NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3507-23
ARON BETRU,
Plaintiff-Respondent/ Cross-Appellant,
v.
TIKIKIL FIRDU,
Defendant-Appellant/ Cross-Respondent. ________________________
Argued May 21, 2026 – Decided June 8, 2026
Before Judges Mawla, Marczyk and Puglisi.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Mercer County, Docket No. FM-11-0888-16.
Barbara Ulrichsen argued the cause for appellant/cross- respondent (SeidenFreed LLC, attorneys; Barbara Ulrichsen and Derek M. Freed, on the briefs).
Amy Sara Cores argued the cause for respondent/cross- appellant (Madjam Music & Entertainment Law, LLC, attorneys; Amy Sara Cores, on the briefs). PER CURIAM
Defendant Tikikil Firdu appeals from an August 19, 2020 order, which
sua sponte expanded a parenting coordinator's authority to calculate child
support, and a May 29, 2024 order adopting the parenting coordinator's
recommendations regarding child support. Plaintiff Aron Betru cross-appeals
from the portions of both orders denying his requests for counsel fees and costs.
We reverse and remand for the reasons expressed in this opinion.
The parties were married for six-and-a-half years. Two children were
born of the marriage—both of whom are unemancipated. In 2009, the divorce
proceedings began in Pennsylvania. In March 2010, the parties entered a
custody and parenting time agreement, which designated defendant the parent
of primary residence. Plaintiff has not had more than 102 overnights per year,
other than during the COVID-19 pandemic.
With plaintiff's consent, defendant and the children moved to New Jersey
around June 2010. On October 14, 2010, the parties entered an agreement
setting plaintiff's child support obligation at $1,900 per month. Due to the
parties' incomes, this has always been an above-the-guidelines case. The parties
were divorced on November 21, 2011. On November 25, 2015, the parties
stipulated to transfer venue to New Jersey.
A-3507-23 2 In 2016, plaintiff filed a complaint to reduce child support pursuant to the
Uniform Interstate Family Support Act, N.J.S.A. 2A:4-30.124 to -30.201, and
sought custody and removal of the children to Maryland, where he resided.
Defendant opposed the application and responded with a request, among other
relief, to increase child support retroactive to June 27, 2016, the date of her New
Jersey counterclaim.
On December 2, 2016, the first motion judge entered an order denying the
modification of custody and removal. The order reflected the parties agreed to
mediate the remaining issues with a court-appointed mediator. Mediation
proved unsuccessful and the motion practice resumed.
On September 30, 2018, the judge entered an order reserving a decision
on child support pending a plenary hearing. The plenary hearing was
rescheduled and heard by a second motion judge, who would later enter the
August 2020 order. On December 4, 2019, pending the plenary hearing, the
judge entered an order memorializing the parties' agreement that the effective
date for the calculation of child support arrears would be November 1, 2018.
From the effective date to the December 4, 2019 order, the arrears were $20,716.
The order established a schedule for plaintiff to pay off the arrears. It further
A-3507-23 3 directed probation not to enforce arrears. Instead, plaintiff would continue
paying child support directly to defendant.
There were difficulties with respect to probation's handling of the account.
As a result, on February 10, 2020, the judge entered a temporary order closing
the probation account and directing plaintiff to pay the arrears through his
attorney beginning March 1, 2020.
In March 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic began, forcing the children's
schooling to become remote. The parties filed competing applications to address
parenting time. Plaintiff sought equal parenting time, a suspension of his child
support obligations from April to July 2020, and the appointment of a parenting
coordinator. On April 6, 2020, the second motion judge entered an order
establishing an equal parenting time arrangement and directing the parties to
propose potential parenting coordinators "to resolve future parenting time
issues."
On May 7, 2020, the judge entered an order adjudicating the child support
issue presented at the plenary hearing. He modified plaintiff's child support
obligation to $1,964 per month, effective June 27, 2016. This added $3,072 to
plaintiff's child support arrears.
