Aronov v. Nabbhan

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Aronov v. Nabbhan

236 A.D.2d 570, 654 N.Y.S.2d 674, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1586

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedFebruary 24, 1997

StatusPublished

This text of 236 A.D.2d 570 (Aronov v. Nabbhan) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Aronov v. Nabbhan, 236 A.D.2d 570, 654 N.Y.S.2d 674, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1586 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1997).

Pincite

Opinion

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Goldstein, J.), dated May 30, 1996, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendants met their initial burden of establishing that the plaintiff did not sustain a "serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). In opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted a purported "affirmation” from his examining physician which was not in admissible form, as it did not comply with thé requirements of CPLR 2106. Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to raise a question of fact as to the "seriousness” of his injuries, with the result that summary judgment was properly granted to the defendants (see, e.g., Pagano v Kingsbury, 182 AD2d 268; see also, Zargary v Finisia Enters., 205 AD2d 683; Traugott v Konig, 184 AD2d 765). Bracken, J. P., O’Brien, Santucci, Friedmann and Gold-stein, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

—In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the plaintiff appeals from an order of the Supreme Court, Queens County (Goldstein, J.), dated May 30, 1996, which granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint.

Ordered that the order is affirmed, with costs.

The defendants met their initial burden of establishing that the plaintiff did not sustain a "serious injury” within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d) (see, Gaddy v Eyler, 79 NY2d 955, 956-957). In opposition to the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the plaintiff submitted a purported "affirmation” from his examining physician which was not in admissible form, as it did not comply with thé requirements of CPLR 2106. Accordingly, the plaintiff failed to raise a question of fact as to the "seriousness” of his injuries, with the result that summary judgment was properly granted to the defendants (see, e.g., Pagano v Kingsbury, 182 AD2d 268; see also, Zargary v Finisia Enters., 205 AD2d 683; Traugott v Konig, 184 AD2d 765). Bracken, J. P., O’Brien, Santucci, Friedmann and Gold-stein, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

236 A.D.2d 570, 654 N.Y.S.2d 674, 1997 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 1586, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aronov-v-nabbhan-nyappdiv-1997.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack