Arnold S. Wax v. Adam Wax and Bobbi Ring, as Personal Representatives of the Estate of Bonny L. Wax

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: October 29, 2025
• Docket: 3D2023-1942
• Status: Published

Opinion

Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida

Opinion filed October 29, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.

________________

No. 3D23-1942 Lower Tribunal No. 22-23472-FC-04 ________________

Arnold S. Wax, Appellant,

vs.

Kerrin Friedman, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Bonny L. Wax, Appellee.

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, David Young, Judge.

Kreusler-Walsh, Vargas & Serafin, P.A., and Stephanie L. Serafin and Rebecca M. Vargas (Palm Beach Gardens); Shafer Cohen, LLP, and Lewis R. Shafer (Boca Raton), for appellant.

Sandy T. Fox, P.A., and Sandy T. Fox and Sara E. Ross, for appellee.

Before SCALES, C.J., and LOGUE and LOBREE, JJ.

LOGUE, J. Arnold S. Wax appeals a partial final judgment dissolving his marriage

to Bonny Lee Wax. 1 He contends the judgment is void for lack of subject

matter jurisdiction because the parties failed to present the statutorily

required corroborating evidence of residency. The Wife, in turn, raises her

own jurisdictional challenge. She argues this Court lacks jurisdiction to

review the trial court’s decision dissolving the marriage because the trial

court reserved jurisdiction to adjudicate all other issues pertaining to the

parties’ dissolution of marriage action, thus rendering the judgment non-final

and non-appealable.

Because we conclude the partial final judgment is final insofar as the

marital status of the parties is concerned, we have jurisdiction. We are

constrained, however, to reverse as the Husband is correct that no

corroborating evidence of residency for either party was presented prior to

entry of the partial final judgment.

BACKGROUND

This appeal arises from a dissolution of marriage proceeding seeking

to dissolve an approximately 55-year marriage. The Husband and Wife were

1 Bonny Lee Wax, the Wife, passed away after the trial court entered the partial final judgment. Accordingly, Kerrin Friedman, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Bonny L. Wax, has been substituted as Appellee. This opinion will continue to refer to the Appellee as Wife for ease.

2 both in their mid-seventies at the time and shared three adult children. The

Husband initiated the proceedings by filing a verified petition for dissolution

of marriage, which alleged both parties had been residents of Florida for

more than six months immediately preceding the petition. The Wife filed an

answer and counterpetition for dissolution of marriage. She admitted the

Husband’s jurisdictional allegation and similarly alleged the parties had been

residents of Florida for the six months preceding the filing. The Husband

admitted the Wife’s jurisdictional allegation.

After the case had been proceeding for almost a year, the Wife filed an

emergency motion to bifurcate the proceedings and for immediate entry of a

final judgment dissolving the marriage. She alleged she had three strokes in

four months and was in a rehabilitation center following her most recent

stroke. Due to her health condition and advanced age, the Wife asked the

trial court to bifurcate the proceedings and enter a final judgment dissolving

the marriage because she feared the Husband’s documented delays and

objections were deliberately designed to prolong proceedings until the Wife

passed away. The Wife argued that if this occurred, she would lose all rights

to equitable distribution along with any entitlements to assets held jointly by

the Husband and Wife as tenants by the entireties.

3 The trial court set the Wife’s emergency motion for a fifteen-minute

Zoom hearing. The Husband and his counsel appeared at the hearing. The

Wife’s counsel also appeared at the hearing and advised the trial court the

Wife was available and could join the hearing if the trial court wanted to hear

from her.

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court stated it would be

granting the divorce and called the Husband to testify. After swearing him in,

the trial court asked the Husband whether he had lived in Florida for more

than six months and whether the marriage was over. The Husband answered

yes to both questions. No other evidence was introduced and at no time did

the Husband or his counsel allege the trial court lacked subject matter

jurisdiction or that either party’s residency status was in question.

The trial court thereafter entered a partial final judgment dissolving the

marriage and reserving jurisdiction on all other issues. In the partial final

judgment, the trial court found it had “jurisdiction over the parties and the

subject matter of this case.” The trial court further found the Husband had

“been a resident of Florida, for more than six (6) months before the filing of

the [Husband’s] Verified Petition for Dissolution of Marriage and Other

Relief.” Finally, the trial court found it had “the right to exercise its discretion

to bifurcate the[ ] proceedings to grant the parties a divorce while reserving

4 as to all other issues based upon the age of the parties and that the health

of the Wife might be an issue.”

