Arness v. Franks

138 F.2d 213, 31 C.C.P.A. 737, 59 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 154, 1943 CCPA LEXIS 143
CourtCourt of Customs and Patent Appeals
DecidedJuly 15, 1943
DocketNo. 4760
StatusPublished
Cited by7 cases

This text of 138 F.2d 213 (Arness v. Franks) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Customs and Patent Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arness v. Franks, 138 F.2d 213, 31 C.C.P.A. 737, 59 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 154, 1943 CCPA LEXIS 143 (ccpa 1943).

Opinion

Garrett, Presiding Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from the decision of the Board of Interference Examiners of the United States Patent Office holding that the party Arness is not entitled to make the counts, three in number, involved in an interference, and awarding priority to the party Franks.

The interference was declared between an application of Arness, serial No. 215,061, filed June 21, 1938, and a patent, No. 2,120,554, issued to Franks June 14, 1938, on an application filed June 8, 1935.

It is alleged in the Arness application that it “is a division of my copending application 96,539, filed August 17, 1936 * * * which is in turn a continuation in part of my copending application No. 645,637 filed December 3, 1932 * * *.” (Application No. 96,539 is not included in the printed record before us but, as the issue finally developed, it does not appear that it was necessary to include it.)

When Arness filed his application, serial No. 215,061, he included therein three claims copied from the Franks patent and requested that an interference be declared. The Primary Examiner held that Arness could not make the claims in the form as copied (this decision is not included in the record before us) and they were amended (apparently, on August 22, 1939) to the present form of the counts in issue, which read:

1. Alloy steel having good impact strength, and containing about 22%' to 30% chromium, carbon in amounts not exceeding 1%, at least 0.1% and not over 0.2% nitrogen distributed substantially uniformly throughout the steel, and [738]*738at least 0.25% but not over 3% metal selected from tbe group consisting of nickel, and mixtures of nickel and copper; tbe remainder being substantially all iron.
2. Alloy steel having good impact strength, and containing about 22% to 30% chromium, carbon in amounts not exceeding 1%, at least 0.1% and not over ■0.2% nitrogen distributed substantially uniformly throughout the steel, and at least 0.25% but not over 3% of nickel, the remainder being substantially all iron.
3. A -wrought article of alloy steel having good impact strength, and containing about 22% to 30% chromium, carbon in amounts up to about 0.3%, at least 0.15% and not over 0.2% nitrogen distributed substantially uniformly throughout' the steel, and at least 0.25% but'not over 3% nickel; the remainder being substantially ail iron.

In a decision dated August 26, 1939, the examiner rejected the claims as amended, saying:

Claims 1, 2, and 4 [claim 4 subsequently became count 3 of the interference] are again further rejected as being unsupported by the specification. There is no statement in the specification as to the specific range of nickel set out in claims 2 and 4, or as to the specific range of the nickel-copper mixture set out in claim 1. The statements made in the last two paragraphs of the last Office action are repeated. The examiner has carefully considered applicant’s argument, but is still of the opinion that the present application is not a division of application No. 96,539, and that applicant has not traced a basis for the claims through his two prior applications which would antedate the filing date of the Franks patent.

Upon appeal by Arness the Board of Appeals in a decision (of course, ex farte) dated September 11, 1940, reversed the examiner, holding, in effect, that Arness was entitled to rely upon his parent application, serial No. 645,637; that it supported the amended claims, and added:

It is a matter for the examiner to determine whether these claims are a proper basis for interference with corresponding claims of the Franks patent.

The interference was declared October 7, 1940.

It does not appear from the record whether preliminary statements were filed,.but on February 1,1941, Franks moved to dissolve, and on February 3, 1941, Arness entered a motion (supplemented by a second motion dated March 1,1941) to shift the burden of proof.

In a decision rendered April 14, 1941, the Primary Examiner denied the motion of Franks to dissolve, and granted the motion of Arness to shift the burden of proof.

It may be said here that before the Primary Examiner Franks advanced three grounds upon which his motion for dissolution was based, but as the matter was presented to the Board of Interference Examiners, the only question involved before it was, as stated by. it, “the sufficiency of the Arness application'serial no. 645,637 to support the counts,” and that is the only issue before us.

After the motion to shift the burden of proof was granted, it was incumbent upon Franks as the junior party to prove priority by a [739]*739preponderance of evidence. He took no testimony (nor did Arness) but submitted the case to the Board of Interference Examiners upon the contention that Arness could not make the counts, -which, under the facts here appearing, constituted a question ancillary to priority.

In his decision denying the motion to dissolve, the examiner expressed the belief “that Arness application No. 645,637 supports the. counts of the Interference.”

We thus have a situation in which there was a difference of view between tribunals of the Patent Office, the examiner and the Board of Appeals, on the one hand, being of opinion that the disclosure of Arness supports the counts, and the Board of Interference Examiners, on the other hand, being of opinion that it does not support them*

In its decision the Board of Interference Examiners made no reference to the holding of the Primary Examiner or to that of the Board of Appeals.

As we understand it, the alloy of the counts is one commonly referred to as “stainless,” or “rustless,” steel.

The opening paragraph of the Franks patent states:

This invention relates to ferritic chromium steels that possess great toughness and excellent resistance to corrosion and oxidation at elevated temperatures. [Italics ours.]

In the Arness application, serial No. 645,637, it is said:

Preferably the proportions of ingredients added are such as to give a ferrous alloy analyzing approximately 10% to 30% chromium, 0.06% to 0-30% carbon, and .03% to .20% nitrogen for the ferritic iron chromium alloys (or chromium up to 30%, nickel up to 30%, carbon below .30%, and nitrogen between 0.03% and 0.20% for the austenitic iron-chromium-nickel alloys). The particular quantity of the alloying metals together with the precise amount of carbon and nitrogen present are largely determinant of the physical characteristics of the alloy as will appear more fully hereinafter. [Italics ours.]

It will be observed that nickel is not mentioned as an ingredient of ferritic alloys, but that “nickel up to 80%” is designated as an ingredient of austenitic alloys. In an illustration immediately following-the above quotation “8% nickel” is named as an ingredient. It is assumed that the process described in the illustration produced aus-tenitic alloys.

In the brief on behalf of Franks before us it is urged that the Arness disclosure is limited to austenitic chromium nickel steels, and does not. suggest that nickel be added to ferritic chromium steels.

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138 F.2d 213, 31 C.C.P.A. 737, 59 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 154, 1943 CCPA LEXIS 143, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arness-v-franks-ccpa-1943.