Arrow Ball LLC v. Alex Peled

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: April 16, 2026
• Docket: A-3260-23
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3260-23

ARROW BALL LLC,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

ALEX PELED and NOAH PELED,

Defendants-Appellants,

and

PLAYA DEL SOL 380 CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION, INC.

Plaintiff/Intervenor- Respondent. ________________________

Submitted December 16, 2025 – Decided April 16, 2026

Before Judges Gooden Brown and Rose.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Camden County, Docket No. LT-000361-24. Alex Peled and Noah Peled, self-represented appellants.

Dimitri Smirnov (Dimitri Smirnov, PC), attorney for respondent Arrow Ball LLC.

Honig & Greenberg, LLC, attorneys for respondent Playa Del Sol 380 Condominium Association, Inc. (Adam D. Greenberg, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

In this landlord-tenant action, self-represented defendants, Alex and Noah

Peled, the tenants, appeal from a May 16, 2024 judgment of possession (JOP)

entered following a bench trial in favor of plaintiff Arrow Ball LLC, the

landlord. After defendants' applications to stay the warrant of removal were

denied by the trial court and this court, defendants were removed from the leased

premises. Because defendants fail to demonstrate the eviction carries potentially

adverse residual legal consequences, we dismiss the appeal as moot.

We summarize the salient facts. On November 22, 2019, Alex 1 entered

into a lease agreement with Yakov Goncharov for the subject rental unit located

1 We use first names to avoid confusion caused by the common surname and intend no disrespect.

A-3260-23 2 in Cherry Hill.2 In August 2022, Goncharov sold the unit to plaintiff. According

to plaintiff, defendants stopped paying rent at that time.

On October 31, 2022, Alex wrote a letter to plaintiff identifying the unit's

"numerous issues including bad insulation, faulty plumbing, black mold [,] and

[the] presence of asbestos." The letter indicated all the issues had been

"addressed to" Goncharov. The letter accused Goncharov of

"[m]isrepresentation and blatant [c]onsumer [f]raud," resulting in "a lump sum

. . . credit" under the lease agreement. The letter further alleged plaintiff

"intentionally or negligently[] continuously exposed . . . [defendants] to severe

injuries (black mold, asbestos, carbon monoxide, constant harassment [,] and

physical and psychological harm)."

On May 25, 2023, plaintiff sent defendants 3 a "Notice to Pay Rent or

Quit," alleging rent had not been paid from August 2022 to May 2023. The

notice required defendants to pay the delinquent rent totaling $10,175 or "move

out[] and deliver possession" of the premises to plaintiff. The notice specified

2 The lease lists the leaseholder as "Alex Armoa Teixeira," an apparent alias of Alex. In their merits brief, defendants identify themselves as a married couple. Although the lease does not list Noah as a resident of the property, defendants' brief states "they [both] moved in on or about November 22, 2019." 3 The letter was addressed to Alex "and all [o]ccupants."

A-3260-23 3 failure to comply would result in forfeiture of the lease and commencement of

eviction proceedings. On the same date, plaintiff sent defendants a lease

termination letter, notifying them that effective July 1, 2023, the lease agreement

would be terminated based on "fail[ure] to pay the rent as required,"

"[c]omplaints from neighbors," and "[d]amage to the property."

After defendants failed to tender rent or surrender the premises, on August

17, 2023, plaintiff filed a complaint against Alex4 under Docket No. 5218-23 for

JOP, alleging non-payment of rent. Because defendants failed to provide

transcripts of the pertinent proceedings, see R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(I), it is unclear in the

appellate record exactly what transpired procedurally after the complaint was

filed.

