1 2 3
4 5 6 7 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10
11 MARIE ENCAR ARNOLD, Case No. 1:23-cv-00266-ADA-CDB
12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 13 v. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT., et al. (Docs. 14)
15 Defendants. 21-DAY DEADLINE 16 17
18 Pending before the Court is Defendant the United States of America’s motion to dismiss
19 Plaintiff Marie Encar Arnold’s (“Plaintiff”) complaint (Doc. 14) and the parties’ respective applicable 20 opposition and reply. (Docs. 16, 22). On April 26, 2023, the Honorable District Judge Ana de Alba 21 referred the pending motion to dismiss to the undersigned, consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) 22 and E.D. Cal. Local Rule 304(a). (Doc. 16). For the foregoing reasons, the Court will recommend 23 Defendant’s motion to dismiss be granted, Plaintiff’s motion to transfer venue be denied, and 24 Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. 25 Background 26 On February 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants the United States of 27 America, the “United States District Court,” the United States Department of Justice, the United States 28 Marshals Service, and Russel Slope. See generally (Doc. 1). The 50-page complaint, appended with 1 approximately 90 pages of exhibits, is convoluted and difficult to comprehend. (Doc. 1 at 1-50). 2 Liberally construed, Plaintiff alleges that on April 22, 2021, she filed pleadings at the Clerk’s Office in 3 the United States District in San Francisco, California. Id. at 4. Thereafter, Plaintiff went to the 4 building’s cafeteria where “Defendant USMS George Nichols” (“USMS Nichols”)1 approached her 5 table and talked to her. Id. Plaintiff claims USMS Nichols was “stating out loud criminal defense” 6 and that he committed an unwarranted invasion of her privacy, “tampering with victim, witness, or an 7 informant during civil case litigation, education, job search, spying on bank account, assets, [social 8 security number]” and retaliated against her. Id. at 4-5. 9 At some point, Plaintiff filed a complaint letter to USMS Russel Slope (“USMS Slope”) 10 regarding Nichols’ behavior. Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges USMS Slope improperly interrogated her. Id. 11 Thereafter, Plaintiff claims USMS Nichols and Slope engaged in “[cyber-hacking], tampering civil 12 cases, using under cover spy ops” to intrude on her personal and professional life. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff 13 states as a result of USMS Nichols and Slope’s actions she and her daughters suffered mental and 14 emotional distress, medical issues, financial hardship, and her cars and property were damaged. Id. at 15 8. 16 The complaint also includes allegations about Plaintiff and her daughters experiencing “high 17 voltage shocks…painful poking needle” claims revolving around radio frequency identification, mind 18 threats, and “memories of chips medical procedures.” Id. at 30. Plaintiff asks the Court to award her 19 $10 billion in damages, protection from the U.S. government, or a job position with Federal Protective 20 Services, that the Electronic Communication Privacy Act be abolished and to abolish the “vote from 21 2008-2022.” Id. at 50. 22 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 23 A. Legal Standard 24 A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of 25 subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 26 to consider claims that are “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this court, or 27
28 1 Although Nichols is referred throughout the complaint as “Defendant,” he in fact is not named in the caption of the complaint and no summons was issued for his service. 1 otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for 2 a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974) (a court 3 lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims that are “essentially fictitious,” “obviously frivolous” or 4 “obviously without merit”). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law 5 or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A court may dismiss a claim as frivolous 6 where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are 7 baseless. Id. at 327; Rule 12(h)(3). 8 Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th 9 Cir. 2010). Prior to dismissal, the court is to tell the plaintiff of deficiencies in the complaint and 10 provide an opportunity to cure—if it appears in any way possible the defects can be corrected. See 11 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, if amendment would be 12 futile, leave to amend need not be given. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 13 1996). 14 B. Discussion 15 This Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims. As set forth above, 16 supra at 2, Plaintiff’s allegations are inherently implausible and expressly implicate the kind of claims 17 that are subject to dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See e.g., Christiana v. United 18 States, No. SA CV 17-0089-DOC (JCGx), 2017 WL 6512220, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2017) 19 (dismissing action where Court determined it lacked jurisdiction over claims that the United States 20 was “electrically shocking parts of Plaintiff’s body” and “burglarizing Plaintiff’s home” as “inherently 21 implausible and obviously without merit”); Schultz v. Krause, No. S-11-1796 MCE GGH PS, 2011 22 WL 6293939, at *4, (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2011) (the Court found on their face, Plaintiff’s conspiracy 23 and spying claims were “so bizarre and delusional that they are wholly insubstantial and cannot invoke 24 this court’s subject matter jurisdiction”), F&R adopted, 2012 WL 74779. 25 Indeed, Plaintiff previously filed an unrelated action in the Northern District of California that 26 raised similar allegations against the United States of America concerning the Department of Justice’s 27 failure to produce recordings of alleged threats, tortures and break-ins, the government’s employment 28 of electronic sound effects of voices patronizing of false accusations, and defendants’ infliction of 1 mental psychological abuse. Arnold v. United States, No. 19-cv-05147-SVK, 2020 WL 732995, at *1- 2 2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2020). The Court dismissed that action, finding: “Plaintiff’s implausible claims 3 cannot confer subject-matter jurisdiction on this Court.” Id. 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) states that a court “should freely give leave [to 5 amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, “[a] district court acts within its 6 discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.” V.V.V.
