Arora v. Kharat

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedJanuary 27, 2023
Docket3:20-cv-50387
StatusUnknown

This text of Arora v. Kharat (Arora v. Kharat) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arora v. Kharat, (N.D. Ill. 2023).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS WESTERN DIVISION

SURINDER ARORA, KEVIN ARORA, and SAWAN KIRPAL, LLC.

Plaintiffs,

v.

MANISH KHARAT, and SAWAN MANAGEMENT, LLC.

Defendants. Case No. 3:20-cv-50387

Honorable Iain D. Johnston

Counter-Plaintiffs,

SURINDER ARORA, KEVIN ARORA, ANU ARORA, SAWAN KIRPAL, LLC, and RAJ RANI HOSPITALITY, INC.

Counter-Defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER Plaintiffs Surinder Arora, Kevin Arora, and Sawan Kirpal LLC (Sawan Kirpal) originally brought this action against Defendants Manish Kharat and Sawan Management LLC (Counter Plaintiffs) seeking recovery for breach of contract. Not to be outdone, Defendants filed a counterclaim [48] against the original plaintiffs, as well as Anu Arora and Raj Rani Hospitality, Inc. (collectively Counter Defendants), alleging breach of contract, fraud, and conspiracy to commit fraud. The Counter Defendants then filed a motion [52] to dismiss the

counterclaims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). On May 20, 2022, the Court granted the motion in part and denied in part [75], allowing Counter Plaintiffs to amend their counterclaim. Before the Court is Counter Defendants’ motion to dismiss the amended counterclaim [85]. Counter Plaintiffs oppose dismissal of the following three amended claims1: (1) causes of action against Anu Arora; (2) a cause of action against Surinder Arora for breach of the loan agreement;

and (3) a cause of action against Sawan Kirpal for conspiracy to commit fraud.2 For the following reasons the motion is granted. I. Legal Standard Under Rule 8, the plaintiff must allege facts sufficient to "state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). For a complaint to be plausible, the plaintiff's factual allegations, as opposed to any legal conclusions, must allow "the court to draw the reasonable inference

that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court accepts as true all the plaintiff's well-pleaded factual allegations and views them—and all reasonable inferences—in the light most

1 In Counter Plaintiffs’ response they oppose dismissal of “at least four of the claims” but only advance arguments on three claims. Resp. to Mot. to Diss., Dkt. 94 at 3. 2 Because Counter Plaintiffs do not oppose dismissal of any other claims in the amended counterclaim, those claims will be dismissed. “If the Court is presented with a colorable argument in a motion to dismiss, and the plaintiff fails to respond to that motion, the Court will assume that the plaintiff concedes the insufficiency of its complaint.” Iain D. Johnston, Standing Order on Motions to Dismiss. https://www.ilnd.uscourts.gov/judge-info.aspx?Bt1LmR2QgBbCj2VD6w9tXA== favorable to the plaintiff. Landmark Am. Ins. Co. v. Deerfield Constr. Inc., 933 F.3d 806, 809 (7th Cir. 2019). On a motion to dismiss, the moving party bears the burden of establishing the insufficiency of the complaint's allegations, and thus that the

complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim. Marcure v. Lynn, 992 F.3d 625, 631 (7th Cir. 2021). The same legal standard applies when analyzing a motion to dismiss a counterclaim, with the plaintiff bearing the burden of establishing the insufficiency of the defendant’s allegations in its counterclaim. See Firestone Fin. Corp. v. Meyer, 796 F.3d 822, 826–27 (7th Cir. 2015). II. Analysis

a. Breach of Contract – Kevin Arora, Anu Arora, Sawan Kirpal and Raj Rani Hospitality, LLC

Counter Defendants Kevin Arora; Anu Arora; Sawan Kirpal; and Raj Rani Hospitality, LLC (Raj Rani Hospitality) ask the Court to dismiss Counter Plaintiffs’ claims that they breached the purchase agreement and the loan agreement. M. to Diss. Amend. Counterclaims, Dkt. 85 at 2–3. In the Court’s previous order Kevin Arora, Anu Arora, and Raj Rani Hospitality were dismissed because they were not parties to the contracts. Dkt. 75 at 8. Given a second chance to plausibly suggest that these defendants were parties to the contracts, Counter Plaintiffs’ amended complaint still fails to do so. So, consistent with the Court’s previous order, Counts I and II are dismissed against Kevin Arora, Anu Arora, and Raj Rani Hospitality. Northbound Group, Inc. v. Norvax, Inc., 795 F.3d 641, 651 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting EEOC v. Waffle House, Inc.¸534 U.S. 279, 294 (2002)) (Illinois contract law states that “a contract cannot bind a nonparty.”) Indeed, the only amendment to Count I is the addition of Sawan Kirpal as a counter-defendant. It is difficult to piece together the theory why Counter Plaintiffs believe Sawan Kirpal is a party to the purchase agreement. But that is beside the

point because Counter Plaintiffs did not respond to the motion to dismiss the claims against Sawan Kirpal in Count I. Because Counter Plaintiffs failed to respond, the claims against Sawan Kirpal are dismissed.3 b. Breach of Contract – Surinder Arora The Court previously dismissed the entirety of Count II of the counterclaim because the Counter Plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege that Surinder Arora

breached his obligations under the loan agreement. As the Court previously found, the agreement does not impose any obligations on him. Dkt. 75 at 9–10. Defendant Surinder Arora now moves to dismiss the amended Count II claim against him for the same reasons.4 In support of their claims, Counter Plaintiffs reference paragraph 30 of their Amended Counterclaim [78] that states, “[i]t was agreed that Surinder Arora would continue to make payments on the Hotel’s underlying mortgage.” But Counter Plaintiffs fail to point to any language within the loan

agreement that memorializes any such obligation. Under Illinois law, if the language of a contract is clear and unambiguous, the parties’ intent is solely determined by the language of the contract. Virginia Surety Co. v. Northern Insurance Co. of New York, 224 Ill. 2d 550, 556 (Ill. 2d 2007).

3 Supra Note 2. 4 Consistent with this Court’s previous ruling [75], the claim in Count I for a breach of the purchase agreement will proceed against Surinder Arora. Counter Plaintiffs argue that Surinder’s continued payment on the mortgage was a precondition to Mr. Kharat’s monthly payments on the promissory note. Dkt. 94 at 6. But Counter Plaintiffs have not pointed to any such language in the contracts or

exhibits, they only make a self-serving reference to this “precondition” by pointing to paragraph 30 in the Amended Complaint. If Counter Plaintiffs had that understanding, it should have been included in the agreements. Thompson v. Gordon, 241 Ill. 2d 428, 449 (2011) (“[A] court cannot alter, change or modify existing terms of a contract, or add new terms or conditions to which the parties do not appear to have assented.”) Absent an express provision, Counter Plaintiffs have

failed to plausibly suggest that Surinder Arora breached his obligations under the loan agreement, and Surinder’s motion to dismiss Count II is granted. c. Count III – Fraud Counter Plaintiffs originally brought a claim for fraud against Surinder Arora, Kevin, Arora, Anu Arora, and Raj Rani Hospitality.

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Arora v. Kharat, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arora-v-kharat-ilnd-2023.