Arroyo Escondido, LLC v. Balmoral Farm, Inc.

• Court: District Court, C.D. California
• Decided: November 19, 2019
• Docket: 2:19-cv-08464
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

O 1

2 3 4 5 6 7 8 United States District Court 9 Central District of California 10 11 ARROYO ESCONDIDO, LLC, Case No: 2:19-cv-08464-ODW (DFMx)

12 Plaintiff,

13 v. 14 BALMORAL FARMS, INC. et al., ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 15 REQUEST FOR A TEMPORARY Defendants. RESTRAINING ORDER [16] 16 17 I. INTRODUCTION 18 On October 1, 2019, Plaintiff Arroyo Escondido, LLC filed suit against 19 Defendants Balmoral Farms, Inc. (“Balmoral”), Traci Brooks, and Carleton Brooks. 20 (See Compl., ECF No. 1.) Presently before the Court is Plaintiff’s Request for a 21 Temporary Restraining Order (“TRO”) to take measurements of the sport horse 22 (“New Moon”). (TRO 1, ECF No. 16.) For the reasons discussed below, the Court 23 DENIES the TRO. 24 II. BACKGROUND 25 On or about April 15, 2018, Plaintiff through its managing member Dr. Christi 26 Payan (“Payan”) purchased New Moon from Defendant Balmoral for $190,000 for 27 high-level equestrian competition. (Compl. ¶ 9.) Payan involved Peter Pletcher 28 (“Pletcher”) his trainer in negotiating the terms of the agreement with Defendants. 1 (Compl. ¶ 10.) Pletcher informed Defendants that Plaintiff sought all medical records, 2 competition records, and other information relevant to New Moon’s quality and 3 stability for its intended purpose. (Compl. ¶ 10.) Defendants failed to disclose all the 4 relevant information but represented to Plaintiff that New Moon was fit and suitable 5 for its intended purpose as a competitive sport horse. (Compl. ¶¶ 10, 11.) 6 Plaintiff alleges that once Payan took possession of New Moon, Payan entered 7 New Moon in jumping competitions but New Moon refused jumps and bucked the 8 rider after going over jumps. (Compl. ¶ 13.) Plaintiff alleges that such behavior is 9 highly unusual for sport horses and New Moon had a history of refusing jumps and 10 bucking prior to the sale. (Compl. ¶¶ 13, 14.) Plaintiff files suit on the grounds that 11 Defendants sold New Moon without disclosing this defect and falsely advertising that 12 New Moon was younger and smaller. (Compl. ¶ 14.) 13 Presently, Plaintiff files a TRO to inspect and examine New Moon and an order 14 restraining Defendants from harming or relocating the horse in any way pending trial. 15 (TRO 4.) Plaintiff argues that New Moon could die of starvation causing it to lose 16 key evidence of horse measurements to substantiate its claim. (TRO 8.) 17 III. LEGAL STANDARD 18 “An application for a temporary restraining order involves the invocation of a 19 drastic remedy which a court of equity ordinarily does not grant, unless a very strong 20 showing is made of a necessity and desirability of such action.” Youngstown Sheet & 21 Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 103 F. Supp. 978, 980 (D.D.C. 1952). The standard for issuing a 22 temporary restraining order is “substantially identical” to that for issuing a preliminary 23 injunction. Stuhlbarg Int’l Sales Co. v. John D. Brush & Co., 240 F.3d 832, 839 n.7 24 (9th Cir. 2001). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65, a court may grant 25 preliminary injunctive relief to prevent “immediate and irreparable injury.” Fed. R. 26 Civ. P. 65(b). To obtain this relief, a plaintiff must make a clear showing that (1) “he 27 is likely to succeed on the merits”; (2) “he is likely to suffer irreparable harm in the 28 absence of preliminary relief”; (3) “the balance of equities tips in his favor”; and 1 (4) “an injunction is in the public interest.” Am. Trucking Ass’ns, Inc. v. City of Los 2 Angeles, 559 F.3d 1046, 1052 (9th Cir. 2009) (quoting Winter v. Natural Res. Def. 3 Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008)). The “clear showing” requirement is particularly 4 strong when a party seeks a TRO. See Mazurek v. Armstrong, 520 U.S. 968, 972 5 (1997). 