Arnold v. General Motors Corp.

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Arnold v. General Motors Corp.

45 A.D.2d 847, 358 N.Y.S.2d 504, 1974 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4434

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJuly 8, 1974

StatusPublished

This text of 45 A.D.2d 847 (Arnold v. General Motors Corp.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Arnold v. General Motors Corp., 45 A.D.2d 847, 358 N.Y.S.2d 504, 1974 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4434 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1974).

Pincite

Opinion

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., defendants appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated December 28, 1973, as, in granting their motion to dismiss the action for plaintiffs’ failure to timely serve a complaint, did so only if a complaint is not served within a stated time. Order reversed, insofar as appealed from, with $20 costs and disbursements, and motion granted unconditionally. Plaintiffs’ failure to serve a complaint for 26 months after a demand for service thereof was unreasonable and unjustified (see McKay v. Smithtown Gen. Hosp., 42 A D 2d 594; Beckham v. Lefferts Gen. Hosp., 36 A D 2d 726). Therefore, it was an improvident exercise of Special Term’s discretion to condition the grant of defendants’ motion on plaintiffs’ continuing failure to serve a complaint within the 20-day period designated in the order under review. The motion should have been granted unconditionally. Hopkins, Acting P. J., Latham, Cohalan and Munder, JJ., concur.

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In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., defendants appeal from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated December 28, 1973, as, in granting their motion to dismiss the action for plaintiffs’ failure to timely serve a complaint, did so only if a complaint is not served within a stated time. Order reversed, insofar as appealed from, with $20 costs and disbursements, and motion granted unconditionally. Plaintiffs’ failure to serve a complaint for 26 months after a demand for service thereof was unreasonable and unjustified (see McKay v. Smithtown Gen. Hosp., 42 A D 2d 594; Beckham v. Lefferts Gen. Hosp., 36 A D 2d 726). Therefore, it was an improvident exercise of Special Term’s discretion to condition the grant of defendants’ motion on plaintiffs’ continuing failure to serve a complaint within the 20-day period designated in the order under review. The motion should have been granted unconditionally. Hopkins, Acting P. J., Latham, Cohalan and Munder, JJ., concur.

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Bluebook (online)

45 A.D.2d 847, 358 N.Y.S.2d 504, 1974 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 4434, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arnold-v-general-motors-corp-nyappdiv-1974.