Arrington v. United States Parole Commission

• Court: District Court, District of Columbia
• Decided: June 20, 2025
• Docket: Civil Action No. 2024-1718
• Status: Published

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

DERREK E. ARRINGTON,

Plaintiff.

v. No. 24-cv-1718 (DLF) UNITED STATES PAROLE COMMISSION, et al.,

Defendants.

ORDER

Derrek Arrington, a prisoner proceeding pro se, seeks release from custody because the

Bureau of Prisons miscalculated his good time credit. Compl. at 3, Dkt. 1. Before the Court is the

defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 15, and Arrington’s Motion to Appoint Counsel, Dkt. 17. For

the reasons that follow, the Court will grant the defendants’ motion to dismiss and deny

Arrington’s motion as moot.

Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), a defendant may move to dismiss an

action for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Because “[s]overeign

immunity is jurisdictional in nature,” FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 475 (1994), claims barred by

the United States’ sovereign immunity are “subject to dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1),” Clayton v.

District of Columbia, 931 F. Supp. 2d 192, 200 (D.D.C. 2013). When reviewing a motion to

dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, the court must “assume the truth of all material factual allegations

in the complaint and construe the complaint liberally.” Am. Nat. Ins. Co. v. FDIC, 642 F.3d 1137,

1139 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). At the same time, plaintiffs bear the

burden of establishing subject-matter jurisdiction, see Arpaio v. Obama, 797 F.3d 11, 19 (D.C. Cir. 2015), and courts must raise obstacles to their jurisdiction sua sponte, see Fort Bend Cnty. v.

Davis, 587 U.S. 541, 548 (2019). “[W]hile complaints filed by pro se litigants are held to less

stringent standards than those applied to formal pleadings drafted by lawyers, even a pro

se plaintiff bears the burden of establishing that the Court has subject matter jurisdiction.” Newby

v. Obama, 681 F. Supp. 2d 53, 55 (D.D.C. 2010) (citation modified).

Arrington purports to bring a claim for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. But the

underlying basis of Arrington’s claim is a challenge to the Bureau’s application of good time

credits. Compl. at 2. Disputes regarding the application of good time credits sound in habeas.

See, e.g., Doughty v. U.S. Bd. of Parole, 782 F. Supp. 653, 656 (D.D.C. 1992) (concluding that

plaintiff’s challenge to the application of good time credits must be brought as a habeas claim),

aff’d, 971 F.2d 765 (D.C. Cir. 1992). A plaintiff cannot seek damages for unlawful detention

without first pursuing habeas relief. Head v. FBI, 86 F. Supp. 3d 1, 5 (D.D.C. 2015). Thus, the

Court will construe Arrington’s claim as a habeas petition. Thomas v. Principi, 394 F.3d 970, 972

(D.C. Cir. 2005) (citation modified).

Two procedural rules require the dismissal of Arrington’s habeas petition. First, a habeas

petition challenging present physical confinement must comply with the “immediate custodian

rule,” which states that the proper respondent is “the warden of the facility where the prisoner is

being held.” Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 435–36 (2004). Second, under the territorial

jurisdiction rule, a “district court may not entertain a habeas petition involving present physical

custody unless the respondent custodian is within its territorial jurisdiction.” Stokes v. U.S. Parole

Comm’n, 374 F.3d 1235, 1239 (D.C. Cir. 2004).

Arrington is incarcerated at a Federal Correctional Institution in El Reno, Oklahoma.

Compl. at 6. Arrington’s immediate custodian is the warden at FCI El Reno, who is not named as

2 a defendant in this action. And the jurisdiction in which FCI El Reno is located is the Western

District of Oklahoma, see FCI El Reno, Bureau of Prisons,

https://www.bop.gov/locations/institutions/ere/ (last visited June 18, 2025), not the District of

Columbia. Thus, the Court will dismiss Arrington’s complaint. Accordingly, it is

ORDERED that the defendants’ Motion to Dismiss, Dkt. 15, is GRANTED. It is further

ORDERED that the plaintiff’s Motion to Appoint Counsel, Dkt. 17, is DENIED AS

MOOT. The Clerk of Court is instructed to close this case.

SO ORDERED.

________________________ DABNEY L. FRIEDRICH June 20, 2025 United States District Judge