A-3507-23 4 Notably, the judge found defendant remained the custodial parent and had
283 overnights per year. Because the parties' incomes exceeded the guidelines,
the judge calculated child support using the guidelines and then supplemented
the guidelines amount based on the evidence of the children's needs presented
at the plenary hearing. Pursuant to Rule 5:7-4(d), the judge ordered child
support would continue to be paid directly and not through probation, because
"[t]here were errors in the calculation and enforcement of arrears that unduly
burdened plaintiff, with wage garnishment and credit reporting occurring,
despite" an order directing probation not to enforce.
Plaintiff disputed the judge's findings. The judge directed the parties to
file supplemental briefs. On June 17, 2020, the judge entered an amended order
vacating the $1,964 per month child support figure in the May 2020 order and
instead ordered child support payable as follows: $1,066 per month for June 27
to December 31, 2016; $2,060 per month for January 1 to December 31, 2017;
and $1,900 per month effective January 1, 2018. The judge revised the arrears
calculation to $3,412 and directed plaintiff to continue making the arrears
payment directly through his attorney.
The judge then entered a separate order appointing a parenting
coordinator. The order stated the parenting coordinator's role was "to assist the
A-3507-23 5 parties to resolve issues related to the care and custody of the children . . . . The
[p]arenting [c]oordinator shall not have the authority to change existing [o]rders
of the [c]ourt unless the parties consent and enter into a [c]onsent [o]rder." The
order authorized the parenting coordinator to "make recommendations to the
parties with regard to the issues relating to the care and custody of the children."
An amended order was entered June 19, 2020, to address a clerical error and
clarify an aspect of the judge's finding, which is irrelevant here.
On July 7, 2020, plaintiff appealed and defendant cross-appealed from
various parts of the June 19, 2020 order. Notably, neither party appealed from
the child support or arrears determinations. On September 17, 2020, the appeal
was resolved via the Civil Appeals Settlement Program, and the issues raised in
the appeal and cross-appeal were remanded for further findings by the motion
judge.
On July 8, 2020, defendant moved for reconsideration of the June 2020
order. She argued plaintiff's child support arrears were $26,298 and requested
child support be paid through probation because plaintiff was failing to make
regular payments through his attorney.
Plaintiff opposed the motion and cross-moved for counsel fees and costs.
He asserted defendant's reconsideration motion was out of time under Rule 4:49-
A-3507-23 6 2 and the June 19, 2020 order was final. The judge rejected the argument and
stated he would adjudicate the reconsideration motion on the merits. Plaintiff's
counsel then argued if there was a question regarding the arrears calculations
the judge could refer the issue to the parenting coordinator. However, there
were no grounds to grant reconsideration. This began a discussion by the judge
with both counsel about whether the parenting coordinator should resolve the
arrears calculation. Plaintiff's counsel suggested the judge could sua sponte
refer the matter to the parenting coordinator. Defendant's attorney replied she
had "some concerns" about blending the parenting coordinator's role with the
financial dispute.
The judge denied the motion for reconsideration, finding he did not
overlook any facts or law when he calculated the arrears and ordered the direct
payment of child support. He also denied plaintiff's request for counsel fees
because defendant's motion for reconsideration was neither frivolous nor made
in bad faith. The judge then advised counsel he would be contacting the
parenting coordinator to see whether he could address the arrears dispute.
Plaintiff's counsel told the judge if the parenting coordinator was going to
address defendant's request for additional arrears, he should also address
plaintiff's request to modify child support during the pandemic period.
A-3507-23 7 On August 19, 2020, the judge entered an order memorializing his rulings.
The order reflected the judge had sua sponte amended the June 19 order "to
expand the scope of the appointment of the [parenting coordinator] . . . to include
the issue of the calculation of plaintiff's child support obligation and arrearages
(taking into account any modifications that may be necessitated by changes to
the parties' parenting time during the COVID-19 pandemic)."
