Arsenault v. Trust

263 A.D.2d 754, 692 N.Y.S.2d 847, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8009
CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York
DecidedJuly 15, 1999
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 263 A.D.2d 754 (Arsenault v. Trust) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arsenault v. Trust, 263 A.D.2d 754, 692 N.Y.S.2d 847, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8009 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1999).

Opinion

Crew III, J.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Dier, J.), entered October 22, 1998 in Warren County, which denied defendant Helen Regan’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims against her.

Plaintiff William Arsenault (hereinafter Arsenault) and his spouse, derivatively, commenced this action seeking to recover for injuries Arsenault allegedly sustained on September 14, 1994 when he fell on property located in the Town of Lake Luzerne, Warren County. At the time of the accident, Arsenault was helping his brother, defendant Wayne Arsenault, move out of a cabin that Wayne Arsenault had rented from defendant Helen Regan (hereinafter defendant). As Arsenault was walking up a set of steps leading up from the lake, a step allegedly gave way, causing him to fall and sustain certain injuries. Following joinder of issue and discovery, defendant moved for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and all cross claims asserted against her. Supreme Court denied the motion, prompting this appeal by defendant.

We affirm. Defendant’s primary argument on appeal is that she neither owned nor possessed the property in question at the time of Arsenault’s accident and, hence, she cannot be liable for the injuries that he sustained. In this regard, it is well settled that “liability for a dangerous condition on property is ‘generally predicated upon ownership, occupancy, control or special use of the property’” (Warren v Wilmorite, Inc., 211 AD2d 904, 905, quoting Turrisi v Ponderosa, Inc., 179 AD2d 956, 957; see, Kiselis v Speculator Chamber of Commerce, 234 AD2d 677, 678). The presence of one or more of the foregoing elements is sufficient to givé rise to a duty to exercise reasonable care (see, Turrisi v Ponderosa, Inc., supra, at 957).

[755]*755Assuming, without deciding, that defendant did not own the property on the date in question, we nonetheless are persuaded that defendant failed to demonstrate, as a matter of law, that she neither occupied nor controlled the subject premises. Defendant testified at her examination before trial that she entered into a rental agreement with Wayne Arsenault and, pursuant to a separation agreement executed by defendant and her then spouse, was to receive all rental income for the property.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
263 A.D.2d 754, 692 N.Y.S.2d 847, 1999 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 8009, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arsenault-v-trust-nyappdiv-1999.