Arnold v. Huntington Ingalls Industries

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Virginia
DecidedMay 30, 2025
Docket2:22-cv-00384
StatusUnknown

This text of Arnold v. Huntington Ingalls Industries (Arnold v. Huntington Ingalls Industries) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Virginia primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arnold v. Huntington Ingalls Industries, (E.D. Va. 2025).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Norfolk Division

FALINE ARNOLD, Plaintiff, v. Action No. 2:22cv384

HUNTINGTON INGALLS INCORPORATED, Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER This matter is before the Court on Huntington Ingalls Incorporated’s (“HII”) motion for sanctions seeking dismissal of the case with prejudice. ECF No. 232. The factual background, procedural history, and analysis outlined in the report and recommendation entered contemporaneously with this opinion and order are incorporated as if fully set forth herein. See ECF No. 295. For the reasons stated in the report and recommendation, the Court finds that sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(b)(2)(A)(ii) are just and appropriate to remedy Ms. Arnold’s failure to comply with discovery obligations and discovery orders. The sanctions imposed are detailed below. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37 “gives the district court wide discretion to impose sanctions for a party’s failure to comply” with discovery obligations. Mut. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Richards & Assocs., Inc., 872 F.2d 88, 92 (4th Cir. 1989). Rule 37(b)(2) authorizes a district court to impose the following sanctions for failure to obey a discovery order: (i) directing that facts be taken as established; (ii) prohibiting designated claims or defenses or the use of certain

evidence; (iii) striking pleadings in whole or in part; (iv) staying the case until the default is cured; (v) dismissing the case in whole or in part; (vi) entering default judgment; and (vii) treating the failure to obey an order as contempt of court. Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A). Rule 37(d)(3) also authorizes imposing the first six sanctions provided in Rule 37(b)(2)(A) if “a party, after being properly served with interrogatories under Rule 33 or a request for inspection under Rule 34, fails to serve its answers, objections, or written response.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(d)(1)(A)(ii), (d)(3). The Fourth Circuit has adopted a four-part test for determining whether (and, if so, which) Rule 37(d) sanctions are appropriate in a particular case. Belk v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 269 F.3d 305, 348 (4th Cir. 2001) (en banc). The district court “must determine (1) whether the non-complying party acted in bad faith, (2) the amount of prejudice that noncompliance caused the adversary, (3) the need for deterrence of the particular sort of non-compliance, and (4) whether less drastic sanctions would have been effective.” Jd. Il. DISCUSSION As explained in the report and recommendation, Ms. Arnold acted in bad faith in failing to respond in timely and complete fashion to HII’s discovery requests and failed to obey the Court’s discovery orders, her actions prejudiced HII, and the need exists to deter further noncompliance. In summary, and as discussed in detail in the report and recommendation, Ms. Arnold failed to: (1) appear for the inspection of her cellphone or provide copies of ESI in compliance with Rule 34 on March 19, 2025; (2) timely provide documents in response to HII’s requests for production of documents; (3) timely and completely produce text messages on her cellphone; (4) timely respond to the Court’s order to provide an affidavit about documents produced to HII on April 21, 2025, or comply with the order when given an extension of time to do so; and (5) testify candidly during

the evidentiary hearing with respect to her production of discovery to HII. Thus, sanctions are appropriate pursuant to Rule 37(b) and (d). The sanction of dismissing Ms. Arnold’s case with prejudice is unwarranted, as discussed in the report and recommendation. Instead, a lesser sanction better serves the administration of justice and fits the facts of this case. Therefore, the Court exercises its discretion to limit Ms. Arnold’s use of certain designated matters in support of her claims going forward. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 37(b)(2)(A)(ii). To enable the parties to identify the evidence in question and to ensure compliance with this order, the Court lists below the disputed discovery items that Ms. Arnold may use to support her claims henceforth. It is impossible at this juncture to identify, from the universe of information Ms. Arnold claims to possess but has not disclosed in discovery, every documentary item that she is prohibited from using to support her claims. For the sake of clarity, however, the Court also partly identifies, from among the disputed items discussed by the parties in their recent filings, some of the items that Ms. Arnold may not use to support her claims. A. Text Messages 1. Text messages subject to future use by Ms. Arnold. On April 21, 2025, Ms. Amold produced to HII fourteen (14) sets of screenshots of text messages with different individuals and/or phone numbers. ECF No. 280, at 11-12. After reviewing the same, the Court determined that the screenshots produced on April 21, 2025 were “at best, woefully incomplete” and based on new information presented by Ms. Arnold directed her to produce “complete text message strings” to HII “in a complete, sequential, and accurate manner” by noon on May 19, 2025. ECF No. 283, at 2-3. On May 19, 2025, Ms. Arnold produced to HII four sets of text strings in four folders, along with nineteen (19) additional pages of screenshots, photographs, and three blank pages not contained in a folder. ECF No. 289, at 1-2.

After review and in light of the testimony and evidence received at the hearing on May 21, 2025, the Court finds that only three of the text message strings produced on May 19, 2025 by Ms. Amold are sufficiently complete, sequential, and accurate. Accordingly, going forward Ms. Arnold may use, subject to objection and the Court’s ruling on the same, only the following text messages in support of her claims: (a) 92 pages of text messages between Ms. Arnold and Mr. Harris’ personal phone (# XXX-7338) from March 26, 2020 to January 13, 2022, as set forth in ECF No. 289-2, at 2-93; (b) 62 pages of text messages between Ms. Arnold and Mr. Harris’ work phone (# XXX-2184) from March 9, 2020 to September 1, 2021, as set forth in ECF No. 289-3, at 2-63; and (c) 11 pages of text messages between Ms. Arnold and Mr. Andrews’ phone (# XXX-5287) from May 20, 2020 to September 8, 2021, as set forth in ECF No. 289-4, at 2-12.! 2. Text messages and screenshots that Ms. Arnold is prohibited from using going forward. Ms. Arnold failed to timely produce complete text strings of the text messages and screenshots noted below in response to HII’s discovery requests and the Court’s Orders.

' The Court rejects HII’s contentions in defense counsel’s affidavit, ECF No. 289, at 2 { 6, and at the May 21, 2025 hearing, May 21, 2025 Hrg. Tr., ECF No. 294, at 124:5—21, that these three text message strings are incomplete because the cellphone application or “app” used to compile them stripped out certain non-text message items, such as multimedia messages, including pictures, videos, or GIFs. In response to questions at the May 21, 2025 hearing, Ms. Arnold satisfied the Court that the images in question were, in fact, contained in the actual text message residing on her cellphone and that she did not intentionally remove them to deprive HII of evidence or to mislead the Court. May 21 Hrg. Tr.

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