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1 2 3
4 5 6 7 9 EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10
11 MARIE ENCAR ARNOLD, Case No. 1:23-cv-00266-ADA-CDB
12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS TO GRANT DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO DISMISS 13 v. PLAINTIFF’S COMPLAINT
14 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT., et al. (Docs. 14)
15 Defendants. 21-DAY DEADLINE 16 17
18 Pending before the Court is Defendant the United States of America’s motion to dismiss
19 Plaintiff Marie Encar Arnold’s (“Plaintiff”) complaint (Doc. 14) and the parties’ respective applicable 20 opposition and reply. (Docs. 16, 22). On April 26, 2023, the Honorable District Judge Ana de Alba 21 referred the pending motion to dismiss to the undersigned, consistent with 18 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) 22 and E.D. Cal. Local Rule 304(a). (Doc. 16). For the foregoing reasons, the Court will recommend 23 Defendant’s motion to dismiss be granted, Plaintiff’s motion to transfer venue be denied, and 24 Plaintiff’s complaint be dismissed with prejudice and without leave to amend. 25 Background 26 On February 22, 2023, Plaintiff filed a complaint against Defendants the United States of 27 America, the “United States District Court,” the United States Department of Justice, the United States 28 Marshals Service, and Russel Slope. See generally (Doc. 1). The 50-page complaint, appended with 1 approximately 90 pages of exhibits, is convoluted and difficult to comprehend. (Doc. 1 at 1-50). 2 Liberally construed, Plaintiff alleges that on April 22, 2021, she filed pleadings at the Clerk’s Office in 3 the United States District in San Francisco, California. Id. at 4. Thereafter, Plaintiff went to the 4 building’s cafeteria where “Defendant USMS George Nichols” (“USMS Nichols”)1 approached her 5 table and talked to her. Id. Plaintiff claims USMS Nichols was “stating out loud criminal defense” 6 and that he committed an unwarranted invasion of her privacy, “tampering with victim, witness, or an 7 informant during civil case litigation, education, job search, spying on bank account, assets, [social 8 security number]” and retaliated against her. Id. at 4-5. 9 At some point, Plaintiff filed a complaint letter to USMS Russel Slope (“USMS Slope”) 10 regarding Nichols’ behavior. Id. at 6. Plaintiff alleges USMS Slope improperly interrogated her. Id. 11 Thereafter, Plaintiff claims USMS Nichols and Slope engaged in “[cyber-hacking], tampering civil 12 cases, using under cover spy ops” to intrude on her personal and professional life. Id. at 6-7. Plaintiff 13 states as a result of USMS Nichols and Slope’s actions she and her daughters suffered mental and 14 emotional distress, medical issues, financial hardship, and her cars and property were damaged. Id. at 15 8. 16 The complaint also includes allegations about Plaintiff and her daughters experiencing “high 17 voltage shocks…painful poking needle” claims revolving around radio frequency identification, mind 18 threats, and “memories of chips medical procedures.” Id. at 30. Plaintiff asks the Court to award her 19 $10 billion in damages, protection from the U.S. government, or a job position with Federal Protective 20 Services, that the Electronic Communication Privacy Act be abolished and to abolish the “vote from 21 2008-2022.” Id. at 50. 22 Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject-Matter Jurisdiction 23 A. Legal Standard 24 A complaint may be dismissed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of 25 subject-matter jurisdiction. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). A federal court lacks subject matter jurisdiction 26 to consider claims that are “so insubstantial, implausible, foreclosed by prior decisions of this court, or 27
28 1 Although Nichols is referred throughout the complaint as “Defendant,” he in fact is not named in the caption of the complaint and no summons was issued for his service. 1 otherwise completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal controversy.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for 2 a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 89 (1998); Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974) (a court 3 lacks subject matter jurisdiction over claims that are “essentially fictitious,” “obviously frivolous” or 4 “obviously without merit”). A claim is legally frivolous when it lacks an arguable basis either in law 5 or in fact. Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). A court may dismiss a claim as frivolous 6 where it is based on an indisputably meritless legal theory or where the factual contentions are 7 baseless. Id. at 327; Rule 12(h)(3). 