Arora Petroleum 2, LLC v. Avin Petroleum LLC

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: February 4, 2026
• Docket: A-1706-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1706-24

ARORA PETROLEUM 2, LLC,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

AVIN PETROLEUM LLC and ERANGA THENNEGEDARA, a/k/a RANKOTHGE ERANGA N. THENNEGEDARA,

Defendants/Third-Party Plaintiffs-Appellants,

SOUTH ST EATONTOWN, LLC, and FELIX G. BRUSELOVSKY, a/k/a FELIX R. BRUSELOVSKY, FELIX BRUSELOVS, FELIX BRUSEL,

Third-Party Defendants- Respondents. ______________________________

Submitted January 20, 2026 – Decided February 4, 2026

Before Judges Natali and Bergman. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Monmouth County, Docket No. L-1040-22.

John J. Hopkins, III, attorneys for appellants.

Herrick Feinstein LLP, attorneys for respondents South St Eatontown, LLC and Felix G. Bruselovsky (K. Heather Robinson, on the brief).

PER CURIAM

Defendants Avin Petroleum, LLC, and its owner, Eranga Thennegedara,

appeal from two February 3, 2025 orders that confirmed an arbitration award

and denied as untimely their request for a trial de novo. Because defendants

failed to meet the thirty-day filing deadline imposed by Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1), and

present no "extraordinary circumstances" that would permit a relaxation of that

time period, we affirm.

Plaintiff operated and ran a gas station and convenience store in

Eatontown for two years, before selling the business and transferring their lease

to defendants in 2022. Prior to the sale, plaintiff entered into a lease agreement

with third-party defendants South St Eatontown, LLC, and Felix G.

Bruselovsky, the landlord who owned the underlying property for the gas station

and store. After taking over operation of the business, defendants failed to make

payments pursuant to the purchase and lease agreements, and plaintiff

accordingly sued them. In their answer, defendants denied all of plaintiff's

A-1706-24 2 allegations and asserted third-party claims, contending any damages they might

owe arose from the actions of the third-party defendants. After the close of

discovery, the matter was referred to mandatory arbitration under Rule 4:21A-

1(a). In a separate matter, third-party defendants successfully moved to evict

defendants.

The parties attended the mandatory arbitration hearing on October 23,

2024. On November 6th, the arbitrator issued an award against defendants, and

in favor of plaintiff for $216,469.87 and third-party defendants for $49,827.67,

with $12,000 "set off" by defendant's security deposit "unless already applied."

In the award, the arbitrator described the business arrangement as "spectacularly

bad" and concluded defendants failed to "meet their burden of proof" with

respect to their claims "of fraud with tones of predatory lending . . . ." The

arbitrator's award also specifically informed all parties that a request for a trial

de novo must be filed within thirty days and include the required $200 filing fee.

The arbitration award was posted on eCourts on November 6th. On

December 12th, within fifty days of that posting, third-party defendants moved

to confirm the award and sought entry of judgment as permitted by Rule 4:21-

6(b)(3). Third-party defendants also advised the court that plaintiff joined in

their timely application.

A-1706-24 3 Defendants failed to file a request for a trial de novo within thirty days of

receiving notice of the November 6th award as required by Rule 4:21-6(b)(1).

Instead, on December 17th, defendants attempted to file an unsigned, untimely

trial de novo request without the required $200 filing fee, which the court

rejected.

After their untimely de novo request was rejected by the court, defendants

made a second attempt by filing a cross motion on December 28th to serve a late

trial de novo, citing Rules 4:21-6(b)(1) and 1:1-2. Defendants supported their

cross-motion with its counsel's certification who maintained defendants filing

was timely because he did not receive a mailed copy of the November 6th e-

filing until a "little over [t]wo [w]eeks after the hearing." Counsel also stated

that at the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator stated "it was more than he could

decide in a [o]ne [h]our hearing" and had "adjourned [the proceeding]. . . [to]

read . . . all the statements and documents . . . ."

