Arnold v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Company

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: July 9, 2025
• Docket: 5:24-cv-06472
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 5 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 6 SAN JOSE DIVISION 7 8 MARIE ENCAR ARNOLD, Case No. 24-cv-06472-EKL (VKD)

9 Plaintiff, ORDER RE DISCOVERY DISPUTE RE 10 v. PLAINTIFF'S DEPOSITION OF DEFENDANT 11 METROPOLITAN LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY, Re: Dkt. Nos. 53, 57 12 Defendant.

13 14 Defendant Metropolitan Life Insurance Company (“Metropolitan”) asks the Court to issue 15 a protective order, pursuant to Rule 26(c)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, preventing 16 plaintiff Marie Arnold from taking depositions of Metropolitan and its employees, at least until the 17 pleadings in this action are settled. Dkt. No. 53, 56. Ms. Arnold’s position is unclear. Referring 18 specifically to her notice of deposition addressed to Metropolitan’s employee, Kevin Lonergan, 19 Ms. Arnold states: “Prematurely, obtaining discovery does not prejudice the preparations. 20 Plaintiff Marie Encar Arnold has agreed to wait for the CMC meeting in person with Federal 21 Honorable District Judge Lee in an email.” Dkt. No. 57 at 2. 22 A district court has “wide discretion in controlling discovery,” Little v. City of Seattle, 863 23 F.2d 681, 685 (9th Cir. 1988), and may issue an order staying discovery upon a showing of “good 24 cause,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1)(A). Metropolitan argues that there is good cause to stay 25 discovery in view of the presiding judge’s orders dismissing Ms. Arnold’s original and amended 26 complaints, and because the discovery sought is unduly burdensome and irrelevant. Dkt. No. 53; 27 Dkt. No. 56. 1 complaint with leave to amend. Dkt. No. 40. On June 24, 2025, the presiding judge granted 2 || Metropolitan’s motion to dismiss the first amended complaint as well. Dkt. No. 55. Although the 3 || presiding judge again afforded Ms. Arnold an opportunity to further amend her complaint, the 4 || order specifically advised Ms. Amold: “If the second amended complaint does not substantially 5 comply with [the Court’s directives regarding necessary amendments], the Court will be inclined 6 || to dismiss this action with prejudice.” Jd. at 6-7. 7 Ms. Arnold filed a second amended complaint on July 8, 2025. Dkt. No. 58. While the 8 second amended complaint includes additional allegations, it appears to be vulnerable to dismissal 9 || on the same grounds cited in the presiding judge’s June 24, 2025 order dismissing the first 10 amended complaint—namely, (1) failure to comply with the pleading requirements of Rule 8, see 11 Dkt. No. 55 at 3; (2) failure to address why the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel do 12 not bar the claims asserted, see id. at 4-5; and (3) failure to address why claims arising in 2012 are 5 13 || not time barred, see id. at 5. While Metropolitan has not yet moved to dismiss Ms. Amold’s 14 second amended complaint, it persuasively argues that it is not possible for Ms. Arnold to amend 3 15 her pleadings to state any viable claim for relief. See Dkt. No. 53 at 2-3. Metropolitan has also 16 shown that the discovery Ms. Arnold seeks—i.e. deposition testimony of Metropolitan’s agent 3 17 Kevin Lonergan—has no bearing on the matters addressed in the June 24, 2025 order dismissing 18 the amended complaint. See id. at3. Ms. Arnold does not address this issue in her response. 19 Accordingly, the Court grants Metropolitan’s request for a protective order staying 20 || discovery at this time because Metropolitan has shown that it is highly unlikely Ms. Arnold will be 21 able to state a claim for relief.! See Wenger v. Monroe, 282 F.3d 1068, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002). 22 || Thus, neither party may seek or obtain discovery unless and until the pleadings are settled. 23 IT IS SO ORDERED. 24 Dated: July 9, 2025

6 Virginia K. DeMarchi United States Magistrate Judge 27 28 ' The Court does not rely on or address the other grounds Metropolitan cites for entry of a protective order.