8 Pro se pleadings are to be liberally construed. Hebbe v. Pliler, 627 F.3d 338, 342 & n.7 (9th 9 Cir. 2010). Prior to dismissal, the court is to tell the plaintiff of deficiencies in the complaint and 10 provide an opportunity to cure—if it appears in any way possible the defects can be corrected. See 11 Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130-31 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). However, if amendment would be 12 futile, leave to amend need not be given. Cahill v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 80 F.3d 336, 339 (9th Cir. 13 1996). 14 B. Discussion 15 This Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction to hear Plaintiff’s claims. As set forth above, 16 supra at 2, Plaintiff’s allegations are inherently implausible and expressly implicate the kind of claims 17 that are subject to dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. See e.g., Christiana v. United 18 States, No. SA CV 17-0089-DOC (JCGx), 2017 WL 6512220, at *2 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2017) 19 (dismissing action where Court determined it lacked jurisdiction over claims that the United States 20 was “electrically shocking parts of Plaintiff’s body” and “burglarizing Plaintiff’s home” as “inherently 21 implausible and obviously without merit”); Schultz v. Krause, No. S-11-1796 MCE GGH PS, 2011 22 WL 6293939, at *4, (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2011) (the Court found on their face, Plaintiff’s conspiracy 23 and spying claims were “so bizarre and delusional that they are wholly insubstantial and cannot invoke 24 this court’s subject matter jurisdiction”), F&R adopted, 2012 WL 74779. 25 Indeed, Plaintiff previously filed an unrelated action in the Northern District of California that 26 raised similar allegations against the United States of America concerning the Department of Justice’s 27 failure to produce recordings of alleged threats, tortures and break-ins, the government’s employment 28 of electronic sound effects of voices patronizing of false accusations, and defendants’ infliction of 1 mental psychological abuse. Arnold v. United States, No. 19-cv-05147-SVK, 2020 WL 732995, at *1- 2 2 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 13, 2020). The Court dismissed that action, finding: “Plaintiff’s implausible claims 3 cannot confer subject-matter jurisdiction on this Court.” Id. 4 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(a)(2) states that a court “should freely give leave [to 5 amend] when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). However, “[a] district court acts within its 6 discretion to deny leave to amend when amendment would be futile.” V.V.V. & Sons Edible Oils Ltd. 7 v. Meenakshi Overseas, LLC, 946 F.3d 542, 547 (9th Cir. 2019) (citation omitted). While the court 8 ordinarily would permit a pro se plaintiff the opportunity to amend, Plaintiff’s delusional allegations in 9 this action compel this Court to conclude that amendment of the complaint would be futile. Cahill, 80 10 F.3d at 339. Allowing Plaintiff to amend her complaint would be futile, as more detailed allegations 11 regarding Plaintiff’s claims of spying, mind control, and other alleged conduct would not remedy the 12 Complaint’s lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, the Court recommends that Plaintiff’s 13 complaint be dismissed without leave to amend.2 14 Conclusion and Recommendation 15 For the reasons set forth above, the Court finds it lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over 16 Plaintiff’s claims. Accordingly, the Court HEREBY RECOMMENDS that: 17 1. Defendant’s motion to dismiss (Doc. 14) be GRANTED; 18 2. Plaintiff’s complaint (Doc. 1) be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE and without leave to 19 amend; and 20 3. The Clerk of Court be directed to close this case. 21 These findings and recommendations will be submitted to the United States district judge 22 assigned to the case, pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Within twenty-one days 23 after being served with these findings and recommendations, Plaintiff may file written objections with 24 the Court. The document should be captioned “Objections to Magistrate Judge’s Findings and 25 Recommendations.” Plaintiff is advised that failure to file objections within the specified time may 26 27
28 2 The assigned district judge has denied without prejudice Plaintiff’s separate motion to transfer venue (Doc. 28). 1 || result in the waiver of rights on appeal. Wilkerson v. Wheeler, 772 F.3d 834, 839 (9th Cir. 2014) 2 || (citing Baxter v. Sullivan, 923 F.2d 1391, 1394 (9th Cir. 1991)). 3 || IT IS SO ORDERED. Dated: _May 17, 2023 | hr 5 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28