest), for
lack of personal jurisdiction pursuant to Mass. R. Civ. P.
12 (b) (2), 365 Mass. 754 (1974). A Superior Court judge
concluded that Kwest had insufficient contacts with the
Commonwealth under the long-arm statute, G. L. c. 223A, § 3, and
that exercising jurisdiction did not comport with the
requirements of due process under the United States
Constitution. We affirm.
1 Karen Feinberg.
2Kwest Enterprises, LLC, and Coolink AC and Heating LLC, doing business as CRP Mechanical. Background. The plaintiffs are Massachusetts residents,
and Arthur3 is the president of Resilient Technologies, Inc.,
doing business as Tracklite Systems (Tracklite), a Massachusetts
corporation with a business address in Andover and an office in
Lawrence. Kwest is a limited liability company organized under
the laws of Alabama with its principal -- and only -- place of
business in Montgomery, Alabama. Kwest does not do business,
own property, have employees, advertise for, or solicit business
in Massachusetts.
In May 2020, Kwest's president telephoned Arthur regarding
a construction project at Kessler Air Force Base in Mississippi
(base). After further phone calls and e-mail messages, on July
15, 2020, Kwest entered into a subcontract with Tracklite for
work on the project, its fourth such subcontract for work at the
base.4 In connection with these projects, "Kwest directed
hundreds of communications -- letters, faxes, telephone calls,
and emails -- to Tracklite in Massachusetts."
On September 26, 2020, Arthur was seriously injured on the
project in Mississippi. The plaintiffs filed suit in
3 As they share a surname, we refer to the plaintiffs by their first names.
4 Kwest paid Tracklite $736,951 for the four projects.
2 Massachusetts against Kwest and others5 alleging negligence in
the operation of the forklift and supervision of the worksite.
Karen brought a claim for loss of consortium. A judge allowed
Kwest's motion to dismiss. This appeal followed.
Discussion. "When a defendant moves to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, the plaintiff bears the burden of
adducing facts on which jurisdiction may be found." Roch v.
Mollica, 481 Mass. 164, 165 (2019), quoting SCVNGR, Inc. v.
Punchh, Inc., 478 Mass. 324, 325 n.3 (2017). We review to
determine whether the plaintiffs made "a prima facie showing of
evidence that, if credited, would be sufficient to support
findings of all facts essential to personal jurisdiction." Fern
v. Immergut, 55 Mass. App. Ct. 577, 579 (2002). "[W]e accept as
true the essential uncontroverted facts that were before the
judge" (citation omitted). SCVNGR, Inc., supra.
A Massachusetts court may assert jurisdiction over
nonresident defendants "when some basis for jurisdiction
enumerated in [G. L. c. 223A, § 3,] has been established" and
when "exercise of jurisdiction under State law [is] consistent
with basic due process requirements mandated by the United
5 The plaintiffs voluntarily dismissed their claims against Coolink AC and Heating LLC and entered into a settlement agreement with East Coast Sealcoating, Inc.
3 States Constitution" (citations omitted). Intech, Inc. v.
Triple "C" Marine Salvage, Inc., 444 Mass. 122, 125 (2005).
Passing on the question whether the plaintiffs met the
requirements of the long-arm statute, we consider whether the
exercise of jurisdiction over Kwest is inconsistent with due
process. "'[T]he constitutional touchstone' of the
determination whether an exercise of personal jurisdiction
comports with due process 'remains whether the defendant
purposefully established "minimum contacts" in the forum
state.'" Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 416 Mass. 763, 772 (1994),
quoting Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U.S. 102,
108–109 (1987). The minimum contacts analysis has three prongs:
the defendant must have purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the forum; the claim must
arise out of or relate to the defendant's contacts with the
forum; and the exercise of jurisdiction must not offend
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice."
Bulldog Investors Gen. Partnership v. Secretary of the
Commonwealth, 457 Mass. 210, 217 (2010), quoting Tatro, supra at
773.
Prong one. To determine whether Kwest purposefully availed
itself of the privileges of conducting activities in
Massachusetts, we look to the voluntariness and foreseeability
4 of its contacts here. See Doucet v. FCA US, LLC, 492 Mass. 204,
211 (2023). We ask whether Kwest had a "meaningful" connection
to Massachusetts that was voluntarily undertaken, and whether it
was reasonably foreseeable that Kwest would be brought into
court in Massachusetts as a result. Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S.
277, 290 (2014). See Doucet, supra.
Here, Kwest did not provide services or goods to any
Massachusetts customer. It did not solicit business in
Massachusetts. It did not advertise in Massachusetts. It did
not have offices or employees in Massachusetts. Kwest merely
hired Tracklite, a business with an office in Massachusetts.
The subject of the subcontract was a construction project in
Mississippi, and the plaintiffs' tort claims arose out of an
accident that occurred in Mississippi.
Kwest's communications with Tracklite were not acts
purposefully directed to Massachusetts. Kwest did nothing to
invoke the benefits and protections of Massachusetts's laws.
Indeed, the subcontract was to be governed by the laws of
Alabama. A mere relationship between the parties -- as existed
here -- was insufficient; what is required is "a quid for a quo
that consists of the state's extending protection or other
services to the nonresident." Cote v. Wadel, 796 F.2d 981, 984
(7th Cir. 1986).
5 Prong two. For Massachusetts to exercise jurisdiction
consistent with due process, Kwest's "suit-related conduct must
create a substantial connection with the forum State." Walden,
571 U.S. at 284.
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