1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 RAFAEL ARROYO, No. 2:21-cv-00266-TLN-AC
12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER v. 14 LL FOLSOM, L.P., a Delaware Limited 15 Partnership; and LL GP, LLC., a Delaware Limited Liability Company, 16 Defendants. 17 18 This matter is before the Court on Defendants LL Folsom, L.P. and LL GP, LLC’s 19 (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff Rafael Arroyo 20 (“Plaintiff”) opposed the motion. (ECF No. 9.) Defendants replied. (ECF No. 11.) For the 21 reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff is a paraplegic and uses a wheelchair for mobility due to his condition. (ECF No. 3 1 at 1.) He has difficulty standing, reaching objects, maneuvering around objects, and 4 transferring himself from his wheelchair to other equipment. (Id. at 4.) Defendants own and 5 operate the Larkspur Landing Folsom (the “Hotel”) and the associated website at 6 https://www.larkspurhotels.com/folsom. (Id.) 7 On October 9, 2020, Plaintiff visited the Hotel’s reservation website to book an accessible 8 room for his upcoming trip in April 2021. (Id.) Plaintiff found the website to contain insufficient 9 information regarding certain accessibility features and thus was not able to independently assess 10 whether a room at the hotel would be accessible. (Id.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges the 11 following information is lacking: (1) whether the doorways provide at least 32 inches of 12 clearance; (2) whether there is at least 30 inches width on the side of the bed; (3) whether the 13 desk/table provides knee and toe clearance that is at least 27 inches high, 30 inches wide, and runs 14 at least 17 inches deep; (4) whether the toilet seat height is between 17–19 inches and whether it 15 has the two required grab bars to facilitate transfer; (5) whether the restroom sink clearance 16 reflects the same measurements of the desk/table, whether the plumbing is insulated to protect 17 against burning contact, and whether the lowest reflective edge of the mirror measurement is no 18 more than 40 inches high; and (6) for the type of shower — what type of shower it is (transfer, 19 standard roll-in, or alternate roll-in), whether it has an in-shower seat, whether there are grab bars 20 mounted on the walls, whether there is a detachable hand-held shower wand, and whether the 21 wall mounted accessories and equipment are all within 48 inches in height. (Id. at 5–7.) 22 On February 11, 2021, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants alleging violations of 23 the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”). (Id. 24 at 8–10.) On March 8, 2021, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 8.) 25 II. STANDARD OF LAW 26 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. 28 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain 1 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 2 Civ. P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). Under notice pleading in 3 federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 4 grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal 5 citation and quotations omitted). 6 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 7 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every 8 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 9 Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 10 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 11 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted). 12 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 13 factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 14 While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 15 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 16 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 17 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 18 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 19 statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, “[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences 20 are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim. Adams v. Johnson, 355 21 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the 22 plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws 23 in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State 24 Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 25 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 26 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim 27 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 28 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more 2 than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility 3 inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 4 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or 5 her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly 6 dismissed. Id. at 680 (internal quotations omitted). 7 In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider only the complaint, any exhibits 8 thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 9 See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. 10 Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998); see also Daniels- 11 Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9 10 11 RAFAEL ARROYO, No. 2:21-cv-00266-TLN-AC