However, it appears defendants requested a habitability hearing that was

ultimately conducted on December 7, 2023, and resulted in the trial judge

granting defendants an abatement and issuing an order to turn over escrow funds

divided between the parties as follows: $2,590 to plaintiff and $10,360 to

defendants. Neither plaintiff nor plaintiff's counsel appeared for the habitability

hearing during which defendants testified regarding the condition of the

4 A subsequent complaint named both Alex and Noah as defendants.

A-3260-23 4 property and proved their habitability claims to the judge's satisfaction. Plaintiff

had requested an adjournment of the habitability hearing, but the request was

denied by the judge.5

Plaintiff subsequently filed another complaint against defendants under

Docket No. 0361-24 seeking possession of the property based on non-renewal

of the lease and non-payment of rent. An amended complaint contained a claim

for damages to the property. See N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1(c) (permitting the

removal of a tenant who "has willfully or by reason of gross negligence caused

or allowed destruction, damage[,] or injury to the premises"). After dismissing

and reinstating Docket No. 0361-24, and conducting a hearing to address the

status of the repairs, which defendants did not attend, the judge scheduled a trial

for May 16, 2024. 6 At the beginning of the trial, Playa Del Sol 380

Condominium Association, Inc. (Playa Del Sol), the property's homeowner's

5 No transcript of the December 7, 2023 habitability hearing was provided in the record. We glean the facts concerning the content of the hearing from the judge's references in a subsequent proceeding and order. 6 Upon receiving notice of the trial, defendants filed a plethora of motions claiming conspiracy, discrimination, mail fraud, and other issues . All of defendants' motions were ultimately denied by the judge.

A-3260-23 5 association, moved to intervene pursuant to Rule 4:33-2 as an interested party.

The judge granted the motion over defendants' objection.

During the trial, plaintiff and Playa Del Sol presented evidence that

defendants had willfully damaged the property by causing leaks that flooded

lower units of the six-story apartment building. Defendants countered with

various conspiracy claims.

William Arcari, president of Playa Del Sol and a twenty-five-year veteran

of the Cherry Hill Fire Department, testified for plaintiff. According to Arcari,

he was called to defendants' unit in April 2024 to respond to a water leak in the

unit just below defendants' unit. Arcari was unable to enter defendants'

bathroom, where the leak supposedly originated, but said he "did[ not] see

anything out of the ordinary" and that, to his knowledge, defendants' unit had

no leaks or plumbing concerns of which he was aware. However, Arcari

believed defendants somehow "caused th[e] damage" to the unit below. Arcari

also testified that in 2022, the previous owner of the property had paid for

significant renovations to defendants' unit, and "all the issues were handled at

that time."

Wesley Bingham, the maintenance supervisor for Playa Del Sol, testified

for intervenor. Bingham testified he entered defendants' unit and the unit below

A-3260-23 6 on April 18, 2024, and witnessed the "water supply line leaking from

[defendants' toilet valve]." According to Bingham, the leak in defendants' unit

"was a little bit more than a drip, but it wasn't pouring out." Bingham did not

believe the damage to the unit below was caused by defendants' toilet valve.

Bingham returned to defendants' unit a few days later and tightened all the water

valves.

Gabriel Dimedio, Playa Del Sol's property manager, testified he visited

defendants' unit once to assess the mold defendants complained about. He

confirmed that in 2022, a licensed contractor remediated the mold by replacing

the wall "where the supposed problem was."

The judge granted JOP in favor of plaintiff. The JOP, entered on May 16,

2024, stated "[t]he [c]ourt . . . conducted a trial on the issues raised in the

complaint and defenses of [h]abitability raised by the tenant; and the [c]ourt

. . . found that . . . defendant has not established the defense of[ h]abitability."

The judgment further provided "[t]he [l]andlord . . . produced and the [c]ourt

. . . reviewed a copy of the lease and any required registration statement and

found that the [l]andlord has proven a cause of action for possession [as] . . .

[t]enant has willfully caused damage to the property."