The Husband timely filed his notice of appeal, and one day later the

Wife passed away. The Husband filed a suggestion of death with this Court

and the personal representative for the Wife’s estate was substituted as

appellee. The Wife thereafter filed a motion to dismiss this appeal

challenging this Court’s jurisdiction to review the partial final judgment. We

have carried that motion with the case.

ANALYSIS

The Husband’s sole argument on appeal is that the trial court lacked

subject matter jurisdiction to enter the partial final judgment because there

was no evidence presented corroborating residency as required by section

61.052, Florida Statutes. Before reaching this issue, however, this Court

must determine whether it has jurisdiction to review the partial final judgment

dissolving the parties’ marriage. The Wife argues the Court lacks jurisdiction

because the partial final judgment was the result of a bifurcated proceeding

in which the trial court reserved jurisdiction to adjudicate all other issues

pertaining to the parties’ dissolution of marriage action. The Wife contends

that, as a result, the partial final judgment is not in fact a final, appealable

order. We address each issue below.

5 I. Jurisdiction

The Wife argues dismissal of this appeal is required based on this

Court’s prior decisions in Klein v. Klein, 551 So. 2d 1235 (Fla. 3d DCA 1989),

and Salzverg v. Salzverg, 696 So. 2d 1278 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).

In Klein, this Court dismissed the wife’s appeal of an order that

dissolved the parties’ marriage, reserved jurisdiction as to the issues of child

custody, child support, alimony, and division of property, and enjoined the

parties from disturbing any of their assets. Klein, 551 So. 2d at 1235. This

Court reasoned that “[t]he order appealed from [was] clearly not a final

appealable order because the judicial labor in the case [had] not come to an

end . . . [and] the subject order [was] not one of the interlocutory orders

appealable under [Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure] 9.130(a).” Id.

(internal citations omitted). Notably, as was the case here, the trial court in

Klein also “bifurcate[d] the marriage dissolution issue from the other issues

in the case[.]” Id. at 1236.

Similarly, in Salzverg, this Court dismissed the husband’s appeal “from

a ‘bifurcated’ order which simply dissolved the parties' marriage . . . for lack

of jurisdiction.” Salzverg, 696 So. 2d at 1278. Salzverg did not include any

significant reasoning, however, apart from citing to Klein.

6 While both cases would appear to be squarely on point, they neglect

to mention or discuss the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Galbut v.

Garfinkl, 340 So. 2d 470 (Fla. 1976). In Galbut, the Supreme Court was

considering a partial judgment of dissolution which reserved jurisdiction to

consider alimony and distribution, and which was entered because of the

husband’s failing health. Id. at 471-72. The lower district court, this Court,

held that this partial judgment of dissolution was a non-final order but certified

the question whether “an order dissolving a marriage prior to final judgment

shall be regarded as an interlocutory order and not as a partial judgment.”

Id. at 473. The Supreme Court accepted jurisdiction, quashed the district

court’s order, and held that a “partial judgment of dissolution is final insofar

as the marital status of the parties is concerned[.]” Id.

Galbut has been relied upon by almost every other district court to

support the conclusion that an order that dissolves a marriage and reserves

jurisdiction to determine all other issues is final and appealable as a partial

final judgment pursuant to Rule 9.110(k). See Shepardson v. Shepardson,

820 So. 2d 360, 361 (Fla. 1st DCA 2002) (“An order dissolving the marriage

but declining to address the remaining issues has been treated as a partial

final judgment. The line of cases out of which this conclusion arose generally

involves bifurcated dissolution proceedings. There is significant case law

7 addressing the trial court’s authority to dissolve a marriage while specifically

reserving jurisdiction to address such other matters as alimony, child

support, and the equitable distribution of property.” (internal citation

omitted)); Haritos v. Haritos, 193 So. 3d 1050, 1052 (Fla. 2d DCA 2016)

(“The June 2013 final judgment of dissolution was a partial final judgment

insofar as the marital status of the parties was concerned.”); Barnett v.