12 Plaintiff, 13 ORDER v. 14 LL FOLSOM, L.P., a Delaware Limited 15 Partnership; and LL GP, LLC., a Delaware Limited Liability Company, 16 Defendants. 17 18 This matter is before the Court on Defendants LL Folsom, L.P. and LL GP, LLC’s 19 (collectively, “Defendants”) Motion to Dismiss. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff Rafael Arroyo 20 (“Plaintiff”) opposed the motion. (ECF No. 9.) Defendants replied. (ECF No. 11.) For the 21 reasons set forth below, Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. 22 /// 23 /// 24 /// 25 /// 26 /// 27 /// 28 /// 1 I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 2 Plaintiff is a paraplegic and uses a wheelchair for mobility due to his condition. (ECF No. 3 1 at 1.) He has difficulty standing, reaching objects, maneuvering around objects, and 4 transferring himself from his wheelchair to other equipment. (Id. at 4.) Defendants own and 5 operate the Larkspur Landing Folsom (the “Hotel”) and the associated website at 6 https://www.larkspurhotels.com/folsom. (Id.) 7 On October 9, 2020, Plaintiff visited the Hotel’s reservation website to book an accessible 8 room for his upcoming trip in April 2021. (Id.) Plaintiff found the website to contain insufficient 9 information regarding certain accessibility features and thus was not able to independently assess 10 whether a room at the hotel would be accessible. (Id.) More specifically, Plaintiff alleges the 11 following information is lacking: (1) whether the doorways provide at least 32 inches of 12 clearance; (2) whether there is at least 30 inches width on the side of the bed; (3) whether the 13 desk/table provides knee and toe clearance that is at least 27 inches high, 30 inches wide, and runs 14 at least 17 inches deep; (4) whether the toilet seat height is between 17–19 inches and whether it 15 has the two required grab bars to facilitate transfer; (5) whether the restroom sink clearance 16 reflects the same measurements of the desk/table, whether the plumbing is insulated to protect 17 against burning contact, and whether the lowest reflective edge of the mirror measurement is no 18 more than 40 inches high; and (6) for the type of shower — what type of shower it is (transfer, 19 standard roll-in, or alternate roll-in), whether it has an in-shower seat, whether there are grab bars 20 mounted on the walls, whether there is a detachable hand-held shower wand, and whether the 21 wall mounted accessories and equipment are all within 48 inches in height. (Id. at 5–7.) 22 On February 11, 2021, Plaintiff filed this action against Defendants alleging violations of 23 the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and the Unruh Civil Rights Act (“Unruh Act”). (Id. 24 at 8–10.) On March 8, 2021, Defendants filed the instant motion to dismiss. (ECF No. 8.) 25 II. STANDARD OF LAW 26 A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted under 27 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(b)(6) tests the legal sufficiency of a complaint. 28 Navarro v. Block, 250 F.3d 729, 732 (9th Cir. 2001). Rule 8(a) requires that a pleading contain 1 “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. 2 Civ. P. 8(a); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009). Under notice pleading in 3 federal court, the complaint must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the 4 grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atlantic v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal 5 citation and quotations omitted). 6 On a motion to dismiss, the factual allegations of the complaint must be accepted as true. 7 Cruz v. Beto, 405 U.S. 319, 322 (1972). A court must give the plaintiff the benefit of every 8 reasonable inference to be drawn from the “well-pleaded” allegations of the complaint. Retail 9 Clerks Int’l Ass’n v. Schermerhorn, 373 U.S. 746, 753 n.6 (1963). A plaintiff need not allege 10 “‘specific facts’ beyond those necessary to state his claim and the grounds showing entitlement to 11 relief.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570 (internal citation omitted). 12 Nevertheless, a court “need not assume the truth of legal conclusions cast in the form of 13 factual allegations.” U.S. ex rel. Chunie v. Ringrose, 788 F.2d 638, 643 n.2 (9th Cir. 1986). 14 While Rule 8(a) does not require detailed factual allegations, “it demands more than an 15 unadorned, the defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. A 16 pleading is insufficient if it offers mere “labels and conclusions” or “a formulaic recitation of the 17 elements of a cause of action.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 18 (“Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 19 statements, do not suffice.”). Thus, “[c]onclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences 20 are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss” for failure to state a claim. Adams v. Johnson, 355 21 F.3d 1179, 1183 (9th Cir. 2004) (citations omitted). Moreover, it is inappropriate to assume the 22 plaintiff “can prove facts that it has not alleged or that the defendants have violated the . . . laws 23 in ways that have not been alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal., Inc. v. Cal. State 24 Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). 25 Ultimately, a court may not dismiss a complaint in which the plaintiff has alleged “enough 26 facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim 27 has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the 28 reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 1 680. While the plausibility requirement is not akin to a probability requirement, it demands more 2 than “a sheer possibility that a defendant has acted unlawfully.” Id. at 678. This plausibility 3 inquiry is “a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial 4 experience and common sense.” Id. at 679. Thus, only where a plaintiff fails to “nudge [his or 5 her] claims . . . across the line from conceivable to plausible[,]” is the complaint properly 6 dismissed. Id. at 680 (internal quotations omitted). 