1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ARNIE GARCIA, JR., Case No. 1: 25-cv-00094-JLT-HBK (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 13 v. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT ORDERS AND TO PROSECUTE 14 O. HERRERA, Officer, et. al., FOURTEEN DAY DEADLINE 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, Arnie Garcia Jr., is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 18 this civil action. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the district court 19 dismiss this action without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with court orders and to 20 prosecute this action. 21 BACKGROUND 22 On March 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 (Doc. No. 9, 23 “Complaint”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the undersigned screened the Complaint and 24 determined that it sufficiently stated an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against 25 Defendants O. Herrera and J. Gallardo and an Eighth Amendment failure to intervene claim 26
27 1 On January 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint that was neither signed nor dated. (Doc. No. 1 at 11-12). The Court struck the unsigned complaint consistent with Federal Rule 11 of Civil Procedure on February 28 25, 2025. (Doc. No. 8). 1 against Defendant Valencia but stated no other claim. (Doc. No. 16, “Screening Order”). To 2 continue the prosecution of this action, the Court directed Plaintiff to either file a first amended 3 complaint, stand on his complaint as screened and voluntarily dismiss claims and defendants not 4 deemed not cognizable, or file a notice to stand on his complaint no later than June 18, 2025. 5 (Id. 13-15). The Court warned Plaintiff that, if he failed to timely comply with the order or seek 6 an extension of time to comply, the undersigned would recommend the district court dismiss this 7 action as a sanction and for failing to comply with the court order and prosecute this action. . (Id. 8 at 15, ¶ 2). 9 After Plaintiff failed to timely comply with the Screening Order, the Court issued an 10 Order to Show Cause on July 24, 2025. (Doc. No. 17). The Court noted Plaintiff had failed to 11 respond to the Screening Order and further warned Plaintiff that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 41(b) permits courts to involuntarily dismiss an action when a litigant fails to prosecute an action 13 or fails to comply with a court order. (Id. at 2). The Court directed Plaintiff to show cause no 14 later than August 8, 2025 why the Court should not recommend that this case be dismissed 15 without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action and/or his failure to timely comply 16 with the Court’s May 19, 2025 Order. (Id.). 17 As of the date of these Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff has not responded to the 18 Screening Order or the Order the Show Cause and the time to do so has long expired.2 19 APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS 20 A. Dismissal Under Local Rule 110 and Federal Rule 41(b) 21 This Court’s Local Rules provides that the “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply 22 with . . . any order of the Court may be grounds for the imposition by the Court of any and all 23 sanctions . . . within the inherent power of the Court.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 110. “District courts have 24 inherent power to control their dockets” and, in exercising that power, may impose sanctions, 25 including dismissal of an action. Thompson v. Housing Auth., City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 26 2 More than 45 days has elapsed from the deadline for Plaintiff to respond to the Order to Show 27 Cause. Indeed, as noted in the Order to Show Cause Plaintiff failed to timely comply with another Court order requiring the Court to previously recall its earlier Findings and 28 Recommendations to dismiss for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute. (See Doc. Nos. 11, 13, 15). 1 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an 2 action, obey a court order, or comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 3 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order to amend a 4 complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for 5 failure to comply with a court order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) 6 (dismissal for failure to prosecute and to comply with local rules). 7 Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily 8 dismiss an action when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with other Rules 9 or with a court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 10 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). In determining whether to dismiss an action 11 under Rule 41(b), the Court must consider several factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious 12 resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the 13 defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the 14 availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423; Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 15 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 16 B. Discussion 17 Considering Local Rule 110, the court appraised Plaintiff both in its Screening Order and 18 its 19 Order to Show Cause that the Court would recommend dismissal as a sanction for failing 20 to comply with a Court order. (See Docs. No. 16 at15, ¶2 and Doc. No. 17 at 2). Thus, the Court 21 may dismiss this case pursuant to Local Rule 110. 22 With regards to the factors under Rule 41, the undersigned concludes dismissal without 23 prejudice is also warranted in this case. As to the first factor, the expeditious resolution of 24 litigation is deemed to be in the public interest. Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 25 990-91 (9th Cir. 1999). 26 Turning to the second factor, this Court’s need to efficiently manage its docket cannot be 27 overstated. This Court has one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation, and due to the delay in 28 filling judicial vacancies, which was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, operated 1 under a declared judicial emergency through May 2, 2021. See In re Approval of the Judicial 2 Emergency Declared in the Eastern District of California, 956 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2020). This 3 Court’s time is better spent on its other matters than needlessly consumed managing a case with a 4 recalcitrant litigant. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket when a litigant ceases to 5 litigate his/her case or respond to a court order. Thus, the Court finds that the second factor 6 weighs in favor of dismissal. 7 Delays inevitably have the inherent risk that evidence will become stale, or witnesses’ 8 memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a defendant, thereby satisfying the third 9 factor. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Thus, the third factor—risk of prejudice 10 to defendant—weighs in favor of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the 11 unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v.
