Armstrong v. . Jonas

167 S.E. 562, 204 N.C. 153, 1933 N.C. LEXIS 346
Supreme Court of North Carolina·Decided February 8, 1933·Published·Cited by 1 cases

Opinion

BbogdeN, J.

If a. notary public owns a life estate in a parcel of land, is he qualified to take the acknowledgment of the grantor and his wife to the execution of a deed of trust upon the remainder in fee?

It has been generally held that if a notary public is a party, trustee, or cestui que trust, in a conveyance of land that he is disqualified to probate the instrument or to take the acknowledgment of its execution. Blanton v. Bostic, 126 N. C., 418, 35 S. E., 1035; Cowan v. Dale, 189 N. C., 684, 128 S. E., 155; Bank v. Tolbert, 192 N. C., 126, 133 S. E., 558; Investment Company v. Woolen, 198 N. C., 452, 152 S. E., 167. The Court observed in the Investment Company case, supra, that “from the authorities in this jurisdiction, the principle laid down ordinarily is to the effect that the notary public must not have a pecuniary or financial interest in the property conveyed.”

*155 The pecuniary interest which vitiates an official act of this sort, implies that the officer taking the acknowledgment will either actually or probably receive as his own, money or equivalent value as a result of the transaction. What value, benefit or advantage could the life tenant possibly realize from the execution of the deed of trust on the remainder in fee ? His life estate is neither diminished nor enlarged thereby; nor is the enjoyment thereof in anyway impaired or affected. Consequently, it is the opinion of this Court that the trial judge made a .correct ruling.

Affirmed.

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Armstrong v. . Jonas, 167 S.E. 562, 204 N.C. 153, 1933 N.C. LEXIS 346 (N.C. 1933).

167 S.E. 562 (Armstrong v. . Jonas) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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