Arnold v. Langmuir

36 F.2d 834, 17 C.C.P.A. 756
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJanuary 13, 1930
DocketPatent Appeal 2188
StatusPublished
Cited by6 cases

This text of 36 F.2d 834 (Arnold v. Langmuir) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arnold v. Langmuir, 36 F.2d 834, 17 C.C.P.A. 756 (ccpa 1930).

Opinion

GRAHAM, Presiding Judge.

Interference proceedings were instituted in the Patent Office between the appellant, Harold D. Arnold, and the appellee, Irving Langmuir. The subjeet-matter of the interference is contained in twelve counts, three of which are typical and which are as follows:

“1. An oscillation generator comprising a resonant circuit for determining the frequency supplied by said generator; a load circuit adapted to be energized by said generator and a three electrode electric discharge repeater for transferring alternating current energy from said generator to said load circuit and preventing said load circuit from reacting on said generator.”
“5. An oscillation generator of the audion type, an alternating current load circuit and an audion repeater between said generator and said load circuit whereby the frequency of the current supplied by said generator is independent of the character of said load circuit.”
“6. An Oscillation generator comprising a discharge device having an input circuit and an output circuit reacting on said input circujt, a load circuit for coupling said generator to a load, and an asymmetrically conducting repeater in circuit between said generator and said load for preventing said load from reacting on said generator.”

The senior party, Langmuir, filed his divisional application, serial No. 708,826, on April 24, 1924. ' This was claimed to be a division of a prior application, serial No. 797,987, filed October 29, 1913, and which said original application was pending at the time this interference was declared. The junior party, Arnold, filed his application for patent August 28, 1917, serial No. 188,562, and which application ripened into a patent on February 25, 1924. On March 23, 1925, Arnold moved that the burden of proof in the interference matter should be shifted to rest upon Langmuir, for the reason that the counts involved in this interference are not supported by the disclosure in Langmuir’s earlier application, No. 797,987, and that Langmuir should therefore be restricted to his application No. 708,820, which, as we have seen, was filed subsequent to Arnold’s filing date. At the same .time, Arnold moved that the interference be dissolved on the alleged ground that claims corresponding to the interference counts are unpatentable to Langmuir, in view of certain references which are said to be statutory bars against the divisional application of Langmuir, and which are said to be not bars against, and which do not anticipate, the Arnold patent involved herein. In connection with this motion, certain speeifieí. references are relied upon. The Law Examiner, after consideration of these motions, held that the alleged divisional application of Langmuir was entitled to the date of the parent case as to counts 1 to 11, inclusive, and 14, but not as to counts 12 and 13, as to which counts the motion to dissolve was allowed. This action was approved by the Examiner of Interferences. Thereafter the Examiner of Interferences awarded priority of invention to Langmuir, and the Board of Appeals affirmed this decision.

*835 The first matter for consideration is the contention made by appellant that the claims made in the divisional application of appellee do not read upon the original claims in appellee’s parent application of October 29, 1913, and that therefore the appellee is not entitled to any earlier date of disclosure and constructive reduction to practice than that shown by his divisional application, namely, April 24, 1924. In this respect it is claimed that in the said parent application Langmuir did not refer to the repeater which is connected between the oscillating generator and the load circuit as an asymmetric device, whereas, in the divisional application of Langmuir, and in the claims of Arnold in his patent, No. 1,485,156, this language is used. In reply to this suggestion, the Law Examiner and the Examiner of Interferences both held that the original disclosure of Langmuir in the patent application was sufficient upon which to base the divisional application; that an examination of the device showed by the drawings and described in the specifications in the parent application of Langmuir were sufficient to disclose that the said device had the inherent properties of an asymmetrically conducting repeater.

We have examined the drawings in both the parent application and the divisional application of Langmuir, and find that the drawing in the divisional application, figure 2, is exactly the same as the drawing accompanying the parent application. In the specifications in the parent application, the said repeater is referred to as an “electron discharge tube,” while Arnold’s and Langmuir’s divisional application describe this device as being of the “audion” type. It is claimed by the appellee, and not controverted by the appellant, that the electron discharge tube and audion have the same functions, and are operated in the same manner. The mere use of the word “asymmetric” is not in itself enough to make a distinction between the divisional claim and the parent application. If it is. plainly apparent from the drawings and specifications, when read in view of the knowledge of the art which the experts in the Patent Offiee are presumed to have, that the same disclosure was made in each case, in our opinion that is sufficient upon which to base a divisional application. If the invention was shown in the parent application of Langmuir, even though the particular use of it now made might not have been in his mind at the time, he is entitled to any use to 'which his invention might be put. It was said in Cleveland Foundry Co. v. Detroit Vapor Stove Co. (C. C. A.) 131 F. 853, 858:

“This distinction harmonizes with the doctrine that the benefit secured by an invention extends to all the uses of which it is capable, whether the inventor had them all in contemplation or not, and the other rule, to which we have already referred, that it does not matter that he does not understand the principles on which his device operates. If he discovers new uses to which his invention may be put, or discerns the principles thereof-more clearly, while his application is pending, in neither ease is there any new invention, nor any enlargement of the old. And, that being so, there can be no legal objection to his so molding his claims as to secure all his invention discloses.”

See, also, Dwight & Lloyd S. Co. v. Greenawalt (C. C. A.) 27 F.(2d) 823; Mershon & Co. v. Bay City B. & L. Co. (C. C.) 189 F. 741; Howe Mach. Co. v. Nat. Needle Co., 134 U. S. 388, 10 S. Ct. 570, 33 L. Ed. 963; Roberts v. Ryer, 91 U. S. 150, 23 L. Ed. 267.

We agree with the Patent Offiee that appellee was entitled to make claims 1 to 11, inclusive, and 14, of his divisional application, and to take the date of the parent application, namely, October 29, 1913, for a constructive reduction to practice.

It is contended by appellant that Langmuir failed to make his divisional application from October 29,1913, to April 24,1924, and that this circumstance should be held to constitute laehes and to bar his‘claim. Arnold obtained his patent in February, 1924, and Langmuir made his divisional claim about two months later. No abandonment or lack of diligence is alleged to have occurred during that period.

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36 F.2d 834, 17 C.C.P.A. 756, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arnold-v-langmuir-ccpa-1930.