Arthur Brune v. Charles J. Morse
This text of 475 F.2d 858 (Arthur Brune v. Charles J. Morse) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
The sole issue on this appeal is the right of Arthur Bruñe to receive pension benefits from the Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension Fund on normal retirement. The trial court, 339 F.Supp. 159, held that Bruñe was not entitled to receive benefits because he had not been employed in the “Teamster industry” for twenty continuous years. We affirm.
Various Teamster affiliates and employers with whom they had collective *859 bargaining agreements negotiated a pension plan to be effective July 1, 1964. 1 Under the plan, an employee is eligible for normal retirement if he meets the following conditions at the time of retirement.
(1) Age 57.
(2) Twenty years of service in the Teamster industry.
(3) Five years of service under a Teamster collective bargaining agreement.
(4) Eighty weeks payment into the pension fund on his behalf.
(5) Is in an employee classification status at the time of retirement.
It is conceded that Bruñe meets all qualifications except the one requiring twenty years of continuous service in the Teamster industry.
Service in the Teamster industry is defined in the plan as follows:
“(a) Employment within a classification of work and in an industry which was at the time of such employment normally covered by Teamster contracts in the local metropolitan area; and/or
“(b) Employment in the same classification of work in which employed after the Effective Date under a Teamster contract and on which pension contributions have been made on behalf of the employee; and/or
“(c) Employment requiring the usual Teamster skills in traditional Teamster industries at the time of such employment ; * * * ’’
Brune worked for the International Shoe Company, in St. Louis, Missouri, from 1927 until 1960, as a lasting machine operator. That company did not have a collective bargaining agreement with a Teamster Union during that period and did not make contributions to the Central States Pension Fund. Moreover, the Teamsters Union did not have collective bargaining agreements with other shoe manufacturers in the St. Louis area during the period. The Teamsters Union did, however, have collective bargaining agreements with retail shoe repair shops in the area, and such contracts covered persons who operated lasting machines.
Bruñe worked as a warehouseman at Buescher’s Wholesale in St. Louis, Missouri, from 1961 to 1969. That company had a collective bargaining agreement with the Teamsters and contributed to the Central States Pension Fund on behalf of Brune from 1967 to Brune’s retirement in 1969.
When Brune retired, he applied for a pension. He added his years of service with International Shoe to his years of service with Buescher’s Wholesale to obtain the necessary twenty years. The trustees denied Brune’s application on the grounds that he did not have twenty years of credited service within the Teamster industry. They stated that Brune was entitled to credit for all years worked for Buescher’s Wholesale but not for the years worked for International Shoe. They did so on the grounds that during the years he worked for International Shoe, Brune was a production worker in a shoe factory rather than in a retail repair shop, and that there were no Teamster contracts covering production workers in shoe factories in the geographic area during the years in question.
Brune commenced an action in District Court. He again contended that he was entitled to credit for his years of service with International Shoe Company. The court rejected this contention. It stated:
“It is the opinion of the Court that the business of repairing shoes is not the same industry as that of manufacturing shoes although the subject matters of the two businesses are the *860 same — shoes. Manufacturing is producing or making shoes. The logical extension of that process might well include distribution, marketing and ultimate retail sale to the consumer. However, shoe repair is a service performed at the request of and to the benefit of the shoe consumer. It is independent of and outside the process of manufacturing and producing shoes for ultimate sale to the consumer.
“Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘Industry’ as:
“ ‘Any department or branch of art, occupation, or business conducted as a means of livelihood or for profit; especially, one which employs much labor and capital and is a distinct branch of trade. Chicago, R. I. & P. Ry. Co. v. State, 83 Okl. 161, 201 P. 260, 264; Dessen v. Department of Labor and Industries of Washington, 190 Wash. 69, 66 P.2d 867, 869.’
“Identical skills or crafts are utilized in different industries without altering the classification of the skill and without merging the industries into one single industry. The service of repairing shoes is a branch of trade distinct from that of manufacturing shoes.
“Accordingly, the Court finds that at the time of plaintiff’s employment as a shoe production worker, that industry was not normally covered by teamster contract in the local metropolitan area. The Court concludes that plaintiff’s years of employment with International Shoe cannot be treated as years of service for which credit can be given toward a pension from the defendant Pension Fund.
On appeal, Brune again contends that he is entitled to credit for his years of service with International Shoe Company.
A careful review of the record and briefs convinces us that the trial court properly denied B rune’s petition for relief. On the basis of the record presented to this Court, it is clear that the trustees did not abuse their discretion in holding that shoe manufacturing was not an industry normally covered by Teamster collective bargaining agreements during the period 1927 through 1960. 2 To the contrary, the record establishes that the Teamsters did not have shoe manufacturing companies under contract during that period. Nor did the trustees abuse their discretion in holding that Brune’s employment during the 1927 through 1960 period had not required “the usual Teamster skills in traditional Teamster industries during the time of such employment.” What evidence there is in the record on this point supports the view that this portion of the coverage language was intended primarily to cover drivers and ware-housemen.
We recognize that the language of the pension plan is so broad and so ambiguous that it invites arbitrariness on the part of the trustees; 3 but, here, the trustees’ action was consistent with the letter of the plan and in accord with the purpose of providing pensions to those for whom contributions have been made over a period of years. Moreover, the trustees’ decision, if consistently fol *861 lowed, will strengthen the pension fund.
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475 F.2d 858, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arthur-brune-v-charles-j-morse-ca8-1973.