On August 28, 2020, the parenting coordinator emailed the judge, copying
counsel, for clarification of his new duties because the parties had different
interpretations of the August 19 order. The parenting coordinator explained one
party wanted to retroactively modify child support, while the other wanted him
to address the issue prospectively. He noted the order referenced "support
obligations and arrearages," which he interpreted as authorizing him "to review
arrearages as well [as] the current obligations." The parenting coordinator asked
the judge how far back he wanted him to review the child support.
The record does not contain a copy of the judge's reply. However, on
December 29, 2020, the parenting coordinator emailed the parties advising the
judge directed him to calculate child support "at least back to September 1[,]
2020."
A-3507-23 8 On January 17, 2021, the parenting coordinator issued his
recommendations. He averaged the parties' incomes for 2016 through 2019, but
omitted plaintiff's 2019 capital gains of $327,951 because "[t]his was not and is
not an ongoing source of income and is not being considered in the monthly
calculation of [the] child support obligation." The parenting coordinator
concluded defendant had a greater income than plaintiff each year in question,
and the income differential for 2016 through 2019 was $61,030, $27,902,
$88,240, and $37,065, respectively. He averaged the differentials for 2016,
2017, and 2019, excluding the 2018 figure because it was an atypical year for
defendant. The parenting coordinator concluded defendant earned $41,999
more than plaintiff per year, which represented a "substantial" disparity that
would have an "impact on the joint obligations with equal parenting time."
Based on plaintiff's representations, the parenting coordinator found
plaintiff had paid $4,600 per month in child support from August 1, 2020 to
January 31, 2021. This resulted in plaintiff owing no child support, and pursuant
to the income differential calculated, created a child support credit.
Although the parenting coordinator found the yearly income differential
was $41,999, his recommendation used a differential of $41,000 without
explaining the difference. He used a child support calculator and input zero
A-3507-23 9 dollars for plaintiff's and $41,000 for defendant's income. This yielded a child
support figure of $107 per week, or $460 per month, defendant owed plaintiff,
effective February 1, 2021. This resulted in a $2,300 total credit to plaintiff for
September to December 2020, and January 2021.
The parenting coordinator issued additional recommendations on August
20, and 26, 2021. As it pertained to child support, the August 20
recommendation explained the child support had not been increased by 14.6%
because neither child was over twelve years of age as of 2016. The parenting
coordinator also noted he would presume plaintiff had at least 104 overnights in
the child support calculation, and he would only use a shared parenting
worksheet. He declined to include the cost of the children's medical insurance
because each parent provided it, and he did not include the costs of
extracurricular activities because the court had not ordered it. The parenting
coordinator did not recommend child support beyond the guidelines amount.
The parenting coordinator provided a series of child support guidelines .
Without explanation, he calculated child support back to January 2016 rather
than July 2016, and input 125 days of overnights each year for plaintiff.
Pursuant to the shared parenting worksheets, the child support was as follows:
$77 per week for January 2016 to December 2017; $83 per week for January to
A-3507-23 10 December 2018; $126 per week for January to December 2019; and $87 per
week for January to December 2020. The parenting coordinator did not make a
recommendation for child support in 2021 but stated the 2020 child support
figure would serve as the starting point to calculate child support.
The August 26 recommendation partially addressed the outstanding issues
of extracurricular activities and afterschool care. The parenting coordinator
concluded the parties should bear the costs of extracurricular activities in
proportion to their incomes, which he found was: defendant 59%; and plaintiff
41%.
On July 26, 2022, plaintiff moved to enforce the parenting coordinator's
January 17, 2021 recommendation crediting him with a child support
overpayment of $54,292 as of July 22, 2022. On October 20, 2022, defendant
filed opposition and cross moved to enforce the May 7 and June 17, 2020 orders.
Defendant's cross-motion requested the court set and compel the payment
of child support and arrears for the period of June 27, 2016 through June 17,
2020. It also requested the court grant a newly appointed parenting coordinator
the ability to make recommendations regarding child support from June 17, 2020
to August 31, 2021, when the parties shared equal residential custody; and
September 1, 2021 through the present, during which regular parenting time had
A-3507-23 11 resumed. Defendant asked the court to order the exchange of updated financial
information for 2020 and 2021, and year-to-date income for 2022, as well as
updated child-related budget expenses to be submitted to the parenting
coordinator. Like plaintiff, defendant also sought counsel fees and costs.
