ARON-STOREY v. GILBERT

CourtDistrict Court, S.D. Indiana
DecidedJuly 10, 2025
Docket1:24-cv-01789
StatusUnknown

This text of ARON-STOREY v. GILBERT (ARON-STOREY v. GILBERT) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, S.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
ARON-STOREY v. GILBERT, (S.D. Ind. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA INDIANAPOLIS DIVISION ANSHIOUS B.D. ARON-STOREY, ) ) Plaintiff, ) ) v. ) No. 1:24-cv-01789-JPH-KMB ) GILBERT Sgt., et al. ) ) Defendants. ) ORDER SCREENING AMENDED COMPLAINT AND DIRECTING FURTHER PROCEEDINGS Plaintiff Anshious Aron-Storey is a prisoner currently incarcerated at Wabash Valley Correctional Facility. He originally filed this civil action against 26 various staffers at New Castle Correctional Facility, where he previously was incarcerated. Dkt. 1. The Court found the original complaint was subject to dismissal for violating Fed. R. Civ. P. 20 by advancing "unrelated claims against separate defendants based on separate events." Dkt. 30 at 6. The Court provided Mr. Aron-Storey the opportunity to file an amended complaint, and he has done so. Dkt. 31. Mr. Aron-Storey's amended complaint is much more focused than the original and does not violate Fed. R. Civ. P. 20. Because the plaintiff is a "prisoner," this Court must screen the amended complaint before service on any defendants. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a), (c). I. Screening Standard When screening a complaint, the Court must dismiss any portion that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim for relief, or seeks monetary relief determine whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard as when addressing a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Schillinger v. Kiley, 954 F.3d 990, 993 (7th Cir. 2020).

Under that standard, a complaint must include "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). The Court construes pro se complaints liberally and holds them to a "less stringent standard than pleadings drafted by lawyers." Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017).

II. The Amended Complaint Mr. Aron-Storey's factual allegations are accepted as true at the pleading stage. See Lisby v. Henderson, 74 F.4th 470, 472 (7th Cir. 2023). The amended complaint names as defendants (1) Officer Davis; (2) Officer Salgado; (3) Sgt. Seye; (4) Officer Maddox; (5) Officer Austin; and (6) Melissa Rutledge. On March 2, 2024, Sgt. Seye and Officers Maddox, Salgado, and Davis used excessive force against Mr. Aron-Storey while escorting him to a new cell at New Castle. Specifically, Sgt. Seye gouged one of Mr. Aron-Storey's eyes and

then punched him multiple times. After Mr. Aron-Storey was face down on the ground, Sgt. Seye stomped on his head and face. Officers Maddox and Davis then arrived, put leg restraints on Mr. Aron-Storey, then carried him to a shower area, where Sgt. Seye and Officers Maddox, Salgado, and Davis together swung him back and forth in the air before throwing him face first onto the floor. Sgt. Seye then also repeatedly pressed Mr. Aron-Storey's face into the shower kiosks.

After this incident, Sgt. Seye and Officers Maddox, Salgado, and Davis stole Mr. Aron-Storey's clothes or let others steal them. Mr. Aron-Storey lacked appropriate clothing until the end of December 2024, causing him to be exposed to cold temperatures. Also, after Mr. Aron-Storey was placed in his new cell, Officer Austin refused to provide him his meals on five consecutive occasions. Officer Austin told Mr. Aron-Storey that Sgt. Seye had directed him to not feed Mr. Aron-Storey. Mr. Aron-Storey filed grievances about his lack of clothing and

being deprived of food. New Castle Grievance Specialist Rutledge did not process these grievances. Mr. Aron-Storey is seeking damages. III. Discussion of Claims Applying the screening standard to the factual allegations in the amended complaint certain claims are dismissed while other claims shall proceed as submitted. A. Claims That Are Dismissed The Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), 42 U.S.C. § 1997e, requires a prisoner to first exhaust his available administrative remedies before filing a

lawsuit in court. Prison staff having the responsibility of providing prisoners with a meaningful opportunity to raise grievances cannot refuse to facilitate that process and then later argue that the prisoner did not comply with procedures or file in a timely manner. See Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006). "Prison officials may not take unfair advantage of the exhaustion requirement . . . and a remedy becomes 'unavailable' if prison employees do not respond to a

properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a prisoner from exhausting." Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006). The PLRA's exhaustion requirement does not, however, create a freestanding right under federal law to access the administrative remedy process. The Seventh Circuit has "specifically denounc[ed] a Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to an inmate grievance procedure." Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 (7th Cir. 2008). Also, "[p]rison grievance procedures are not mandated by the First Amendment and do not by their very

existence create interests protected by the Due Process Clause." Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953-54 (7th Cir. 2011) (citing George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609 (7th Cir. 2007); Grieveson v. Anderson, 538 F.3d 763, 772 & n. 3 (7th Cir. 2008); Antonelli v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996)). Because Mr. Aron-Storey had no expectation of a particular outcome of his grievances or complaints there is no viable claim which can be vindicated through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Juriss v. McGowan, 957 F.2d 345, 349 n.1 (7th Cir. 1992) (without a predicate constitutional violation one cannot make out a prima facie case under

§ 1983). Therefore, all claims against Grievance Specialist Rutledge are dismissed. B. Claims That Shall Proceed Claims shall proceed against Sgt. Seye and Officers Maddox, Salgado, and Davis under the Eighth Amendment for the alleged use of excessive force against

Mr. Aron-Storey on March 2, 2024.

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Related

Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Owens v. Hinsley
635 F.3d 950 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Michael C. Antonelli v. Michael F. Sheahan
81 F.3d 1422 (Seventh Circuit, 1996)
Simmons v. Cook
154 F.3d 805 (Eighth Circuit, 1998)
Orrin S. Reed v. Daniel McBride
178 F.3d 849 (Seventh Circuit, 1999)
Sylvester E. Wynn v. Donna Southward
251 F.3d 588 (Seventh Circuit, 2001)
Dole v. Chandler
438 F.3d 804 (Seventh Circuit, 2006)
George v. Smith
507 F.3d 605 (Seventh Circuit, 2007)
Grieveson v. Anderson
538 F.3d 763 (Seventh Circuit, 2008)
John Townsend v. Sarah Cooper
759 F.3d 678 (Seventh Circuit, 2014)
Daniel Schillinger v. Josh Kiley
954 F.3d 990 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)
Cesal v. Moats
851 F.3d 714 (Seventh Circuit, 2017)
Ralph Lisby v. Jonathan Henderson
74 F.4th 470 (Seventh Circuit, 2023)

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ARON-STOREY v. GILBERT, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aron-storey-v-gilbert-insd-2025.