Arora v. NAV Consulting Inc.

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedOctober 13, 2022
Docket1:21-cv-04443
StatusUnknown

This text of Arora v. NAV Consulting Inc. (Arora v. NAV Consulting Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arora v. NAV Consulting Inc., (N.D. Ill. 2022).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS EASTERN DIVISION

AMIT ARORA, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) No. 21 C 4443 v. ) ) Judge Sara L. Ellis NAV CONSULTING INC., d/b/a/ NAV ) FUND ADMINISTRATION GROUP, and ) NAV GUPTA, ) ) Defendants. )

OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiff Amit Arora brings this lawsuit against Nav Consulting Inc., d/b/a/ Nav Fund Administration Group (“NAV”) and Nav Gupta (collectively, “Defendants”), alleging discrimination during his employment based on race, ethnicity, national origin, and citizenship status in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq., 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and the Illinois Human Rights Act, 775 ILCS § 5/2-102. Defendants now move for judgment on the pleadings on Arora’s Section 1981 claim (Count III). Because Arora does not allege that racial animus was the but-for cause of the complained-of employment actions, the Court grants NAV’s motion for partial judgment on the pleadings and dismisses Count III. BACKGROUND1 NAV is a hedge fund administrator headquartered in Oakbrook Terrace, Illinois. Nav Gupta, NAV’s CEO, owns a majority stake in NAV with his family and controls the company’s

1 The Court takes the facts in the background section from Arora’s first amended complaint and views the facts in the light most favorable to Arora. N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, Inc. v. City of S. Bend, 163 F.3d 449, 452 (7th Cir. 1998). The Court, however, is “not obliged to ignore any facts set forth in the complaint that undermine the plaintiff's claim or to assign any weight to unsupported conclusions of law.” Id. day-to-day operations. Arora worked for NAV for over seventeen years, first while living in India (where he was born) and then in the United States. Arora’s race is Asian and ethnicity Indian, and he describes himself as “Ethnic-Indian.” NAV sponsored Arora’s H-1B visa and eventual Green Card. In 2020, Arora resigned from his position as a Senior Account Manager.

Arora alleges that Defendants mistreated him and other Ethnic-Indian employees by: housing them in crowded conditions; requiring them to perform unpaid, non-hedge-fund-related work for the company and Gupta; and failing to fairly promote, pay, or allow them professional development opportunities when compared to NAV’s non-Ethnic-Indian employees. Arora also describes a decades-long scheme by Defendants to delay his permanent residency process and to keep him at the company by requiring a series of one-sided employment contracts with onerous terms such as three-months required notice, five-figure liquated damages, and expansive non- compete clauses. Gupta directed these discriminatory employment practices. After Arora left NAV, NAV sent him a demand letter seeking $48,000 in liquidated damages because he resigned prior to the end of his three-year contract and then filed a still-pending arbitration claim against

Arora when he didn’t pay. NAV also pursued an unsuccessful non-compete lawsuit against Arora’s new employer. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c), a party may move for judgment on the pleadings after the complaint and answer have been filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(c). When the movant seeks to “dispose of the case on the basis of the underlying substantive merits . . . the appropriate standard is that applicable to summary judgment, except that the court may consider only the contents of the pleadings.” Alexander v. City of Chicago, 994 F.2d 333, 336 (7th Cir. 1993). The pleadings include the complaint, answer, and documents attached as exhibits to the complaint and answer. N. Ind. Gun & Outdoor Shows, 163 F.3d at 452–53. The Court should grant a motion for judgment on the pleadings if “no genuine issues of material fact remain to be resolved” and the movant “is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Alexander, 994 F.2d at 336.

ANALYSIS Defendants seek dismissal of Count III on the basis that a Section 1981 claim requires race to be the “but for” cause of the alleged employment action, and Arora pleads that NAV discriminated against him not only because of his race, but also because of his ethnicity, national origin, and citizenship status. “To prevail [on a Section 1981 claim], a plaintiff must initially plead and ultimately prove that, but for race, it would not have suffered the loss of a legally protected right.” Comcast Corp. v. Nat’l Ass’n of Afr. Am.-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1019 (2020). Arora admits that he alleges not one but three causes for NAV’s treatment of him (“race discrimination, national origin discrimination, and citizenship-based discrimination,” Doc. 42 at

3). The first amended complaint similarly bundles these theories of discrimination. See, e.g., Doc. 10 ¶ 2 (“This action alleges that NAV and Mr. Gupta discriminated against Mr. Arora throughout his employment with NAV because of his Indian ethnicity, Indian national origin, Asian race, and his citizenship status.”), ¶ 50 (“NAV and Mr. Gupta mistreated and discriminated against Mr. Aurora and other Ethnic-Indians purposefully because of their Indian ethnicity . . . . their Asian race and Indian national origin.”). As courts in this Circuit have interpreted Comcast, a plaintiff cannot allege multiple discrimination theories as the “but for” cause for a Section 1981 violation. See, e.g., James v. City of Evanston, No. 20-CV-00551, 2021 WL 4459508, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 29, 2021) (although plaintiff asserted the City’s action was racially motivated, the complaint pleaded that avoidance of public scrutiny, not race, was the but-for cause); Vang v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 20-CV-1260-JES-TSH, 2021 WL 5761002, at *9 (C.D. Ill. Dec. 3, 2021) (allegations that “center on Plaintiffs’ national origin, not their race” insufficient to state Section 1981 claim).

Because Arora pleads not only race but also his ethnicity and national origin as the cause of Defendants’ discrimination, his Section 1981 claim fails as a matter of law.2 Arora argues that Defendants misinterpret Comcast because the law acknowledges that there may be multiple “but for” causes of discrimination (as here). While a plaintiff may plead multiple causes under some discrimination laws, notably Title VII (using theories known as “motivating factor,” if multiple discriminatory causes, or “mixed motive,” if legal mixed with illegal ones), in Comcast the Supreme Court held that to successfully plead a Section 1981 claim, “[r]acial discrimination must be the determining factor.” Piccioli v. Plumbers Welfare Fund Local 130, U.A., No. 19-CV-00586, 2020 WL 6063065, at *6 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 14, 2020). “Put differently, a plaintiff cannot survive a motion to dismiss upon a showing that racial

discrimination was one factor among many in a defendant's decision.” Id. Arora invites the Court to minimize Comcast’s clear directive by applying another Supreme Court case, Bostock, that acknowledged generally, “[o]ften, events have multiple but- for causes,” then explained, “[w]hen it comes to Title VII, the adoption of the traditional but-for causation standard means a defendant cannot avoid liability just by citing some other factor that

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