Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC13-1346 ____________
ARRINGTON R. WELLS, Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.
[January 16, 2014]
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Arrington R. Wells has filed a notice to invoke this Court’s
discretionary jurisdiction, pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), of the Florida
Constitution. Wells seeks review of an unelaborated per curiam decision of the
First District Court of Appeal, dismissing his petition to invoke the First District’s
all writs jurisdiction on the authority of Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236 (Fla.
2004), and Pettway v. State, 776 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 2000). See Wells v. State, 114
So. 3d 1037, 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Wells alleges that the First District’s
decision expressly and directly conflicts with numerous other district court
decisions regarding illegal sentences. We dismiss Wells’ petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. We also take
this opportunity to clarify our intention to apply the reasoning of Gandy v. State,
846 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2003), to unelaborated dismissals from the district courts of
appeal that, like the First District’s decision in this case, merely cite to a case not
pending review in, or not quashed or reversed by, this Court, or to a statute or rule
of procedure, and do not contain any discussion of the facts in the case “such that it
could be said that the district court ‘expressly addresse[d] a question of law within
the four corners of the opinion itself.’ ” Id. at 1144 (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 530
So. 2d 286, 288 (Fla. 1988)).
Applying our decisions in Gandy and other prior cases holding that this
Court lacks discretionary review jurisdiction over unelaborated per curiam
affirmances and denials, we conclude that the analysis in those cases is equally
valid as to unelaborated per curiam dismissals, such as the First District’s decision
in this case. Because this Court lacks discretionary review jurisdiction under the
Florida Constitution to review this type of case, we authorize the Office of the
Clerk to administratively dismiss future petitions for review in similar cases.
FACTS
As in all petitions seeking this Court’s discretionary jurisdiction pursuant to
article V, section 3(b)(3), we are confined to consider only those facts contained
within the four corners of the district court’s majority opinion. See Reaves v.
-2- State, 485 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1986). In this case, the decision of the First
District as to Wells’ petition to invoke the district court’s all writs jurisdiction
reads in its entirety as follows:
PER CURIAM. DISMISSED. See Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2004); see also Pettway v. State, 776 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 2000).
Wells, 114 So. 3d at 1038. Wells asserts in his jurisdictional filings in this Court
that he is currently serving an illegally enhanced sentence as a Prison Release
Reoffender (PRR) because the release date used to qualify Wells as a PRR
originated from a temporary detention. He therefore contends that the First District
erred in dismissing his all writs petition and that this Court should grant
discretionary review to address the merits of his illegal sentence claim, alleging
that an express and direct conflict exists between the First District’s decision and
several decisions of other district courts of appeal relating to the legality of PRR
sentences.
ANALYSIS
Article V, section 3(b), of the Florida Constitution governs the jurisdiction
of the Florida Supreme Court. As we have explained, this jurisdiction “extends
only to the narrow class of cases enumerated” in that constitutional provision.
Gandy, 846 So. 2d at 1143 (quoting Mystan Marine, Inc. v. Harrington, 339 So. 2d
200, 201 (Fla. 1976)).
-3- In a line of cases beginning with Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla.
1980), this Court addressed the limits of its jurisdiction under article V, section
3(b), to review unelaborated per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal.
In Jenkins, 385 So. 2d at 1359, this Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review
per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal “rendered without opinion,
regardless of whether they are accompanied by a dissenting or concurring opinion,
when the basis for such review is an alleged conflict of that decision with a
decision of another district court of appeal or of the Supreme Court.” This Court
reasoned that the single word “affirmed” in a decision stating in its entirety, “Per
Curiam Affirmed,” cannot satisfy the constitutional requirement that a decision
must “expressly” conflict with a decision of another district court of appeal or of
this Court in order to vest this Court with jurisdiction. Id.