7 In ruling on a motion to dismiss, a court may consider only the complaint, any exhibits 8 thereto, and matters which may be judicially noticed pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201. 9 See Mir v. Little Co. of Mary Hosp., 844 F.2d 646, 649 (9th Cir. 1988); Isuzu Motors Ltd. v. 10 Consumers Union of U.S., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 1035, 1042 (C.D. Cal. 1998); see also Daniels- 11 Hall v. Nat’l Educ. Ass’n, 629 F.3d 992, 998 (9th Cir. 2010) (the court need not accept as true 12 allegations that contradict matters properly subject to judicial notice). 13 If a complaint fails to state a plausible claim, “‘[a] district court should grant leave to 14 amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading 15 could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts.’” Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 16 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (quoting Doe v. United States, 58 F.3d 494, 497 (9th Cir. 1995)); 17 see also Gardner v. Martino, 563 F.3d 981, 990 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding no abuse of discretion in 18 denying leave to amend when amendment would be futile). Although a district court should 19 freely give leave to amend when justice so requires under Rule 15(a)(2), “the court’s discretion to 20 deny such leave is ‘particularly broad’ where the plaintiff has previously amended its 21 complaint[.]” Ecological Rights Found. v. Pac. Gas & Elec. Co., 713 F.3d 502, 520 (9th Cir. 22 2013) (quoting Miller v. Yokohama Tire Corp., 358 F.3d 616, 622 (9th Cir. 2004)). 23 III. ANALYSIS 24 Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint in its entirety because the website at 25 issue complies with the ADA’s Reservations Rule.1 (ECF No. 8-1 at 11.) 26 1 Defendants request that the Court take judicial notice of seven exhibits. (See RJN, Exs. 1- 27 7.) Plaintiff only opposes judicial notice of Exhibit 3, a list of cases filed by Plaintiff in other courts. Plaintiff argues that his prior litigation history is irrelevant to the case at hand. (ECF No. 28 9 at 1.) Plaintiff does not contest the remaining exhibits. (Id.) The Court DENIES Defendants’ 1 A. Regulatory Framework 2 Title III of the ADA provides “[n]o individual shall be discriminated against on the basis 3 of disability in the full and equal enjoyment of the goods, services, facilities, privileges, 4 advantages, or accommodations of any place of public accommodation by any person who owns, 5 leases (or leases to), or operates a place of public accommodation.” 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a). 6 Moreover, individuals with disabilities must be “afforded reasonable modifications” by public 7 accommodations such as hotels to the “policies, practices, and procedures, when such 8 modifications are necessary to afford such goods, services, facilities, privileges, advantages, or 9 accommodations to individuals with disabilities.” Id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii). The ADA delegates 10 rulemaking authority to the Department of Justice (“DOJ”), which must “issue regulations . . . to 11 carry out the provisions of” Title III relating to hotel accommodations. Id. § 12186(b). 12 This case concerns the “Reservations Rule,” which requires hotels to “[i]dentify and 13 describe accessible features in the hotels and guest rooms offered through its reservations service 14 in enough detail to reasonably permit individuals with disabilities to assess independently 15 whether a given hotel or guest room meets his or her accessibility needs.” 28 C.F.R. § 16 36.302(e)(1)(ii). In 2010, the DOJ provided further guidance about how hotels may comply with 17 the regulations. See 28 C.F.R. Pt. 36, App. A. The DOJ guidance indicates that older hotels built 18 before the ADA Standards came into effect should specify features that do not comply with the 19 1991 Standards. Id. As to newer hotels built in compliance with the 1991 Standards, “it may be 20 sufficient to specify that the hotel is accessible and, for each accessible room, to describe the 21 general type of room (e.g., deluxe executive suite), the size and number of beds (e.g., two queen 22 beds), the type of accessible bathing facility (e.g., roll-in shower), and communications features 23 available in the room (e.g., alarms and visual notification devices).” Id. The DOJ guidance also 24 request for judicial notice with regards to Exhibit 3 to the extent Defendants cite Plaintiff’s prior 25 litigation history as a basis for scrutinizing the validity of Plaintiff’s current claim. See D’Lil v. Best W. Encina Lodge & Suites, 538 F.3d 1031, 1040 (9th Cir. 2008). The Court GRANTS 26 Defendants’ request for judicial notice with respect to the remaining exhibits. These exhibits 27 consist of documents that are within the public record and a website that is publicly accessible and referenced in the Complaint. See Reyn’s Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 28 746 n.6 (9th Cir. 2006); Perkins v. LinkedIn Corp., 53 F. Supp. 3d 1190, 1204 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 1 states that in each case, hotels should make trained staff available to answer questions about 2 accessibility features and provide guests with more detailed information. Id. The Ninth Circuit 3 recently held that courts should afford the DOJ guidance “controlling weight.” Love v. Marriott 4 Hotel Servs., Inc., 40 F.4th 1043, 1048 (9th Cir. 2022). 