Aromont USA, Inc. v. United States

34 Ct. Int'l Trade 1014, 2010 CIT 90
CourtUnited States Court of International Trade
DecidedAugust 12, 2010
DocketCourt 03-00354
StatusPublished

This text of 34 Ct. Int'l Trade 1014 (Aromont USA, Inc. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of International Trade primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Aromont USA, Inc. v. United States, 34 Ct. Int'l Trade 1014, 2010 CIT 90 (cit 2010).

Opinion

OPINION & ORDER

AQUILINO, Senior Judge:

U.S. Customs and Border Protection (“CBP”) classified certain merchandise derived from veal, chicken, duck, lamb, beef, fish, lobster, mushroom or vegetable stock under subheading 2104.10.00 (“Soups and broths and preparations therefor . . . Other”) of the Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (“HTSUS”) (2001) arid imported from France by Aromont USA, Inc., which protested that classification, taking the position that those goods should have been classified under subheading 2106.90.99, covering “Food preparations not elsewhere specified or included . . . Other”. Upon denial of the protest after liquidation of duties 1 , the plaintiff commenced this case, and, following joinder of issue, the defendant interposed a motion for summary judgment of dismissal. 2 The plaintiff has responded with a cross-motion for summary judgment on its behalf.

Jurisdiction of the court is pursuant to 19 U.S.C. §1581(a) and 28 U.S.C. §2631(a).

I

The import, of course, of a motion for summary judgment is that there is no genuine issue of material fact that requires trial within the meaning of USCIT Rule 56 and teaching of Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986). Here, the parties’ papers in support of their cross-motions do not lead this court to conclude otherwise. Indeed, the plaintiff admits defendant’s description of the preparation if not nature of the products at issue, which are listed in its Exhibit A 3 , to wit:

(a) First, Aromont ran the bones through the “guillotine” to cut them into small sizes.
(b) Next, Aromont fe0.d the bones directly into cookers, or the bones were roasted.
*1016 (c) The bones were then simmered for a long period of time.
(d) The resulting “classical stock” had the fat skimmed off and the bones and other sediment removed. The resulting mixture was a “clear richly flavored broth that [was] then reduced to a rich honey like consistency.”
(e) The honey paste was then pumped into mixing and packing machines.

16. There is no difference between the merchandise Aromont marketed as “demiglaces” and those it marketed as “stocks.”

17. With the exception of the vegetable varieties, Aromont’s “stocks” were prepared in the exact same manner. 4

A

The primary thrust of plaintiff’s protest to CBP, and now on appeal to this court, is that two rulings it obtained earlier from Customs, namely NY800645 (Aug. 26, 1994) and HQ957024 (March 3, 1995) 5 , should have led the agency to the classification preferred herein. They did not. Nor can this court conclude otherwise now. The Service’s ruling practice and procedure published at the time of entry were in pertinent part:

Tariff classification rulings. Each ruling letter setting forth the proper classification of an article under the provisions of the [HTSUS] will be applied only with respect to transactions involving articles identical to the sample submitted with the ruling request or to articles whose description is identical to the description set forth in the ruling letter.

19 C.F.R. §177.9(b)(2) (2001). NY800645 describes one of Aromont’s proffered substances as a beef flavoring in powder form without the use of beef extract. As for the other substances referred for ruling, all liquids, Customs found:

1) Veal flavoring - contains veal extract, veal fat, concentrates of carrot, onion, leek, tomato, garlic and mushroom, olive oil, sunflower oil, glucose, dextrine and other ingredients.

2) Chicken flavoring - contains chicken extract, chicken fat, duck extract, egg yolk, concentrates of carrot, onion and leek, olive oil, sunflower oil, glucose, dextrine and other ingredients.

*1017 3) Duck flavoring - contains duck extract, duck fat, sunflower oil, glucose, dextrine, and other ingredients.

4) Lamb flavoring - contains lamb extract, lamb fat, concentrates of carrot, onion, leek and garlic, olive oil, sunflower oil, glucose, dex-trine, and other ingredients.

5) Fish flavoring - contains fish extract, chicken fat, seafood extract, concentrates of carrot, onion and shallot, sunflower oil, glucose, dextrine, and other ingredients.

6) Lobster flavoring - contains fish extract, lobster extract, chicken fat, seafood extract, concentrates of carrot, onion, tomato and shallot, sunflower oil, glucose, dextrin and other ingredients.

7) Beef flavoring - contains glucose, dextrine, autolysed yeast, soya lecithin, salt and other ingredients. 6

On its face, this description is not “identical” to the description of plaintiff’s merchandise currently at bar, either as admitted by it with regard to defendant’s statement of undisputed material facts, supra, or in its own statement or pleadings. Cf. Plaintiff’s Complaint passim and its Counter Statement of Undisputed Facts, paras. 3-8. Hence, the requirement of section 177.9(b)(2) is not satisfied, nor is the other requirement of that section met in the papers before this court. That is, they do not show that plaintiff’s present products are “identical” to the samples upon which Customs made its findings in NY800645 and recited above.

B

The first general rule of interpretation of the HTSUS is that classification shall be determined according to the terms of its headings and any relative section or chapter notes. In this case, the defendant stands by CBP’s classification of plaintiff’s goods as “broth” eo nominee heading 2104., But it correctly notes that that term is not defined in the HTSUS. Hence, the common and commercial meaning is presumed. See, e.g., Brookside Veneers, Ltd. v. United States, 847 F.2d 786, 789 (Fed.Cir. 1988). See also E.M. Chemicals v. United States, 920 F.2d 910, 913 (Fed.Cir. 1990) (“[t]ariff terms are to be construed in accordance with their common and popular meaning, in the absence of a contrary legislative intent”).

The defendant relies on a dictionary definition of “broth”, to wit, a “liquid in which meat, fish, cereal grains, or vegetables have been cooked”.

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Related

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Brookside Veneers, Ltd. v. The United States
847 F.2d 786 (Federal Circuit, 1988)
E.M. Chemicals v. The United States
920 F.2d 910 (Federal Circuit, 1990)
Clarendon Marketing, Inc. v. United States
144 F.3d 1464 (Federal Circuit, 1998)
Minnetonka Brands, Inc. v. United States
110 F. Supp. 2d 1020 (Court of International Trade, 2000)
United States v. Carborundum Co.
536 F.2d 373 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1976)
United States v. Siemens America, Inc.
653 F.2d 471 (Customs and Patent Appeals, 1981)
Orlando Food Corp. v. States
140 F.3d 1437 (Federal Circuit, 1998)

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Bluebook (online)
34 Ct. Int'l Trade 1014, 2010 CIT 90, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/aromont-usa-inc-v-united-states-cit-2010.