After considering the parties' written submissions and oral arguments,

which included defendants' counsel's clarifying representation that he received

the November 6th arbitration award "at least a week later," the court issued two

orders that granted plaintiff's and third-party defendants' motion to confirm the

arbitrator's award and rejected defendants' motion to allow a late filing. In its

A-1706-24 4 oral decision, the judge explained that while the third-party defendants timely

filed their motion to confirm the award, defendants failed to file their request

for a trial de novo within thirty days of receiving the award as required.

The court also rejected all of defendants claims excusing them from the

thirty-day deadline as none qualified as "exceptional and compelling"

circumstances to warrant relaxing the filing deadlines under Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1)

or Rule 1:1-2, as required under Hartsfield v. Fantini, 149 N.J. 611, 618 (1997)

(holding "courts must determine that 'extraordinary circumstances' exist [to

relax the thirty-day rule in Rule 4:21A-6(b)] and that those circumstances did

not arise from an attorney's 'mere carelessness' or 'lack of proper diligence.'")

(quoting In re T., 95 N.J. Super. 228, 235 (App. Div. 1967)). Thus, after third-

party defendants certified they had no objection to the "$12,000 set off" in the

arbitration award due to defendant's security deposit, the court entered judgment

against defendants in the amount of $216,469.87 for plaintiff and $37,827.67 for

third-party defendants and dismissed defendants' claims.

This appeal followed in which defendants raise two primary arguments.

First, they contend that although they received the "arbitration award [vi]a

letter," they failed to receive an "official notice" or a "notification of the right

to request" a de novo trial, as required by Rule 4:21A-6. They further contend

A-1706-24 5 it was unclear as to what they received because they were "unsure if the hearing

was being treated as a R[ule] 4:21A hearing or a mediation." Defendants also

rely on Rule 1:1-2 to permit their belated filing because of "the apparent failure

of the [a]rbitrator to receive all of the documents by email and the timing and

failure to provide the [d]efendant[s] [with] correct notices . . . ." They contend

they "tried to file the [request] within [thirty] days," but "eCourts refused to

allow . . . the request to be entered . . . ."

Next, for the first time on appeal, defendants argue by enforcing Rule

4:21A-6(b)(1)'s deadline, the court's orders violate their due process rights

because they have the effect of denying their constitutional right to a jury trial.

On this point they stress both the federal and state constitutions "guarantee[] the

right of all parties to a jury trial," and further the New Jersey Constitution "gives

greater [d]ue [p]rocess rights to its citizens." Finally, defendants contend the

thirty-day requirement of Rule 4:21A-6 should not be used as "a statute of

limitations on a case." We disagree with all of these arguments.

With respect to their first arguments, we agree with the court that

defendants' application was untimely, and they failed to establish extraordinary

circumstances to permit the late filing or to permit the filing under any equitable

principle. We deem defendants newly-minted constitutional arguments to be

A-1706-24 6 improperly raised for the first time on appeal and, as to the substance of those

arguments, of insufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. See

R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We provide the following comments to amplify our

decision.

We first identify the standards of review governing our analysis. An

interpretation of court Rules governing mandatory arbitration, including review

of an order confirming the arbitration award is de novo, as it involves the

interpretation of Rules 4:21A-5 and 4:21A-6. See Meehan v. Antonellis, 226

N.J. 216, 230 (2016) (appellate courts interpret statutes and court rules de novo).

Under this standard, a "trial court's interpretation of the law and the legal

consequences that flow from established facts are not entitled to any special

deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531, 552 (2019) (alteration

in original) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140

N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). In reviewing an arbitration decision, however, "we must

be mindful of New Jersey's 'strong preference for judicial confirmation of

arbitration awards.'" Sanjuan v. Sch. Dist. of W. N.Y., 256 N.J. 369, 381 (2024)

(quoting Middletown Twp. PBA Loc. 124 v. Twp. of Middletown, 193 N.J. 1,

10 (2007)).