Defendant argued the first parenting coordinator exceeded the scope of
his authority. His recommendations could not be binding because they were
incomplete. Defendant pointed out her motion, which resulted in the entry of
the August 19, 2020 order, sought a recalculation of arrears, not child support
modification. She did not consent to the parenting coordinator recalculating
child support retroactive to 2016, but "figured [she] would see where the process
took [the parties] because maybe the [p]arenting [c]oordinator could come to a
full resolution regarding child support [she] could live with rather than
continuing to litigate this years[-]long issue." However, the parenting
coordinator's recommendations ignored the judge's determination following the
plenary hearing, which was based on the credible evidence. Defendant's
certification set forth the child support plaintiff paid from 2016 through October
2022.
Plaintiff's reply certification pointed out the June 19, 2020 order had
amended the June 17 order and permitted the parenting coordinator to review
A-3507-23 12 child support and arrears. He argued defendant consented to the recalculation
of the child support awarded in the June 17, 2020 order. Although plaintiff's
motion initially sought to set the child support credit at $54,292, plaintiff
provided a chart showing a corrected child support over-payment calculation,
totaling $42,564.
The parties' motions were argued before a third motion judge on
September 8, 2023. Defendant pointed out there was no motion to modify
support pending that would in turn grant the parenting coordinator the ability to
retroactively modify support. The discrete issues before the second motion
judge, which he referred to the parenting coordinator, pertained to arrears and
support during the pandemic. Granting plaintiff's motion to retroactively modify
child support to 2016 would violate the statutory prohibition on the retroactive
modification of child support in N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a. Additionally, the
parenting coordinator lacked the authority to modify court orders. Although the
third motion judge indicated she had prepared a preliminary decision , no
decision was issued, and the matter was transferred to a fourth motion judge.
On May 8, 2024, a fourth motion judge conducted a case management
conference and discussed appointing a third parenting coordinator because the
second wished to resign. The judge instructed the parties to provide him with a
A-3507-23 13 copy of the transcript of oral argument before the third motion judge, the two-
page summaries of their respective positions, and the third parenting
coordinator's retainer amount.
On May 22, 2024, the fourth judge made oral findings. He concluded the
August 19, 2020 order sua sponte expanding the scope of the parenting
coordinator's role to retroactively modify child support was a final order, which
went unchallenged by an appeal or motion for reconsideration. The judge found
the parenting coordinator had done "a very thorough job" with the "arithmetical
issues." He was "satisfied that the arithmetical issues [handled] through [the
parenting coordinator]'s appointment [were] appropriate," and adopted the
parenting coordinator's findings. The judge found plaintiff had overpaid child
support by $54,292. He appointed a third parenting coordinator and authorized
her to run calculations to determine if the total overpaid child support amount
needed to be updated. 1
1 The third parenting coordinator would later correctly decline to address child support, pointing to Rule 5:8D, which had been promulgated effective September 1, 2023, along with guidelines limiting the role of parenting coordinators to parenting issues. A-3507-23 14 I.
Defendant argues the May 29, 2024 order was invalid as a matter of law
because it violated the anti-retroactivity statute, N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a. She
asserts the June 17, 2020 order was a final order because it resulted from the
two-day plenary hearing conducted by the second motion judge, which was
meant to resolve plaintiff's child support obligation. Further, when the court
heard defendant's motion for reconsideration in August 2020, plaintiff
acknowledged the June 17, 2020 order was final in his responsive pleadings and
during oral argument. He defended the motion by arguing defendant was out of
time to seek reconsideration. The motion judge also said the issues before him
were the calculation of arrears, payment of support through probation, and
plaintiff's cross-motion for counsel fees. Further, plaintiff did not appeal from
the child support determination, and his prior appeal was not considered
interlocutory.