6 IV. DISCUSSION 7 Even where there is a strong likelihood of success on the merits, plaintiffs must 8 demonstrate that irreparable injury is likely in the absence of an injunction. Winters, 9 555 U.S. at 22. Here, Plaintiff alleges seven claims in the Complaint all premised on 10 the assertion that Defendants engaged in fraud by misrepresenting New Moon’s 11 abilities and size. (TRO 6.) However, Plaintiff fails to cite any case law indicating its 12 likelihood of success on the merits and thus, fails to meet its burden. However, even 13 if Plaintiff had met its burden and could demonstrate a likelihood of success on the 14 merits, the Court does not find immediate or irreparable harm. 15 In the context of evaluating whether to grant a temporary restraining order, 16 harm is irreparable where it extends beyond pecuniary injury. See Regents of Univ. of 17 Cal. v. Am. Broad. Cos., Inc., 747 F.2d 511, 519 (9th Cir. 1984) (“[A] party is not 18 entitled to a preliminary injunction unless he or she can demonstrate more than simply 19 damages of a pecuniary nature.”); but see Herb Reed Enters., LLC v. Florida Entm’t 20 Mgmt., Inc., 736 F.3d 1239, 1250 (9th Cir. 2013) (“Evidence of loss of control over 21 business reputation and damage to goodwill could constitute irreparable harm.”). 22 “[P]laintiff must demonstrate potential harm which cannot be redressed by a legal or 23 an equitable remedy following a trial. The [temporary restraining order] must be the 24 only way of protecting the plaintiff from the harm.” Campbell Soup Co. v. ConAgra, 25 Inc., 977 F.2d 86, 91 (3d Cir. 1992). 26 Here, Plaintiff requests the Court grant its request for a temporary restraining 27 order on two grounds; First, Plaintiff asserts that it needs to immediately inspect and 28 measure the horse to prevent destruction of valuable measurements in the event that 1 New Moon’s musculoskeletal system is impacted or in the event New Moon dies. 2 (TRO 7.) Second, Plaintiff claims that it cannot renew its mortality insurance on New 3 Moon without current measurements and if New Moon were to die before it renewed 4 its insurance, Plaintiff would suffer a loss. (Decl. of Dr. Christi Payan (“Payan 5 Decl.”) ¶ 11, ECF No. 16-3.) 6 Payan declares that Balmoral has “threatened to mistreat this horse by starving 7 the horse unless Plaintiff relents in this case by taking the horse back from Balmoral.” 8 (Payan Decl. ¶ 11.) However, the Court finds suspect the instant request as 9 Defendants have been in possession of New Moon since March of 2019, Plaintiff lost 10 coverage of its life insurance on New Moon in August 2019, and Plaintiff filed this 11 case in October 2019. (TRO 2–3; Payan Decl. Ex. B (“Life Insurance Coverage”), 12 ECF No. 16-5.) Since eight months have passed since Defendants repossessed New 13 Moon and no harm has occurred to it, and given that Plaintiff fails to articulate any 14 specific or current reason why New Moon will become sick or die, the Court finds no 15 immediate or irreparable harm. Furthermore, from the email exchange between 16 counsel for Plaintiff and Defendants it is apparent that there is no evidence that New 17 Moon will come to immediate harm apart from normal risk of animal sickness of 18 mortality. (Declaration of David Yoshida Ex. C (“Email Chain”), ECF No. 16-9.)1 19 On balance, the Court finds the Winter factors do not weigh in favor of granting 20 a temporary restraining order. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff’s request for 21 a TRO. 22 Furthermore, from the email exchange, it is apparent that Plaintiff’s request is 23 the proper subject of a discovery motion rather than a temporary restraining order. 24

25 1 Defendants’ Counsel “You could have had Dr. Smith available or certainly change his schedule for today if you were really concerned about the welfare of the pony. But that’s not the case. So it’s 26 only on your time line.” (Email Chain 2.)

27 Plaintiff’s Counsel, “If the pony dies, which you know it can, we lose irreplaceable evidence . . ..” 28 (Email Chain 3.) Defendants’ Counsel “The only evidence you lose, assuming Neon was to die, which is not probable . . ..” (Email Chain 3.) 1 || Parties should file a properly noticed discovery motion to resolve their scheduling 2 || conflicts 3 Vv. CONCLUSION 4 For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Request for a 5 || Temporary Restraining Order. (ECF No. 16.) 6 7 IT IS SO ORDERED. 8 November 19, 2019 my 9 oe ay 10 allel

11 OTIS D. IGHT, Il b UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28