Barnett, 743 So. 2d 105, 105 n.1 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) (“We therefore

conclude that where . . . the marriage is dissolved and one of the parties dies

before the remaining issues are resolved, the order dissolving the marriage

is appealable as a final judgment.”); Bland v. Bland, 971 So. 2d 210, 212

(Fla. 5th DCA 2007) (“The case law indicates that an order that dissolves a

marriage and reserves jurisdiction to determine all other issues is a partial

final judgment for purposes of Rule 9.110(k).”).

This Court, moreover, in at least one decision pre-dating Klein and

Salzverg, seemingly deemed a final judgment of dissolution that reserved

jurisdiction for a future determination of property rights to be a final,

appealable order. See Behar v. Se. Banks Tr. Co., N. A., 374 So. 2d 572

(Fla. 3d DCA 1979). In Behar, this Court affirmed the final judgment of

dissolution and noted the trial court “was perfectly justified in bifurcating” the

issue of the dissolution of the parties’ marriage from the remaining issues of

8 “property rights, special equities (if any), alimony, support, etc.,” citing with

approval to Galbut. Id. at 575.

Ultimately, while there is logic supporting this Court’s prior decisions in

Klein and Salzverg, see, e.g., Shepardson, 820 So. 2d at 362, this Court is

bound by the Florida Supreme Court’s decision in Galbut. See Solares v.

City of Miami, 166 So. 3d 887, 888 (Fla. 3d DCA 2015) (“As judges sitting on

a District Court of Appeal, ‘[w]e are bound to follow the case law set forth by

the Florida Supreme Court[.]’” (quoting Carrithers v. Cornett’s Spirit of

Suwannee, Inc., 93 So. 3d 1240, 1242 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012))). Accordingly,

we conclude we have jurisdiction to review the trial court’s order dissolving

the parties’ marriage as it “is final insofar as the marital status of the parties

is concerned[.]” Galbut, 340 So. 2d at 473.

II. Merits

As it pertains to the merits, the Husband’s argument that the trial court

lacked subject matter jurisdiction because neither party presented the

statutorily required corroborating evidence of residency, thus rendering the

partial final judgment void, is correct and requires us to reverse.

Section 61.021, Florida Statutes, states that “[t]o obtain a dissolution

of marriage, one of the parties to the marriage must reside 6 months in the

state before the filing of the petition.” Section 61.052(2), in turn, provides that

9 this residency requirement must be corroborated with evidence, which may

include “a valid Florida driver license, a Florida voter's registration card, a

valid Florida identification card issued under s. 322.051, or the testimony or

affidavit of a third party[.]” § 61.052(2), Fla. Stat.

The Florida Supreme Court has stated that “Florida’s residency

requirement is jurisdictional and must be alleged and proved in every case.”

Fernandez v. Fernandez, 648 So. 2d 712, 713 (Fla. 1995). And

“corroborating testimony cannot be waived by an admission that the

residency requirement has been met.” Id.

Here, while the Husband and Wife both sufficiently alleged residency

in their petition and counter-petition, both admitted the residency allegations

of the opposing party in their respective responses, and the Husband

testified at the hearing that he had been a Florida resident for more than six

months before filing the petition, neither party presented any corroborating

evidence at the hearing.

Accordingly, because both parties failed to present corroborating

evidence of their residence, the trial court lacked jurisdiction to render the

partial final judgment. See, e.g., Wise v. Wise, 310 So. 2d 431, 432 (Fla. 1st

DCA 1975) (holding trial court lacked jurisdiction to render final judgment

where husband failed to properly present proof of his residency because his

10 testimony regarding residency was not corroborated); Grey v. Grey, 995 So.

2d 623, 624 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008) (“In light of the absence of evidence to

establish compliance with the statutory residency requirement, the trial court

erred in entering the final judgment of dissolution.”); McNeil v. Jenkins-

McNeil, 252 So. 3d 354, 356 (Fla. 5th DCA 2018) (“The residency

requirement may not be established by the uncorroborated testimony of one

party, nor can the requirement of corroborating evidence be waived by

admission by the parties in the pleadings that the residency requirement has

been met.” (internal citations omitted)). Therefore, reversal of the partial final

judgment is required.

Reversed.