A-1706-24 7 Further, we review the determination whether there was substantial

compliance with Rule 4:21A–6(b)(1), or good cause to relax its requirements,

for an abuse of discretion. See Schor v. FMS Fin. Corp., 357 N.J. Super. 185,

195 (App. Div. 2002). "[A]n abuse of discretion occurs when a decision is 'made

without a rational explanation, inexplicably departed from established policies,

or rested on an impermissible basis.'" Deutsche Bank Tr. Co. Ams. v. Angeles,

428 N.J. Super. 315, 319 (App. Div. 2012) (alteration in original) (quoting U.S.

Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467-68 (2012)).

With these principles in mind, we turn to the Rules at issue. Rule 4:21A-

5, as amended in September 2024, provides:

No later than ten days after the completion of the arbitration hearing, the arbitrator shall file the written award with the civil division manager. The court shall upload the award into the court's electronic filing system, at which time it shall be deemed filed and provided to all parties. The award shall include a notice of the right to request a trial de novo and the consequences of such a request as provided by Rule 4:21A-6.1

1 We note that before the 2024 amendment, which went into effect prior to the award here, the Supreme Court in an order and Notice to the Bar stated that "documents filed through an approved electronic filing system are deemed filed upon receipt into the system." See Order: Filing of Documents Electronically Using a Judiciary-Authorized Electronic Filing System—Supreme Court Relaxation of Rule 1:5-6 (Nov. 15, 2017).

A-1706-24 8 Further, pursuant to Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1), a party may obtain a trial de novo

if, "within 30 days after filing of the arbitration award, a party thereto files with

the civil division manager and serves on all other parties a notice of rejection of

the award and demand for a trial de novo and pays a trial de novo fee. . . ."

Following a timely trial de novo, the action is returned to the trial calendar. R.

4:21A-6(c). The express language of this rule provides that both filing and

service of the demand must be accomplished within thirty days of the entry of

an arbitration award. Ibid.2

The short deadline established in Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1) for filing a de novo

demand is designed to "require a prompt demand for a trial de novo in cases

subject to mandatory arbitration," Corcoran v. St. Peter's Med. Ctr., 339 N.J.

2 Although not applicable to the award here, a new subparagraph (b)(2) had been adopted effective July 2025 to provide that a party who missed the thirty- day window to file a demand for trial de novo would receive an additional ten days to file a motion "to reject an arbitration award and demand a trial de novo as within time upon establishing good cause." See Order: Amendments To Rules 4:21A-2, 4:21A-4, 4:21A-6; Increased Arbitrator Compensation; Increased Trial De Novo Fee; Added Ecourts Functionality (June 24, 2025); Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 7.2.1 on R. 4:21A-9, at 1368 (2026). Those amendments, however, were rescinded effective September 2025, and the Judiciary "implemented a process to issue an electronic reminder to the parties . . . seven days before the [thirty]-day deadline." See Order: 2025 Omnibus Rule Amendment Order & Supreme Court Action on Non-Rule Recommendations (July 31, 2025).

A-1706-24 9 Super. 337, 344 (App. Div. 2001), and to "ensure[] that the court will promptly

schedule trials in cases that cannot be resolved by arbitration," Nascimento v.

King, 381 N.J. Super. 593, 597 (App. Div. 2005). "The Legislature intended

[that rule] . . . to be strictly enforced." Hartsfield v. Fantini, 149 N.J. 611, 616

(1997) (alteration and omission in original) (quoting Hart v. Prop. Mgmt. Sys.,

280 N.J. Super. 145, 147 (App. Div. 1995)).

The thirty-day filing requirement can be relaxed under Rule 4:21A-6(b)(1)

upon a showing of "extraordinary circumstances." Hartsfield, 149 N.J. at 618.

"That determination is fact sensitive and should be made on a case-by-case

basis." Wallace v. JFK Hartwyck at Oak Tree, Inc., 149 N.J. 605, 609 (1997).

To qualify as "extraordinary," the situation must be something "unusual or

remarkable," or "having little or no precedent and usually totally unexpected."