5 B. Defendants’ Website 6 Plaintiff alleges Defendants’ website did not have sufficient detail regarding essential 7 accessibility features. (ECF No. 1.) In moving to dismiss, Defendants argue the website 8 complies with the Reservations Rule. (ECF No. 8 at 9.) 9 The Ninth Circuit’s recent decision in Love supports Defendants’ argument and likely 10 forecloses Plaintiff’s claims. In Love, the Ninth Circuit affirmed dismissal of a plaintiff’s ADA 11 claim in a substantially similar case. See 40 F.4th 1043. The plaintiff in Love used a wheelchair 12 and alleged “he needed to know whether there was at least 30 inches of maneuvering space beside 13 the bed, whether the sink and mirror had enough clearance to be used from a wheelchair, whether 14 there were grab bars mounted near the toilet and shower, whether the shower had a seat and 15 detachable hand-held wand, and whether the heights of the toilet and bathing facilities were 16 appropriate.” Id. at 1045. As in the instant case, the plaintiff alleged the hotel’s failure to post 17 this information on its website violated the Reservations Rule. Id. The district court granted the 18 hotel’s motion to dismiss, finding that the website complied with the Reservations Rule. Id. 19 In affirming dismissal, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the hotel’s website complied with 20 the Reservations Rule because it specified the hotel was “accessible” (which the court deemed a 21 term of art that signaled compliance with the ADA and its regulations) and listed accessible 22 features in certain guest rooms. Id. at 1048–1049. The website also described the accessible 23 guest rooms with information about (1) “the general type of room”; (2) “the size and number of 24 beds”; (3) “the type of accessible bathing facility”; and (4) “communications features available in 25 the room” in accordance with the DOJ guidance. Id. The Love court found the hotel’s website 26 satisfied the Reservations Rule without needing the level of detail requested by the plaintiff. 27 In the instant case, Defendants’ website describes the Hotel itself and certain individual 28 suites as “accessible” and then lists multiple features of the rooms in detail. (ECF No. 8-2 at 5– 1 6.) For instance, the website states that in accessible suites there are grab bars in 2 bathtubs/showers, accessible vanities, lowered towel racks, bathtubs/showers with stool, hand- 3 held shower heads, and in the accessible executive suite, a roll-in shower with stool. (Id. at 6.) 4 The website also indicates the Hotel and rooms offer a variety of accessibility features that seem 5 to cover every issue Plaintiff raises in his Complaint. (Id. at 5.) For example, the website 6 indicates the Hotel has the following mobility features: “doorways wide enough for 7 maneuvering,” toilet heights that “meet ADA requirements,” “grab bars available in relation to 8 the toilet,” bathroom sinks “lowered with the ability to fit a wheelchair underneath,” bathroom 9 sinks “insulated to prevent burns,” “sink taps [that] are reachable,” “a reachable hand held shower 10 head,” and “space for a wheelchair to move easily in the guest room and washroom.” (Id.) The 11 website also provides a phone number and email address that potential guests can use to contact 12 the Hotel for more information about the accessible features offered at the Hotel or other 13 accessibility concerns. (Id.) 14 The Court concludes Defendants’ website complies with the Reservations Rule as to those 15 issues Plaintiff raises in the Complaint. Defendants are not required to provide exact 16 measurements to show compliance with the ADA. Defendants’ use of the word “accessible” 17 signifies compliance with the ADA and its regulations, Defendants describe various accessibility 18 features in the hotel and rooms, and Defendants provide contact information for further questions 19 or concerns about accessibility. See Love, 40 F.4th at 1049. 20 As such, the Court GRANTS Defendants’ motion to dismiss the ADA claim. In addition, 21 Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim is predicated on his ADA claim. (ECF No. 1 at 10.) Because the 22 Court has dismissed the ADA claim, Plaintiff’s derivative Unruh Act claim also fails. Moreover, 23 to the extent Plaintiff cannot plead a viable ADA claim, the Court declines to exercise 24 supplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s Unruh Act claim. Lastly, while the Court has serious 25 doubts as to Plaintiff’s ability to plead a viable ADA claim, the Court will give Plaintiff an 26 opportunity to amend his Complaint. 27 /// 28 /// 1 IV. CONCLUSION 2 For the foregoing reasons, the Court hereby GRANTS Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss 3 | with leave to amend. (ECF No. 8.) Plaintiff may file an amended complaint not later than thirty 4 | (30) days of the electronic filing date of this Order. Defendants shall file a responsive pleading 5 | not later than twenty-one (21) days thereafter. If Plaintiff does not file an amended complaint, the 6 | Court will dismiss this action and close the case. 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. f /) 8 | DATED: September 21, 2022 “ ! : / } Vu 9 Troy L. Nuhley> 10 United States District Judge 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28