A-3260-23 7 In an oral opinion of the same date, the judge found "defendant ha[d]

wil[l]fully destroyed[,] damage[d,] or injured the premises." The judge also

found Alex was not credible and determined there were "absolutely no

habitability issues" with the unit. The judge explained Alex "was not . . . straight

with the [c]ourt" and "took advantage of the situation where there was no

plaintiff here during th[e first] habitability hearing." The judge believed Alex

"[d]id not disclose to the [c]ourt a fair and honest history of his tenancy in th [e]

unit, . . . whether it was with [the previous landlord] . . . or with [plaintiff]." The

judge added "a lot of [defendant's] complaints . . . were either . . . pre-existing

problems that were then addressed by the prior . . . landlord . . . or were

potentially . . . caused by [defendant]."

Specifically, the judge found Alex was not truthful about renovations that

the previous landlord had ordered, including reconstructing and replacing a wall,

or about defendants' prior allegations "with regard to mold claims." Regarding

the leak from the bathroom that Alex claimed came from the toilet valve, the

judge rejected Alex's version of events, again deeming his testimony not

credible and finding the ensuing water damage to units below was "a result of

[Alex]'s . . . conduct in some sort of strange way or the other," as was the "mold

to the exten[t] that there was mold in there."

A-3260-23 8 Likewise, the judge rejected Alex's suggestion that the "health department

people were . . . conspiring against" and "lying to him," referring to the

suggestion as "untrustworthy" and "not believable." The judge also found "no

proof of" asbestos, which Alex alleged was in the apartment. In sum, the judge

found:

[I]t seems that [Alex], for whatever reason, is basically unable to be satisfied no matter what is done with regard to that property. . . . What I saw [in videos presented to the court] is what he was complaining about w[ere] cosmetic types of matters. . . . [T]he caulking was . . . not good. . . . There was some . . . drywall work that was . . . probably sub-par. . . . [That's c]osmetic. He was complaining . . . the lock is hard to . . . open as he gets in the door. He was complaining there's no threshold under the . . . front door. . . . That's cosmetic. It's not habitability.

Defendants sought a stay pending appeal and a hardship stay, both of

which were denied on June 6 and 10, 2024, respectively.7 This appeal, limited

to the May 16, 2024 JOP, followed.8

7 We denied defendants' emergent application for relief. 8 Defendants' notice of appeal only identifies the May 16, 2024 JOP as the subject of the appeal. "It is clear that it is only the orders designated in the notice of appeal that are subject to the appeal process and review." W.H. Indus., Inc. v. Fundicao Balancins, Ltda, 397 N.J. Super. 455, 458 (App. Div. 2008). A-3260-23 9 On appeal, defendants reprise the arguments rejected by the judge,

including: the judge lacked jurisdiction to hear the case because plaintiff's

notice to quit failed to meet the statutory requirements of the New Jersey Anti -

Eviction Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:18-61.1 to -61.12; the judge impermissibly reinstated

the case and allowed Playa Del Sol to intervene; plaintiff failed to register the

property as required by N.J.S.A. 46:8-28, governing the registration

requirements for the owner of "a one-dwelling unit rental"; and plaintiff lacked

standing to bring the action under N.J.S.A. 14A:2-2.1(1)(a), prohibiting a

corporation doing business in the State from transacting business "using a name

other than its actual name" in order "to be deceptive as to its actual identity."

Although the parties dispute how defendants vacated the premises,

defendants concede they are no longer occupying the property. According to

plaintiff, new residents now occupy the property. In a summary dispossess

action, "the court's jurisdiction is limited to determining the issue of the

landlord's right to possession of the premises." Daoud v. Mohammad, 402 N.J.

Super. 57, 61 (App. Div. 2008). If "the tenant vacated the premises and the

premises have been re-rented, the issue can no longer be determined" and is

deemed moot. Ibid.; see Sudersan v. Royal, 386 N.J. Super. 246, 251 (App. Div.

A-3260-23 10 2005) ("Ordinarily, where a tenant no longer resides in the property, an appeal

challenging the propriety of an eviction is moot.").

