Arteaga Silva v. Blanche

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 20, 2026
• Docket: 25-5089
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

MARGHY JULIETH ARTEAGA SILVA; No. 25-5089 R. S. C. A.; L. D. A. S., Agency Nos. A241-749-618 Petitioners, A241-749-619 A241-749-620 v.

TODD BLANCHE, Acting Attorney MEMORANDUM* General,

Respondent.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration Appeals

Submitted May 18, 2026** Pasadena, California

Before: BENNETT, KOH, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges. Petitioners, Marghy Julieth Arteaga Silva and her two minor daughters, are

natives and citizens of Colombia.1 They petition for review of an order of the Board

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel previously granted Respondent’s unopposed motion to submit this case on the briefs and record (Dkt. No. 23). 1 The minor Petitioners sought asylum as derivative beneficiaries. They also filed their own applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing their appeal of an immigration judge’s

(IJ’s) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT.

“We review only the BIA’s opinion, except to the extent that it expressly

adopted portions of the IJ’s decision.” Velasquez-Gaspar v. Barr, 976 F.3d 1062,

1064 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Rayamajhi v. Whitaker, 912 F.3d 1241, 1243 (9th Cir.

2019)). We generally “review the BIA’s denials of asylum, withholding of removal,

and CAT relief for substantial evidence.” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026,

1031 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation modified). “We review legal questions, including

questions of statutory interpretation, de novo.” Lopez v. Garland, 116 F.4th 1032,

1036 (9th Cir. 2024).

We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252 and deny the petition.

1. The agency did not err in denying Petitioners’ applications for asylum and

withholding of removal. When an applicant seeks asylum or withholding of removal

based on membership in a “particular social group” (PSG), the applicant must

demonstrate (1) “the existence of a cognizable [PSG],” (2) “his membership in that

[PSG],” and (3) “a risk of persecution on account of his membership in the specified

[PSG].” Reyes v. Lynch, 842 F.3d 1125, 1132 n.3 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting Matter

of W-G-R-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 208, 223 (B.I.A. 2014)). “[T]o establish that a proposed

under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) based on the same material facts as the adult Petitioner’s application. The agency considered Petitioners’ applications together, so we do the same here.

2 25-5089 social group is cognizable for purposes of withholding of removal, an applicant must

show that the proposed social group is ‘(1) composed of members who share a

common immutable characteristic, (2) defined with particularity, and (3) socially

distinct within the society in question.’” Conde Quevedo v. Barr, 947 F.3d 1238,

1242 (9th Cir. 2020) (quoting Matter of M-E-V-G-, 26 I. & N. Dec. 227, 237 (B.I.A.

2014)). The BIA’s conclusion regarding whether there is evidence of these factors

“is a question of fact that we review for substantial evidence.” See id. at 1242. But

the ultimate question—whether, given those facts, there is a PSG—is a legal

question. See id.

The BIA did not err in concluding that Petitioners failed to establish

membership in a cognizable PSG. The BIA concluded that the first proposed PSG,

women who are vulnerable to criminal groups and gangs, and who are not protected

by the government, lacks particularity and social distinction. Petitioners have failed

to show that the record compels a contrary conclusion. See Rodriguez-Zuniga v.

Garland, 69 F.4th 1012, 1016–17 (9th Cir. 2023). The BIA also determined that the

second proposed PSG, business owners, is not cognizable because owning a small

business is not a shared characteristic that is immutable or fundamental to one’s

identity or conscience. We find no error in that conclusion. See Macedo Templos

v. Wilkinson, 987 F.3d 877, 882–83 (9th Cir. 2021) (“[B]eing a wealthy business

3 25-5089 owner is not an immutable characteristic because it is not fundamental to an

individual’s identity.”).

2. The agency also did not err in denying Petitioners’ application for relief under

CAT. To establish entitlement to CAT protection, an applicant must show, among

other things, that she would face torture “inflicted by, or at the instigation of, or with

the consent or acquiescence of, a public official acting in an official capacity or other

person acting in an official capacity” in the proposed country of removal. Plancarte

Sauceda v. Garland, 23 F.4th 824, 834 (9th Cir. 2022) (quoting 8 C.F.R.

§ 1208.18(a)(1)). The BIA upheld the IJ’s finding that Petitioners failed to

demonstrate that, if returned to Colombia, they would more likely than not be

tortured with government acquiescence. We review the agency’s determination that

a petitioner did not show a likelihood of torture with government acquiescence for

substantial evidence. See Salguero Sosa v. Garland, 55 F.4th 1213, 1222 (9th Cir.

2022).

Substantial evidence supports the agency’s determination that Petitioners

failed to show a likelihood of their torture with government acquiescence. The

agency found that there was insufficient information in the record to conclude either

that criminal gang members would have carried out the death threats lodged against

Petitioners, or that criminal gang members were acting with the consent,

acquiescence, or willful blindness of a public official or other person acting in an

4 25-5089 official capacity. The evidence did not compel a contrary conclusion. Though adult

Petitioner testified that she observed one police officer interact in a friendly manner

with a criminal gang member, that interaction does not compel the conclusion that a

government official is likely to consent or acquiesce in Petitioners’ torture upon their

return to Colombia. See Andrade-Garcia v. Lynch, 828 F.3d 829, 836 (9th Cir. 2016)

(“[G]eneral ineffectiveness on the government’s part to investigate and prevent

crime [does] not suffice to show acquiescence.”). And though country condition

reports show some credible reports that Colombian government officials have

employed torture and related abuses, the evidence in the record does not compel the

conclusion that Petitioners would be subject to torture or any similar abuse.

3. Petitioners argue that, under Loper Bright Enterprises2, we must repudiate the

BIA’s precedents defining the statutory term “particular social group.” In Reyes, we

deferred under Chevron to those BIA precedents. 842 F.3d at 1135. Petitioners’

argument fails because “the Supreme Court has instructed that Loper Bright

Enterprises does not ‘call into question prior cases that relied on the Chevron

framework.’” Lopez, 116 F.4th at 1045 (quoting Loper Bright Enters., 603 U.S. at

412). We thus “lack the authority to overrule” Reyes, an “existing circuit precedent”

which “binds us, and forecloses [Petitioners’] argument.” See id.

2 Loper Bright Enters. v. Raimondo, 603 U.S. 369, 412 (2024) (overruling Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984)).

5 25-5089 The temporary stay of removal remains in place until the mandate issues. The

motion for a stay of removal (Dkt. No. 2) is otherwise denied.

PETITIONS DENIED.

6 25-5089