Given these facts, defendant argues the parenting coordinator was
unauthorized to modify the June 17, 2020 order by adjusting child support
retroactive to June 27, 2016. Excluding the pandemic period of April to June
2020, neither party sought to modify the June 17, 2020 order. Therefore, the
fourth motion judge erred when he adopted the parenting coordinator's
A-3507-23 15 recommendation. Defendant also asserts the judge also erred because he did not
address N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a, even though defendant pointed it out to him.
Defendant asserts the fourth motion judge improperly delegated his
judicial authority when he adopted the parenting coordinator's recommendation.
The June 19, 2020 order explicitly prohibited the parenting coordinator from
modifying existing orders without the parties' consent. Defendant alleges she
never consented to the retroactive modification of child support , and the parties
only authorized the parenting coordinator to calculate arrears and plaintiff's
child support obligations during the pandemic.
Defendant contends even if the parenting coordinator was permitted to
make recommendations regarding the retroactive modification of child support,
the fourth motion judge still erred when he accepted the recommendations
without considering the facts in dispute between the parties. She asserts the
judge's findings were limited and did not address the parties' arguments. This
was problematic because the parenting coordinator made several errors when he
recalculated child support. Defendant urges us to remand this matter to a
different judge.
Ordinarily, "findings by the trial court are binding on appeal when
supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154
A-3507-23 16 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998). This is because the Family Part has "special
jurisdiction and expertise in family matters," which often requires the exercise
of reasoned discretion. Id. at 413. If there is satisfactory evidentiary support
for the Family Part judge's findings, our "task is complete and [we] should not
disturb the result." Beck v. Beck, 86 N.J. 480, 496 (1981) (quoting State v.
Johnson, 42 N.J. 146, 161-62 (1964)).
We do not "accord the same deference to a trial judge's legal
determinations. Rather, all legal issues are reviewed de novo." Ricci v. Ricci,
448 N.J. Super. 546, 565 (App. Div. 2017) (citation omitted) (citing Reese v.
Weis, 430 N.J. Super. 552, 568 (App. Div. 2013)). "[L]egal conclusions, and
the application of those conclusions to the facts, are subject to . . . plenary
review." Reese, 430 N.J. Super. at 568.
"The trial court has substantial discretion in making a child support
award." Foust v. Glaser, 340 N.J. Super. 312, 315 (App. Div. 2001). "If
consistent with the law, such an award 'will not be disturbed unless it is
manifestly unreasonable, arbitrary, or clearly contrary to reason or to other
evidence, or the result of whim or caprice.'" Id. at 315-16 (quoting Raynor v.
Raynor, 319 N.J. Super. 591, 605 (App. Div. 1999)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
A-3507-23 17 "The obligation to provide child support 'is engrained into our common
law, statutory, and rule-based jurisprudence.'" Colca v. Anson, 413 N.J. Super.
405, 414 (App. Div. 2010) (quoting Burns v. Edwards, 367 N.J. Super. 29, 39
(App. Div. 2004)). Along these lines, the child support guidelines are premised
upon the principles "that (1) child support is a continuous duty of both parents,
(2) children are entitled to share in the current income of both parents, and (3)
children should not be the economic victims of divorce." Child Support
Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J. Court Rules, Appendix IX-A to
R. 5:6A, ¶ 1, www.gannlaw.com (2026).
If the parties' income exceeds the maximum under the guidelines, the trial
court has discretion in the methodology it "employ[s] in arriving at a child
support award" with the goal of calculating an award "in the best interest of the
child after giving due consideration to the [N.J.S.A. 2A:34-23(a)] statutory
factors and the guidelines." Caplan v. Caplan, 182 N.J. 250, 272 (2005). In
above-the-guidelines cases, "[c]hildren are entitled to have their 'needs' accord
with the current standard of living of both parents, which may reflect an increase
in parental good fortune." Zazzo v. Zazzo, 245 N.J. Super. 124, 130 (App. Div.
1990); see also Walton v. Visgil, 248 N.J. Super. 642, 649 (App. Div. 1991).