Subsequently, in Dodi Publishing Co. v. Editorial America, S.A., 385 So. 2d
1369 (Fla. 1980), and Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981), this Court
extended the reasoning of Jenkins. When read together, Dodi Publishing and Jollie
“stand for the proposition that this Court does not have jurisdiction to review per
curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal that merely affirm with citations to
cases not pending review in this Court.” Persaud v. State, 838 So. 2d 529, 531-32
(Fla. 2003). This Court has since explained that, “while the holding in Dodi
Publishing expressly applied only to per curiam decisions from the district courts
-4- citing to cases not pending on review in this Court, we had historically applied the
decision in Dodi Publishing to district court decisions merely citing to a statute, a
rule, or a decision of the United States Supreme Court or this Court.” Gandy, 846
So. 2d at 1143 (citing Persaud, 838 So. 2d at 532).
In Florida Star, this Court succinctly summed up its prior decisions in Dodi
Publishing and Jollie, explaining that this Court does not
have subject-matter jurisdiction over a district court opinion that fails to expressly address a question of law, such as opinions issued without opinion or citation. Thus, a district court decision rendered without opinion or citation constitutes a decision from the highest state court empowered to hear the cause, and appeal may be taken directly to the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, there can be no actual conflict discernible in an opinion containing only a citation to other case law unless one of the cases cited as controlling authority is pending before this Court, or has been reversed on appeal or review, or receded from by this Court, or unless the citation explicitly notes a contrary holding of another district court or of this Court. See Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981).
Fla. Star, 530 So. 2d at 288 n.3.
More recently, in Stallworth v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 974, 978 (Fla. 2002), this
Court further extended the reasoning of Jenkins and subsequent cases relating to
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Supreme Court of Florida ____________
No. SC13-1346 ____________
ARRINGTON R. WELLS, Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent.
[January 16, 2014]
PER CURIAM.
Petitioner Arrington R. Wells has filed a notice to invoke this Court’s
discretionary jurisdiction, pursuant to article V, section 3(b)(3), of the Florida
Constitution. Wells seeks review of an unelaborated per curiam decision of the
First District Court of Appeal, dismissing his petition to invoke the First District’s
all writs jurisdiction on the authority of Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236 (Fla.
2004), and Pettway v. State, 776 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 2000). See Wells v. State, 114
So. 3d 1037, 1038 (Fla. 1st DCA 2013). Wells alleges that the First District’s
decision expressly and directly conflicts with numerous other district court
decisions regarding illegal sentences. We dismiss Wells’ petition for review for lack of jurisdiction. We also take
this opportunity to clarify our intention to apply the reasoning of Gandy v. State,
846 So. 2d 1141 (Fla. 2003), to unelaborated dismissals from the district courts of
appeal that, like the First District’s decision in this case, merely cite to a case not
pending review in, or not quashed or reversed by, this Court, or to a statute or rule
of procedure, and do not contain any discussion of the facts in the case “such that it
could be said that the district court ‘expressly addresse[d] a question of law within
the four corners of the opinion itself.’ ” Id. at 1144 (quoting Fla. Star v. B.J.F., 530
So. 2d 286, 288 (Fla. 1988)).
Applying our decisions in Gandy and other prior cases holding that this
Court lacks discretionary review jurisdiction over unelaborated per curiam
affirmances and denials, we conclude that the analysis in those cases is equally
valid as to unelaborated per curiam dismissals, such as the First District’s decision
in this case. Because this Court lacks discretionary review jurisdiction under the
Florida Constitution to review this type of case, we authorize the Office of the
Clerk to administratively dismiss future petitions for review in similar cases.
FACTS
As in all petitions seeking this Court’s discretionary jurisdiction pursuant to
article V, section 3(b)(3), we are confined to consider only those facts contained
within the four corners of the district court’s majority opinion. See Reaves v.
-2- State, 485 So. 2d 829, 830 (Fla. 1986). In this case, the decision of the First
District as to Wells’ petition to invoke the district court’s all writs jurisdiction
reads in its entirety as follows:
PER CURIAM. DISMISSED. See Baker v. State, 878 So. 2d 1236 (Fla. 2004); see also Pettway v. State, 776 So. 2d 930 (Fla. 2000).