Martinelli v. Farm-Rite, Inc., 345 N.J. Super. 306, 311 (App. Div. 2001)

(citations omitted). They must also further the goals of arbitration, "'which [are]

to bring about inexpensive, speedy adjudications of disputes and to ease the

caseload of state courts.'" Hartsfield, 149 N.J. at 619 (quoting In re T., 95 N.J.

Super. 228, 235 (App. Div. 1967)). Extraordinary circumstances, however, will

"not arise from an attorney's 'mere carelessness' and 'lack of proper diligence.'"

Martinelli, 345 N.J. Super. at 310 (quoting Hartsfield, 149 N.J. at 618).

A-1706-24 10 Against these legal principles, we are convinced the court correctly

confirmed the arbitration award and denied defendants' motion to file a late trial

de novo. We reach this result because we are satisfied the record supports the

court's conclusion that defendants failed to comply, substantially or otherwise,

with the thirty-day filing period to request a trial de novo and presented no

"extraordinary circumstances" to justify relaxing this deadline.

We reject defendants' assertions they were not bound by the thirty-day

time limitation to file a trial de novo demand under Rule 4:21A-6 because their

counsel did not receive a paper copy of the award in the regular mail or because

counsel failed to observe the filing clearly posted on eCourts. The former is

contrary to the time limitations of Rule 4:21A-5, and before the Rule's

amendment, the referenced Supreme Court order. The latter is insufficient to

constitute an extraordinary circumstance under Hartsfield. Defendants' reasons

for missing the filing deadline reflect a "lack of proper diligence" which our

Supreme Court has clearly stated is insufficient to establish extraordinary

circumstances. Hartsfield, 149 N.J. at 618.

Further, defendants' counsel's claim that he never received notice is belied

by the uncontroverted proofs produced by third-party defendants that notice of

the arbitration award was uploaded to eCourts on November 6th. In support,

A-1706-24 11 third-party defendants produced both the notification email itself and a log of

the notifications from eCourts, both of which confirm the arbitration award was

posted on November 6th.

Moreover, we note defendants provided no corroborative support, by way

of copies of the purported mailing, for example, to support their counsel's

generalized claim regarding receipt of the award. In his certification,

defendants' counsel attests he did not receive the arbitration award until "two

weeks after the hearing" and that he "received the award well after November

6[th]." We note these two assertions are seemingly contradictory as November

6th is approximately two weeks after October 23rd, the date when the arbitration

proceeding was held.3

We also agree with the court that defendants failed to establish the

existence of "extraordinary circumstances," warranting their belated filing. The

record does not support any claim that the conduct of the arbitration proceeding,

or the arbitrator's instructions somehow seduced them into their belated and

deficient filing. It is clear all parties were aware they were appearing for a

mandatory arbitration, and the arbitrator's award, filed on eCourts the day it was

3 We note the parties have not addressed the fact that the award appears to include the electronic signatures of counsel. As that fact was not raised below, we do not, and need not, address it. A-1706-24 12 issued, clearly informed defendants of the thirty-day deadline and the

requirement of a filing fee.

Finally, for the first time on appeal, defendants contend the court's orders

violate their constitutional rights. It is well-settled that appellate courts "will

decline to consider questions or issues not properly presented to the trial court

when an opportunity for such a presentation is available 'unless the questions so

raised on appeal go to the jurisdiction of the trial court or concern matters of

great public interest.'" Nieder v. Royal Indem. Ins. Co., 62 N.J. 229, 234 (1973)

(quoting Reynolds Offset Co., Inc. v. Summer, 58 N.J. Super. 542, 548 (App.

Div. 1959)). Neither exception applies here.

In any event, as noted, supra, we deem defendants' arguments on this point

of insufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a written opinion. It is

enough to state that our Supreme Court has concluded Rule 4:21A "preserve[s]

an individual's right to a jury trial by providing that a person dissatisfied with

the arbitration award has the right to request a trial de novo." Hartsfield, 149

N.J. at 616. We are satisfied the court's proper interpretation and application of

Rule 4:21A-6 did not violate defendants' constitutional rights.

Affirmed.

A-1706-24 13