A-3507-23 18 Pursuant to these principles, we conclude the retroactive modification of
child support was a mistaken exercise of discretion and application of law.
Initially, we reject the notion defendant ever agreed to retroactively modify child
support. Aside from the fact neither party appealed from the June 17, 2020
order, which had been hard fought and entered following a plenary hearing, it is
obvious to us from a review of the August 2020 transcript defendant never
assented to a modification of child support. The transcript shows defendant's
counsel declined to continue arguing with the judge after the judge suggested
having the parenting coordinator address child support. We decline to interpret
this deference to the court as acquiescence, let alone assent to the retroactive
modification of child support.
The retroactive modification of child support is also prohibited as a matter
of law. N.J.S.A. 2A:17-56.23a states:
No payment or installment of an order for child support, or those portions of an order which are allocated for child support . . . shall be retroactively modified by the court except with respect to the period during which there is a pending application for modification, but only from the date the notice of motion was mailed either directly or through the appropriate agent.
Since the plenary hearing had concluded and the judge had already decided child
support, there was no pending application to modify child support that would
A-3507-23 19 exempt the child support from the statutory prohibition on retroactive
modification.
It was further improper for the parenting coordinator to address child
support. As we noted, effective September 1, 2023, our Supreme Court adopted
Rule 5:8D governing parenting coordinators. The Rule contains no language
permitting a parenting coordinator to address child support and instead provides
as follows:
The [p]arenting [c]oordinator should provide guidance and direction to the parties with the children's best interests as the primary focus by reducing conflict and fostering sound decisions that will aid positive child development. The goals of the [p]arenting [c]oordinator shall be to aid the parties in monitoring and effectuating the existing parenting plan . . . ; to reduce misunderstandings and miscommunication between the parents; to help reduce litigation filed with the Family Part; to clarify priorities of the parents and their children; to explore possibilities for compromise; and to develop methods of communication that promote collaboration in parenting. The [p]arenting [c]oordinator should facilitate decision-making by the parties whenever practicable and make recommendations when the parties cannot agree.
[R. 5:8D(b).]
Rule 5:8D(d) states "[t]he Administrative Director of the Courts shall
issue (1) guidelines covering the operation of [p]arenting [c]oordinators . . . ,
and (2) . . . [t]he guidelines shall include, but not be limited to, the following:
A-3507-23 20 the authority . . . of a [p]arenting [c]oordinator." Subsequently, the Director
issued Directive #16-23, which attached guidelines expressly stating: "The
appointment of a [p]arenting [c]oordinator shall not affect the court's
jurisdiction in any aspect of the case, including . . . support." Admin. Off. of
the Cts., Admin. Directive #16-23, Family – Parenting Coordinator Program –
Guidelines; Forms attach. 1, at 1 (Sep. 1, 2023). The guidelines further state:
"The [p]arenting [c]oordinator shall not have authority to make
recommendations regarding financial issues . . . ." Id. attach. 1, at 2.
We are aware the second motion judge did not have the benefit of Rule
5:8D and the Directive's guidance. However, the Rule existed and clearly
applied when the third and fourth motion judges heard this case and considered
defendant's objections to the parenting coordinator addressing child support.
For these reasons, the fourth motion judge should not have considered the
parenting coordinator's recommendations regarding child support, because they
were void as a matter of law, and should have decided the dispute himself.
Instead, the judge adopted the parenting coordinator's recommendation
without explaining his decision as required by Rule 1:7-4(a). We have
repeatedly observed the absence of "explicit findings and clear statements of
reasoning [impedes meaningful appellate review and] 'constitutes a disservice
A-3507-23 21 to the litigants, the attorneys, and the appellate court.'" Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J.
414, 428 (2015) (quoting Curtis v. Finneran, 83 N.J. 563, 569-70 (1980)).
"Naked conclusions do not satisfy the purpose of [Rule] 1:7-4." Curtis, 83 N.J.
at 570. The fourth motion judge's findings fell short of the mark. Furthermore,
his wholesale adoption of the parenting coordinator's recommendations was
troubling given the substantial errors in the child support calculations. We detail
a few of those errors here.