Wells, 114 So. 3d at 1038. Wells asserts in his jurisdictional filings in this Court
that he is currently serving an illegally enhanced sentence as a Prison Release
Reoffender (PRR) because the release date used to qualify Wells as a PRR
originated from a temporary detention. He therefore contends that the First District
erred in dismissing his all writs petition and that this Court should grant
discretionary review to address the merits of his illegal sentence claim, alleging
that an express and direct conflict exists between the First District’s decision and
several decisions of other district courts of appeal relating to the legality of PRR
sentences.
ANALYSIS
Article V, section 3(b), of the Florida Constitution governs the jurisdiction
of the Florida Supreme Court. As we have explained, this jurisdiction “extends
only to the narrow class of cases enumerated” in that constitutional provision.
Gandy, 846 So. 2d at 1143 (quoting Mystan Marine, Inc. v. Harrington, 339 So. 2d
200, 201 (Fla. 1976)).
-3- In a line of cases beginning with Jenkins v. State, 385 So. 2d 1356 (Fla.
1980), this Court addressed the limits of its jurisdiction under article V, section
3(b), to review unelaborated per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal.
In Jenkins, 385 So. 2d at 1359, this Court held that it lacked jurisdiction to review
per curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal “rendered without opinion,
regardless of whether they are accompanied by a dissenting or concurring opinion,
when the basis for such review is an alleged conflict of that decision with a
decision of another district court of appeal or of the Supreme Court.” This Court
reasoned that the single word “affirmed” in a decision stating in its entirety, “Per
Curiam Affirmed,” cannot satisfy the constitutional requirement that a decision
must “expressly” conflict with a decision of another district court of appeal or of
this Court in order to vest this Court with jurisdiction. Id.
Subsequently, in Dodi Publishing Co. v. Editorial America, S.A., 385 So. 2d
1369 (Fla. 1980), and Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1981), this Court
extended the reasoning of Jenkins. When read together, Dodi Publishing and Jollie
“stand for the proposition that this Court does not have jurisdiction to review per
curiam decisions of the district courts of appeal that merely affirm with citations to
cases not pending review in this Court.” Persaud v. State, 838 So. 2d 529, 531-32
(Fla. 2003). This Court has since explained that, “while the holding in Dodi
Publishing expressly applied only to per curiam decisions from the district courts
-4- citing to cases not pending on review in this Court, we had historically applied the
decision in Dodi Publishing to district court decisions merely citing to a statute, a
rule, or a decision of the United States Supreme Court or this Court.” Gandy, 846
So. 2d at 1143 (citing Persaud, 838 So. 2d at 532).
In Florida Star, this Court succinctly summed up its prior decisions in Dodi
Publishing and Jollie, explaining that this Court does not
have subject-matter jurisdiction over a district court opinion that fails to expressly address a question of law, such as opinions issued without opinion or citation. Thus, a district court decision rendered without opinion or citation constitutes a decision from the highest state court empowered to hear the cause, and appeal may be taken directly to the United States Supreme Court. Moreover, there can be no actual conflict discernible in an opinion containing only a citation to other case law unless one of the cases cited as controlling authority is pending before this Court, or has been reversed on appeal or review, or receded from by this Court, or unless the citation explicitly notes a contrary holding of another district court or of this Court. See Jollie v. State, 405 So. 2d 418, 420 (Fla. 1981).
Fla. Star, 530 So. 2d at 288 n.3.
More recently, in Stallworth v. Moore, 827 So. 2d 974, 978 (Fla. 2002), this
Court further extended the reasoning of Jenkins and subsequent cases relating to
per curiam affirmances without written opinion to unelaborated per curiam denials
of relief, holding that “this Court does not have discretionary review jurisdiction
. . . to review per curiam denials of relief, issued without opinion or explanation,
whether they be in opinion form or by way of unpublished order.”
