Arredondo v. SUNLIFE POWER LLC

CourtDistrict Court, W.D. Texas
DecidedAugust 2, 2023
Docket3:22-cv-00299
StatusUnknown

This text of Arredondo v. SUNLIFE POWER LLC (Arredondo v. SUNLIFE POWER LLC) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, W.D. Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arredondo v. SUNLIFE POWER LLC, (W.D. Tex. 2023).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS EL PASO DIVISION

MABEL ARREDONDO, § § Plaintiff, § v. § EP-22-CV-00299-DCG § SUNLIFE POWER LLC, § § Defendant. §

MEMORANDUM ORDER DENYING LEAVE TO AMEND Pro se Plaintiff Mabel Arredondo moves for leave to file her first amended complaint. 2d Mot. Am., ECF No. 57. Concluding that Plaintiff has not established good cause for leave to amend, the Court DENIES her Motion. I. BACKGROUND This case has a long and somewhat complicated history. Early in the case, the Court granted Defendant SunLife Power LLC’s attorneys’ motion to withdraw. Order, ECF No. 32. In that Order, the Court admonished Defendant, as it had done before, see Notice, ECF No. 29, at 2, “that it cannot proceed on its own behalf and that it must be represented by an attorney,” see Order at 2. By March 9, 2023, Defendant had not obtained counsel, so the Court entered another order requiring Defendant “to obtain counsel—and have counsel enter an appearance—by March 30, 2023.” 2d Order, ECF No. 36, at 1. To this day, Defendant has not obtained counsel.1 Anticipating that Defendant might not obtain counsel, the Court, in its March 9th Order, told Plaintiff that “[s]hould Defendant fail to comply with the Court’s order, [she] should

1 Representatives of SunLife Power may be refusing to accept Certified U.S. Mail of this Court’s notices and orders. See Returned Mail Receipt, ECF No. 34 (showing that mail was “return[ed] to sender” because the recipients “refused” to receive it); 2d Returned Mail Receipt, ECF No. 39 (same). promptly take some action to push this case toward resolution.” Id. The Court specifically informed her that she “could move for default, followed by default judgment.” Id. at 1 n.2. By April 18, 2023, Plaintiff had taken no action, so the Court sua sponte issued an order requiring Plaintiff to move for default or “[t]ake some other action to push her dispute with Defendant

. . . toward its resolution.” See 1st Order Take Action, ECF No. 41, at 2. Plaintiff again disregarded the Court’s order, and the Court again sua sponte gave Plaintiff additional time— until May 24, 2023—to take some action in this case. 2d Order Take Action, ECF No. 44. Plaintiff did nothing by the May 24 deadline. Instead, on May 25, 2023, Plaintiff filed her first motion to amend her complaint. 1st Mot. Am., ECF No. 47. The Court denied that motion without prejudice because Plaintiff did “not follow[] the Western District of Texas’s Local Rule[]” requiring her to “file ‘an executed copy of the proposed pleading . . . as an exhibit to the motion for leave.’” Order Denying 1st Mot. Am., ECF No. 48, at 2 (quoting W.D. TEX. L.R. CV-7(b)). The Court also explained to Plaintiff that she would be required to show good cause to amend her complaint because the

Court had previously entered a Scheduling Order setting a March 1, 2023 deadline to file “motions to amend or supplement pleadings or to join additional parties,” and that deadline had long expired.2 Id. at 1, 2 n.1; see also Scheduling Order, ECF No. 16, at 1. On July 5, 2023, Plaintiff filed a renewed motion for leave to amend her complaint.3 See 2d Mot. Am. She asks to add “two Defendant[s] that were unknown at the time Plaintiff[] [filed her] Original Complaint.” Id. at 1. She explains that the new defendants “had direct

2 On June 14, 2023, the Court noticed that the U.S. Postal Service had not delivered to Plaintiff the Court’s Order Denying Leave to Amend, so the Court sua sponte extended Plaintiff’s deadline to file a renewed motion to amend her complaint. Order Ext. Deadline, ECF No. 53, at 1–2. 3 This time, Plaintiff complied with the Western District of Texas’s Local Rule requiring that she attach her proposed amended pleading to her motion. See Proposed Am. Compl., ECF No. 57-1. involvement [in] the factual issues alleged by Plaintiff in [her] original complaint” and that “[t]he amendment is needed in order . . . to push the case to [its] resolution.” Id. II. DISCUSSION Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a) typically governs the amendment of pleadings, and

commands courts to freely give leave to amend “when justice so requires.” Filgueira v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 734 F.3d 420, 422 (5th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). But that “lenient standard . . . does not apply if an amendment would require the modification of a previously entered scheduling order.” Id. Where, as here, a court has already issued a scheduling order and the relevant deadline has passed, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 16(b)(4) “governs the amendment of pleadings.” Id. Rule 16(b)(4) requires a party to show good cause when she wants to modify an already-expired scheduling order deadline. FED. R. CIV. P. 16(b)(4); Filgueira, 734 F.3d at 422. Courts consider the following factors when determining whether good cause exists under Rule 16(b)(4):

(1) the explanation for the failure to timely move for leave to amend; (2) the importance of the amendment; (3) potential prejudice in allowing the amendment; and (4) the availability of a continuance to cure such prejudice. Filgueira, 734 F.3d at 422. Courts generally view the factors holistically, but particularly egregious errors by a party seeking to amend her pleading may be dispositive. See, e.g., EEOC v. Serv. Temps Inc., 679 F.3d 323, 334 (5th Cir. 2012). Take Service Temps as an example. There, the defendant moved to amend its answer to add a defense “[m]ore than three months after the pleadings deadline.”4 Id. at 328. The district court held that defendant provided no “plausible explanation for its delay,” and accordingly denied the defendant’s motion to amend its pleading. Id. at 334 (quotation omitted). The Fifth

Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the district court’s conclusion “that [the defendant’s] failure to account for its delay was dispositive, [and] outweigh[ed] the other three factors for assessing good cause,” was “well supported and squarely within its sound discretion.” Id. Here, Plaintiff moves to amend her complaint nearly three months after the amendment deadline expired. See Scheduling Order at 1. Moreover, Plaintiff received notice of the identities of the two defendants she now seeks to add to her complaint nearly five months before she moved to amend her complaint. From information available on the docket, Plaintiff could have determined the identities of the two putative defendants, Mr. Paul Bardwell and Mr. Matt Hickey, and their possible connection to this case around January 7, 2023.5 If she didn’t know by then, she should have known on February 27, 2023 when she signed a certified mail receipt of the Court’s order granting SunLife’s attorneys’ motion to withdraw.6 Then, beginning in early

4 That Service Temps dealt with a defendant’s request to amend its pleading (rather than a plaintiff’s request) does not affect the applicable standard. The Fifth Circuit applies the same good cause factors no matter which party is seeking leave to amend its pleading. Compare Service Temps, 679 F.3d at 334, with Fahim v. Marriott Hotel Servs., Inc., 551 F.3d 344, 348 (5th Cir. 2008). 5 See 1st Mot. Withdraw, ECF No. 21, at 1 (identifying the putative defendants by name and address); Order Denying 1st Mot. Withdraw, ECF No. 22, at 3 (mailing a copy of the order to Mr. Bardwell and Mr. Hickey); Certified Mail Receipt Order Denying 1st Mot. Withdraw, ECF No.

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Arredondo v. SUNLIFE POWER LLC, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arredondo-v-sunlife-power-llc-txwd-2023.