Notwithstanding the fact the parenting coordinator was statutorily barred
from retroactively modifying child support, his calculation reached back even
earlier than the June 27, 2016 effective date for child support set by the June 17,
2020 order—extending to January 2016. The parenting coordinator's
calculations also deprived the children of the full benefit of plaintiff's entire
income when he arbitrarily excluded plaintiff's capital gains income for 2019.
The guidelines are clear: a party's net capital gains are a source of income for
child support. Child Support Guidelines, Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J.
Court Rules, Appendix IX-B to R. 5:6A, Line 1 through 5 - Determining Income,
Sources of Income ¶ s, www.gannlaw.com (2026).
The parenting coordinator demonstrated a lack of familiarity with
calculating above-the-guidelines support when he averaged the "differential" of
A-3507-23 22 the parties' earnings and then failed to explain why he was not awarding support
above the guidelines. He also arbitrarily used a shared parenting worksheet
when plaintiff never had the requisite number of overnights to receive the
benefits of a shared parenting calculation. The parenting coordinator did not
include the children's share of the health insurance premium despite the fact the
guidelines state the cost should be included in the calculation and does not bar
the expense because both parents insure the children. Child Support Guidelines,
Pressler & Verniero, Appendix IX-A to R. 5:6A, ¶¶ 9(b), 26.
These patent errors by the parenting coordinator should have given the
fourth motion judge pause before he adopted them. The motion judge also found
plaintiff's child support overpayment was $54,292 without explaining how he
arrived at the number.
For these reasons, the May 29, 2024 order is reversed. We remand the
matter to the second motion judge because he, having tried the case, is most
familiar with it. On remand, we direct the judge to decide defendant's requests
to: enforce the June 17, 2020 child support order through the date the parties
began to share custody during the pandemic; enforce the arrears awarded under
the June 17, 2020 order; determine the child support payable during the
pandemic; and decide to whom child support will be paid going forward.
A-3507-23 23 Rule 5:7-4(d) states: "All orders which include payment of child support
. . . shall be entered onto the statewide automated child support enforcement
system, and presumptively deemed payable to the New Jersey Family Support
Payment Center, and supervised by the Probation Division, unless the court
orders otherwise, for good cause shown." We recognize the second motion
judge found good cause to have child support flow outside of probation because
of its errors. However, given the nature of this litigation and the substantial
errors committed by the parenting coordinator, we fail to see how the parties,
their attorneys, the court, and the best interests of the children benefitted by
exempting support from flowing through probation. For these reasons, we direct
the second motion judge to reconsider ordering child support payable through
probation after he adjudicates the issues we outlined in the preceding paragraph.
II.
Plaintiff's cross-appeal urges us to remand the denial of his request for
counsel fees and costs for findings. He argues both the August 19, 2020 and
May 29, 2024 orders lacked findings under Rule 1:7-4 as to why the request for
fees and costs were denied.
Counsel fee determinations are "discretionary, and will not be reversed
except upon a showing of an abuse of discretion." Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super.
A-3507-23 24 18, 46 (App. Div. 2011). An abuse of discretion may arise when the trial judge
has not considered and applied the Rule 5:3-5(c) factors or made inadequate
findings to support the award. Clarke v. Clarke ex rel. Costine, 359 N.J. Super.
562, 572 (App. Div. 2003).
We need not go into detail about the second and fourth motion judges'
findings regarding counsel fees. They each denied counsel fees, reasoning
neither party had acted in bad faith. However, Rule 5:3-5(c) mandates
consideration of more than just a party's good faith; it sets forth eight other
unrelated factors. See R. 5:3-5(c)(1)-(2), (4)-(9).
For these reasons, we reverse the denial of counsel fees in both the August
20, 2020 and May 29, 2024 orders, and remand the issue for reconsideration as
to both parties' requests for fees. Our decision should not be interpreted as
expressing an opinion on whether either party is entitled to fees.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
A-3507-23 25