Armstrong v. Quill

Appellate Court of Illinois

Armstrong v. Quill

153 Ill. App. 81, 1910 Ill. App. LEXIS 919

CourtAppellate Court of Illinois

DecidedFebruary 15, 1910

DocketGen. No. 14,872

StatusPublished

This text of 153 Ill. App. 81 (Armstrong v. Quill) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Court of Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Armstrong v. Quill, 153 Ill. App. 81, 1910 Ill. App. LEXIS 919 (Ill. Ct. App. 1910).

Pincite

Opinion

Mr. Justice Mack

delivered the opinion of the court.

In a suit for goods sold and delivered plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Daniel J. Quill and M. Quill Adams sued jointly with Dennis Quill as co-partners. Service of process was not secured on Dennis Quill. To reverse a judgment subsequently rendered on scire facias against him he sued out a writ of error, and contends that the evidence fails to show that he is jointly liable with his co-defendants.

Dennis Quill had sold his business to his co-defendants, his children, four years prior to the transactions. Proper notice had been given to the trade, and though the name Dennis Quill was retained as the firm name, all of the stationery except a few old stray letterheads, one of which reached plaintiff, indicated clearly that the other two had succeeded to the business. Dennis loaned money to his children and frequently made out checks direct to their creditors, but always handed them to the children for delivery. He selected the goods in question for them because his forty years’ experience enabled him best to pass on the quality needed. There is a conflict in the testimony as to the conversation between him and plaintiff. Assuming, without deciding, that plaintiff’s version is correct, that he had no knowledge of the changes in the business and that he sold the goods solely to Dennis Quill for his own use, he has failed to establish the only case on which his judgment can be upheld. The proof is clear that Dennis Quill was not a member of the firm; it is, in our judgment, equally clear that he was not an ostensible member of the firm. Neither he nor his co-partners were estopped from denying joint liability; he was never held out as a member of the firm.

If plaintiff’s version is correct, he might have had a good claim against Dennis Quill individually; if the latter’s version is correct, he had a good claim against the other two defendants. But he cannot hold Dennis Quill jointly with the others.

The judgment on the scire facias will be reversed.

Reversed.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Mr. Justice Mack

delivered the opinion of the court.

In a suit for goods sold and delivered plaintiff obtained a default judgment against Daniel J. Quill and M. Quill Adams sued jointly with Dennis Quill as co-partners. Service of process was not secured on Dennis Quill. To reverse a judgment subsequently rendered on scire facias against him he sued out a writ of error, and contends that the evidence fails to show that he is jointly liable with his co-defendants.

Dennis Quill had sold his business to his co-defendants, his children, four years prior to the transactions. Proper notice had been given to the trade, and though the name Dennis Quill was retained as the firm name, all of the stationery except a few old stray letterheads, one of which reached plaintiff, indicated clearly that the other two had succeeded to the business. Dennis loaned money to his children and frequently made out checks direct to their creditors, but always handed them to the children for delivery. He selected the goods in question for them because his forty years’ experience enabled him best to pass on the quality needed. There is a conflict in the testimony as to the conversation between him and plaintiff. Assuming, without deciding, that plaintiff’s version is correct, that he had no knowledge of the changes in the business and that he sold the goods solely to Dennis Quill for his own use, he has failed to establish the only case on which his judgment can be upheld. The proof is clear that Dennis Quill was not a member of the firm; it is, in our judgment, equally clear that he was not an ostensible member of the firm. Neither he nor his co-partners were estopped from denying joint liability; he was never held out as a member of the firm.

If plaintiff’s version is correct, he might have had a good claim against Dennis Quill individually; if the latter’s version is correct, he had a good claim against the other two defendants. But he cannot hold Dennis Quill jointly with the others.

The judgment on the scire facias will be reversed.

Reversed.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

153 Ill. App. 81, 1910 Ill. App. LEXIS 919, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/armstrong-v-quill-illappct-1910.