"Mootness is a threshold justiciability determination rooted in the notion

that judicial power is to be exercised only when a party is immediately

threatened with harm." Stop & Shop Supermarkets Co. v. Cnty. of Bergen, 450

N.J. Super. 286, 291 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting Betancourt v. Trinitas Hosp.,

415 N.J. Super. 301, 311 (App. Div. 2010)). "[F]or reasons of judicial economy

and restraint, courts will not decide cases in which the issue is hypothetical, [or]

a judgment cannot grant effective relief." Ibid. (alteration in original) (quoting

Cinque v. N.J. Dep't of Corr., 261 N.J. Super. 242, 243 (App. Div. 1993)).

An appeal issue is moot if the appellant "is not entitled to any affirmative relief." Reilly v. AAA Mid- Atl. Ins. Co. of N.J., 194 N.J. 474, 484 (2008). See also Redd v. Bowman, 223 N.J. 87, 104 (2015) ("An issue is 'moot when our decision sought in a matter, when rendered, can have no practical effect on the existing controversy.'" (quoting Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Mitchell, 422 N.J. Super. 214, 221-22 (App. Div. 2011))).

[In re M.U.'s Application for a Handgun Purchase Permit, 475 N.J. Super. 148, 202 (App Div. 2023).]

Here, the matter is moot because defendants were removed from the

premises and vacating the JOP would have no practical effect. See Sudersan,

386 N.J. Super. at 251. On June 3, 2024, defendants were served with a warrant

A-3260-23 11 of removal informing them that a special civil part officer would execute the

warrant, to "remove all persons from the property," and to "vacate the premises

and permit the landlord to change the locks." On June 13, 2024, defendants

were removed from the premises by a special civil part officer and plaintiff

regained possession of the property. Defendants have not identified what, if

any, residual legal consequences will ensue if the JOP is not vacated. That fact

renders this appeal moot. See id. at 251, 254 (vacating a JOP when "the eviction

carrie[d] residual legal consequences potentially adverse to defendant," who

may have lost her federal housing subsidy if the unlawful eviction stood, but

declining to "grant [the] defendant any further relief").

We will decide moot issues "where the underlying issue is one of

substantial importance, likely to reoccur but capable of evading review."

Wisniewski v. Murphy, 454 N.J. Super. 508, 519 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting

Zirger v. Gen. Accident Ins. Co., 144 N.J. 327, 330 (1996)). That said, "[b]efore

continued jurisdiction will be invoked in moot cases[,] there must be an 'issue

of great public importance compelling definitive resolution despite mootness.'"

Ibid. (quoting Oxfeld v. N.J. State Bd. of Educ., 68 N.J. 301, 303 (1975)).

Defendants' arguments do not meet that high standard.

A-3260-23 12 As we noted in Daoud, 402 N.J. Super. at 61-62, rejecting defendants'

arguments as moot would not leave them without a remedy. Indeed,

if defendant[s] feel[] aggrieved by the disposition, [they] may still pursue a remedy in the Law Division. See Acad. Spires, Inc. v. Jones, 108 N.J. Super. 395, 400 (Law Div. 1970) (stating a landlord who unjustifiably seeks and obtains possession may later be held to respond in damages and citing N.J.S.A. 2A:18- 59, Constr. and Renting Corp. v. Stein, 6 N.J. Super. 239 (App. Div. 1950), and Lyster v. Berberich, 3 N.J. Super. 78 (App. Div. 1949)).

[Daoud, 402 N.J. Super. at 61 (citations reformatted).]

Thus, we dismiss the appeal without prejudice to defendants' pursuing

whatever remedies may be available in the Law Division, subject to plaintiff's

valid defenses, if any. As in Daoud, "[w]e do not suggest that such an action

should be pursued or would have a favorable outcome; we simply point out that

there are means of relief for an aggrieved tenant other than retention of the

premises." Id. at 61-62.

Appeal dismissed.

A-3260-23 13