-5- Thereafter, in Gandy, we further held that this Court does not have
discretionary review jurisdiction to review “per curiam unelaborated denials of
relief from the district courts of appeal that . . . merely cite to a case not pending on
review in this Court, or to a statute or rule of procedure, and do not contain any
discussion of the facts in the case such that it could be said that the district court
‘expressly addresse[d] a question of law within the four corners of the opinion
itself.’ ” Gandy, 846 So. 2d at 1144 (quoting Fla. Star, 530 So. 2d at 288).
Accordingly, based on our case law since Jenkins, it is clear that we have
explicitly held that this Court lacks discretionary review jurisdiction over the
following four types of cases: (1) a per curiam affirmance rendered without written
opinion—see Jenkins, 385 So. 2d at 1359; (2) a per curiam affirmance with a
citation to (i) a case not pending review or a case that has not been quashed or
reversed by this Court, (ii) a rule of procedure, or (iii) a statute—see Dodi
Publishing, 385 So. 2d at 1369, and Jollie, 405 So. 2d at 421; (3) a per curiam or
other unelaborated denial of relief rendered without written opinion—see
Stallworth, 827 So. 2d at 978; and (4) a per curiam or other unelaborated denial of
relief with a citation to (i) a case not pending review or a case that has not been
quashed or reversed by this Court, (ii) a rule of procedure, or (iii) a statute—see
Gandy, 846 So. 2d 1144. None of these four scenarios, however, specifically
addresses the situation presented in this case: an unelaborated per curiam dismissal
-6- with a citation to cases not pending review in, and not quashed or reversed by, this
Court.
Applying this Court’s decisions in Jenkins, Dodi Publishing, Stallworth, and
Gandy to the notice to invoke this Court’s discretionary jurisdiction filed in this
case, we conclude that our analysis in those cases as to unelaborated per curiam
affirmances and denials is equally valid as to unelaborated per curiam dismissals.
We therefore hold that this Court does not have discretionary review jurisdiction
over unelaborated per curiam dismissals from the district courts of appeal (1) that
are issued without opinion or explanation, whether in opinion form or by way of
unpublished order; or (2) that, like the First District’s decision in Wells’ case,
merely cite to a case not pending review in, or not quashed or reversed by, this
Court, or to a statute or rule of procedure, and do not contain any discussion of the
facts in the case such that it could be said that the district court “expressly
addresse[d] a question of law within the four corners of the opinion itself.” Fla.
Star, 530 So. 2d at 288.
As we did in Gandy, we also take this opportunity to explain that in the
future, we will apply the reasoning of this opinion, Jenkins, Dodi Publishing,
Stallworth, and Gandy to similar cases and will dismiss review for lack of
jurisdiction. We hereby authorize the Office of the Clerk to administratively
dismiss future petitions for review in similar cases.
-7- CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained above, we hold that this Court lacks discretionary
review jurisdiction to review an unelaborated per curiam dismissal from a district
court of appeal that is issued without opinion or explanation or that merely cites to
a case not pending review in, or reversed or quashed by, this Court, or to a statute
or rule of procedure. Accordingly, we dismiss Wells’ petition for review. No
motion for rehearing or clarification will be entertained in this case or in future
cases that are dismissed based on the reasoning set forth in this opinion. See Fla.
R. App. P. 9.330(d).
It is so ordered.
POLSTON, C.J., and PARIENTE, QUINCE, CANADY, LABARGA, and PERRY, JJ., concur. LEWIS, J., concurs in result.
Application for Review of the Decision of the District Court of Appeal – Direct Conflict of Decisions
First District – Case No. 1D13-1681
(Leon County)
Arrington R. Wells, pro se, Crawfordville, Florida,
for Petitioner
Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, Criminal Appeals, and Meredith Hinshelwood, Assistant Attorney General, Tallahassee, Florida
for Respondent
-8-