Armstrong v. W.R. Grace Co.

CourtNorth Carolina Industrial Commission
DecidedDecember 5, 2003
DocketI.C. NO. 452760
StatusPublished

This text of Armstrong v. W.R. Grace Co. (Armstrong v. W.R. Grace Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering North Carolina Industrial Commission primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Armstrong v. W.R. Grace Co., (N.C. Super. Ct. 2003).

Opinions

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Upon review of all of the competent evidence of record with references to the errors assigned and finding no good grounds to reconsider the evidence, receive further evidence, rehear the parties or their representatives, the Full Commission AFFIRMS the Opinion and Award of the Deputy Commissioner.

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The Full Commission finds as a fact and concludes as matters of law the following, which were entered into by parties as:

STIPULATIONS
1. All parties are properly before the North Carolina Industrial Commission, and the Industrial Commission has jurisdiction of the parties and of the subject matter.

2. All parties have been correctly designated, and there is no question as to misjoinder or nonjoinder of the parties.

3. Defendant-employer employed three or more employees on 23 October 1992.

4. On 23 October 1992, an employment relationship existed between plaintiff and defendant-employer.

5. Continental Casualty Company was the carrier on the risk for workers' compensation purposes on 23 October 1992.

6. Plaintiff's average weekly wage as of 23 October 1992 was $413.48. This yields an applicable compensation rate of $275.67.

7. Plaintiff went on a medical leave of absence on 23 October 1992.

8. In addition to the deposition transcripts and any exhibits attached thereto, the parties stipulated into evidence in this matter stipulated exhibit one, a metric conversion chart. Plaintiff introduced and the undersigned admitted into evidence plaintiff's exhibits marked and numbered 1-75. Defendants introduced and the undersigned admitted into evidence defendants' exhibits one through four.

9. The issues to be determined as a result of the hearing are: whether plaintiff's job with defendant-employer placed him at an increased risk of developing repetitive motion injury or disease to his upper extremities; whether the physical requirements of plaintiff's job significantly contributed to his development of bilateral elbow arthroses; whether plaintiff is permanently totally disabled as a result of alleged occupational disease(s) or whether he has retained any disability as defined in the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act; and whether plaintiff's claim is barred for not being timely filed and/or does the doctrine of laches or some other time bar defense apply.

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Based upon all of the competent evidence of record the Full Commission makes the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1. On the date of the hearing in the matter, plaintiff, who is left hand dominant, was 45 years old. Plaintiff has a high school diploma and no other formalized education. Plaintiff has not worked in any capacity for any employer since going out of work on a medical leave of absence on 23 October 1992.

2. Plaintiff was hired by defendant-employer, or its predecessor, in 1975 as a general helper. Plaintiff also worked as a maintenance helper, a machine operator, and a tooling assembler. Plaintiff worked for defendant-employer until going out of work on the medical leave of absence due to pain and loss of range of motion in his elbows which rendered him incapable of working.

3. Plaintiff's job as a machine operator for defendant-employer, a position he held for greater than 13 years, required that he use his upper extremities frequently and repetitively and with load-bearing force. As a machine operator, plaintiff prepared raw product, finished the product, and cleaned and adjusted the machines. The machine operator job required lifting, transporting, handling, and reaching, and load-bearing movements to remove flashing. The job was repetitive and moderately forceful.

4. In May 1989 plaintiff began developing problems with his left elbow while working. Shortly thereafter, plaintiff's right elbow also began to develop problems while working. However, plaintiff continued to work and did not present for medical treatment until 26 January 1990 when he was examined by Dr. E.O. Marsigli, an orthopaedist. Plaintiff reported that he had been unable to fully extend his upper left extremity since May 1989.

5. On or about 23 December 1991 Dr. A.H. Marsigli diagnosed post traumatic arthritis of the left elbow. X-rays and an MRI done upon Dr. E.O. Marsigli's referral in February 1992 confirmed degenerative changes of both elbows in the form of erosive arthropathies. By letter dated 19 February 1996, Dr. E.O. Marsigli stated that he could not determine a cause for plaintiff's bilateral elbow condition, and that "job-related traumatic arthrosis of the elbow has not been described in the literature" to his knowledge.

6. Plaintiff saw Dr. Christopher M. Barsanti, another orthopaedist, for a second opinion. Dr. Barsanti referred plaintiff to Dr. Helen E. Harmon, a rheumatologist, for evaluation. On 8 July 1992 Dr. Harmon diagnosed questionable rheumatoid arthritis. Laboratory results were mixed, and Dr. Harmon did not prescribe anti-rheumatic medications as plaintiff was not currently experiencing inflammation. Dr. Harmon was unable to comment on whether plaintiff's work situation caused or exacerbated his bilateral elbow symptoms, and Dr. Barsanti deferred any such opinions to plaintiff's treating physician(s).

7. Plaintiff came under the care of Dr. Ralph W. Coonrad, an orthopaedic surgeon, in October 1992. Due to the severity of plaintiff's left elbow symptoms, Dr. Coonrad performed a total left elbow replacement on or about 23 November 1992. The diagnosis confirmed by Dr. Coonrad post-surgery was arthrosis of both elbows due to rheumatoid arthritis.

8. Plaintiff was seen in another second opinion by rheumatologist Dr. William Byrd on 3 August 1993. Dr. Byrd diagnosed severe bilateral synovitis and pain of plaintiff's elbows with uncertain etiology; however, he could not exclude rheumatoid arthritis as an underlying diagnosis.

9. Dr. Coonrad performed a total right elbow replacement on 28 September 1993. Plaintiff then saw Dr. David S. Caldwell, a rheumatologist, on 21 December 1993. As a result of this examination, Dr. Caldwell noted that plaintiff may have an atypical presentation of rheumatoid arthritis. While Dr. Caldwell indicated at the time that plaintiff's job may have had something to do with plaintiff's bilateral elbow problems, he indicated he would defer to Dr. Coonrad's judgment with respect to whether repetition played a role in plaintiff's symptomatology.

10. Dr. Coonrad was not deposed in this case. However, the medical notes make reference to his expertise in elbow problems, and also the fact that Dr. Coonrad had never seen a patient develop the type of elbow problems from which plaintiff suffered due to repetitive use. On 3 May 1996 Dr. Coonrad made a record of having had a conversation with plaintiff and counsel in which he discussed, essentially, that it was unlikely that plaintiff's job caused his rapidly progressive and severe arthrosis of each elbow, and that while it may be possible that the job aggravated his condition (if there were other workers who also had the same sorts of problems), no percentage or degree of aggravation could be determined.

11. Plaintiff's diagnosis of rheumatoid arthritis was a difficult one to make due to its atypical presentation. Plaintiff's symptomatology initially affected only his elbow joints to the exclusion of other joints, which is unusual. However, the fact that both elbow joints were affected as opposed to only or primarily the dominant arm was suggestive of the disease of rheumatoid arthritis.

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Bluebook (online)
Armstrong v. W.R. Grace Co., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/armstrong-v-wr-grace-co-ncworkcompcom-2003.