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ARNIE GARCIA, JR., Case No. 1: 25-cv-00094-JLT-HBK (PC) 12 Plaintiff, FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATION TO DISMISS CASE WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR 13 v. FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH COURT ORDERS AND TO PROSECUTE 14 O. HERRERA, Officer, et. al., FOURTEEN DAY DEADLINE 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff, Arnie Garcia Jr., is a state prisoner proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis in 18 this civil action. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned recommends the district court 19 dismiss this action without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to comply with court orders and to 20 prosecute this action. 21 BACKGROUND 22 On March 18, 2025, Plaintiff filed his Complaint under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 (Doc. No. 9, 23 “Complaint”). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the undersigned screened the Complaint and 24 determined that it sufficiently stated an Eighth Amendment excessive force claim against 25 Defendants O. Herrera and J. Gallardo and an Eighth Amendment failure to intervene claim 26
27 1 On January 22, 2025, Plaintiff filed a complaint that was neither signed nor dated. (Doc. No. 1 at 11-12). The Court struck the unsigned complaint consistent with Federal Rule 11 of Civil Procedure on February 28 25, 2025. (Doc. No. 8). 1 against Defendant Valencia but stated no other claim. (Doc. No. 16, “Screening Order”). To 2 continue the prosecution of this action, the Court directed Plaintiff to either file a first amended 3 complaint, stand on his complaint as screened and voluntarily dismiss claims and defendants not 4 deemed not cognizable, or file a notice to stand on his complaint no later than June 18, 2025. 5 (Id. 13-15). The Court warned Plaintiff that, if he failed to timely comply with the order or seek 6 an extension of time to comply, the undersigned would recommend the district court dismiss this 7 action as a sanction and for failing to comply with the court order and prosecute this action. . (Id. 8 at 15, ¶ 2). 9 After Plaintiff failed to timely comply with the Screening Order, the Court issued an 10 Order to Show Cause on July 24, 2025. (Doc. No. 17). The Court noted Plaintiff had failed to 11 respond to the Screening Order and further warned Plaintiff that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12 41(b) permits courts to involuntarily dismiss an action when a litigant fails to prosecute an action 13 or fails to comply with a court order. (Id. at 2). The Court directed Plaintiff to show cause no 14 later than August 8, 2025 why the Court should not recommend that this case be dismissed 15 without prejudice for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute this action and/or his failure to timely comply 16 with the Court’s May 19, 2025 Order. (Id.). 17 As of the date of these Findings and Recommendation, Plaintiff has not responded to the 18 Screening Order or the Order the Show Cause and the time to do so has long expired.2 19 APPLICABLE LAW AND ANALYSIS 20 A. Dismissal Under Local Rule 110 and Federal Rule 41(b) 21 This Court’s Local Rules provides that the “[f]ailure of counsel or of a party to comply 22 with . . . any order of the Court may be grounds for the imposition by the Court of any and all 23 sanctions . . . within the inherent power of the Court.” E.D. Cal. L.R. 110. “District courts have 24 inherent power to control their dockets” and, in exercising that power, may impose sanctions, 25 including dismissal of an action. Thompson v. Housing Auth., City of Los Angeles, 782 F.2d 829, 26 2 More than 45 days has elapsed from the deadline for Plaintiff to respond to the Order to Show 27 Cause. Indeed, as noted in the Order to Show Cause Plaintiff failed to timely comply with another Court order requiring the Court to previously recall its earlier Findings and 28 Recommendations to dismiss for Plaintiff’s failure to prosecute. (See Doc. Nos. 11, 13, 15). 1 831 (9th Cir. 1986). A court may dismiss an action based on a party’s failure to prosecute an 2 action, obey a court order, or comply with local rules. See, e.g., Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 3 1258, 1260-61 (9th Cir. 1992) (dismissal for failure to comply with a court order to amend a 4 complaint); Malone v. U.S. Postal Service, 833 F.2d 128, 130-31 (9th Cir. 1987) (dismissal for 5 failure to comply with a court order); Henderson v. Duncan, 779 F.2d 1421, 1424 (9th Cir. 1986) 6 (dismissal for failure to prosecute and to comply with local rules). 7 Additionally, Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) permits the court to involuntarily 8 dismiss an action when a litigant fails to prosecute an action or fails to comply with other Rules 9 or with a court order. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b); see Applied Underwriters v. Lichtenegger, 913 10 F.3d 884, 889 (9th Cir. 2019) (citations omitted). In determining whether to dismiss an action 11 under Rule 41(b), the Court must consider several factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious 12 resolution of litigation; (2) the Court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of prejudice to the 13 defendants; (4) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits; and (5) the 14 availability of less drastic sanctions. Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1423; Carey v. King, 856 F.2d 15 1439, 1440 (9th Cir. 1988). 16 B. Discussion 17 Considering Local Rule 110, the court appraised Plaintiff both in its Screening Order and 18 its 19 Order to Show Cause that the Court would recommend dismissal as a sanction for failing 20 to comply with a Court order. (See Docs. No. 16 at15, ¶2 and Doc. No. 17 at 2). Thus, the Court 21 may dismiss this case pursuant to Local Rule 110. 22 With regards to the factors under Rule 41, the undersigned concludes dismissal without 23 prejudice is also warranted in this case. As to the first factor, the expeditious resolution of 24 litigation is deemed to be in the public interest. Yourish v. California Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 25 990-91 (9th Cir. 1999). 26 Turning to the second factor, this Court’s need to efficiently manage its docket cannot be 27 overstated. This Court has one of the heaviest caseloads in the nation, and due to the delay in 28 filling judicial vacancies, which was further exacerbated by the COVID-19 pandemic, operated 1 under a declared judicial emergency through May 2, 2021. See In re Approval of the Judicial 2 Emergency Declared in the Eastern District of California, 956 F.3d 1175 (9th Cir. 2020). This 3 Court’s time is better spent on its other matters than needlessly consumed managing a case with a 4 recalcitrant litigant. The Court cannot effectively manage its docket when a litigant ceases to 5 litigate his/her case or respond to a court order. Thus, the Court finds that the second factor 6 weighs in favor of dismissal. 7 Delays inevitably have the inherent risk that evidence will become stale, or witnesses’ 8 memories will fade or be unavailable and can prejudice a defendant, thereby satisfying the third 9 factor. See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 57 (1968). Thus, the third factor—risk of prejudice 10 to defendant—weighs in favor of dismissal since a presumption of injury arises from the 11 unreasonable delay in prosecuting an action. Anderson v. Air W., 542 F.2d 522, 524 (9th Cir. 12 1976). Because Plaintiff’s inaction amounts to an unreasonable delay in prosecuting this action, 13 the third factor weighs in favor of dismissal. 14 The fourth factor usually weighs against dismissal because public policy favors the 15 disposition of cases on the merits. Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 643 (9th Cir. 2002). 16 However, “this factor lends little support to a party whose responsibility it is to move a case 17 toward disposition on the merits but whose conduct impedes progress in that direction,” which is 18 the case here. In re Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Products Liability Litigation, 460 F.3d 1217, 19 1228 (9th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted). Indeed, “trial courts do not have time to waste on 20 multiple failures by aspiring litigants to follow the rules and requirements of our courts.” 21 Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 644 (Trott, J., concurring in affirmance of district court’s involuntary 22 dismissal with prejudice of habeas petition where petitioner failed to timely respond to court 23 order and noting “the weight of the docket-managing factor depends upon the size and load of the 24 docket, and those in the best position to know what that is are our beleaguered trial judges.”). 25 Finally, the Court’s warning to a party that failure to obey the court’s order will result in 26 dismissal satisfies the “considerations of the alternatives” requirement. Ferdik, 963 F.2d at 1262; 27 Malone, 833 F.2d at 132-33; Henderson, 779 F.2d at 1424. As noted supra, both the Court’s 28 Screening Order and its Order to Show Cause expressly warned Plaintiff that his failure to timely 1 | comply would both Orders would result in a recommendation of dismissal of this action. Thus, 2 | Plaintiff had adequate warnings that dismissal could result from his noncompliance. And the 3 | instant dismissal is a dismissal without prejudice, which is a lesser sanction than a dismissal with 4 | prejudice, thereby addressing the fifth factor. 5 After considering the factors set forth supra and binding case law, the undersigned 6 || recommends dismissal, without prejudice, under Fed. R. Civ. P. 41 and Local Rule 110. 7 Accordingly, it is RECOMMENDED: 8 This action be DISMISSED without prejudice for Plaintiffs failure to prosecute this case 9 | and/or obey a court order. 10 Dated: _ September 24, 2025 Mihaw. fareh Yack 12 HELENA M. BARCH-KUCHTA 3 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
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