Armstrong v. Jefferson

Court of Appeals for the First Circuit·Decided July 25, 1994·No. 94-1060·Published

Opinion

USCA1 Opinion


United States Court of Appeals
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
For the First Circuit
____________________

No. 94-1060

ROLAND L. ARMSTRONG AND REILOUS LATNEY,

Plaintiffs, Appellants,

v.

JEFFERSON SMURFIT CORPORATION
AND SMURFIT PENSION SERVICES COMPANY,

Defendants, Appellees.

____________________

APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS

[Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior U.S. District Judge]
__________________________

____________________

Before

Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
______________

____________________

David A. Robinson with whom Jay N. Michelman and Michelman Law
__________________ _________________ _____________
Offices were on brief for appellants.
_______
Michael L. Mulhern, with whom Deborah Gage Haude, Winston &
____________________ ___________________ __________
Strawn, John O. Mirick, and Mirick, O'Connell, DeMaillie & Lougee,
______ _______________ _______________________________________
were on brief for appellees.

____________________

July 22, 1994
____________________

Stahl, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, plaintiffs-
_____________

appellants Roland L. Armstrong and Reilous Latney challenge

the district court's dismissal of their action brought

pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of

1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. We affirm.
__ ____

I.
I.
__

STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BACKGROUND
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BACKGROUND
_________________________________

Because we are reviewing the grant of a Fed. R.

Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we will accept the

allegations of the complaint as true for purposes of our de
__

novo review. See Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 700
____ ___ _________ ____________

(1st Cir. 1994). If, under any theory, these allegations are

sufficient to state a claim for which the relief sought can

be granted, we will reverse the district court's dismissal of

plaintiffs' complaint. See id.
___ ___

Plaintiffs are disabled retirees who participated

in an employee welfare benefit plan sponsored by defendant-

appellee Jefferson Smurfit Corporation and administered by

defendant-appellee Smurfit Pension and Insurance Services

Company. In early 1992, defendants made what plaintiffs

claim was a "highly unusual" offer of either (1) continuing

to participate in the existing retiree group medical

insurance program at new 1992 monthly premium costs, or (2)

discontinuing participation in the program in exchange for

-2-
2

lump sum payments.1 In the course of making this offer,

defendants neither informed plaintiffs that the lump sum

payments were subject to taxation nor advised plaintiffs to

seek tax counsel in making their elections. Plaintiffs

elected to receive the lump sum payments. Subsequently, they

incurred substantial tax liabilities.2

Plaintiffs allege that defendants stood to gain

from plaintiffs' election of the lump sum payments, and that

defendants' failure to inform them of possible tax

implications was prompted by a desire to encourage such an

election. Plaintiffs further contend that they would not

have elected to receive the lump sum payments had they been

aware of the tax consequences. The theory of their case is

that defendants' failure either to inform them that the lump

sum payments would be subject to taxation or to advise them

to seek tax counsel constituted a breach of defendants'

ERISA-prescribed fiduciary duties, see section 404(1)(A) and
___

(B), codified at 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1)(A) and (B),3 and

____________________

1. Plaintiff Armstrong was offered a lump sum of $120,000.
Plaintiff Latney was offered a lump sum of $55,000.

2. Plaintiff Armstrong incurred over $37,000 in federal and
state tax liabilities. Plaintiff Latney incurred almost
$17,000 in federal and state tax liabilities.

3. Section 404(a)(1) directs fiduciaries of ERISA plans to
discharge their duties with respect to a plan "solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries of the plans."
Subsection A of this provision instructs fiduciaries to act
"for the exclusive purpose of . . . (i) providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying

-3-
3

entitles them to recover the federal and state taxes they

paid on the lump sum payments. At oral argument, plaintiffs'

counsel made clear that reimbursement for the taxes paid by

plaintiffs -- the remedy requested in plaintiffs' complaint -

- is the only remedy sought in this case.

The district court rejected plaintiffs' argument on

two separate grounds. The court first ruled that plaintiffs'

allegations are insufficient to state a claim for breach of

fiduciary duty under ERISA. It then held, in the

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Armstrong v. Jefferson, (1st Cir. 1994).

Armstrong v. Jefferson (Armstrong v. Jefferson) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

Related

Massachusetts Mutual Life Insurance v. Russell
473 U.S. 134 (Supreme Court, 1985)
Mertens v. Hewitt Associates
508 U.S. 248 (Supreme Court, 1993)
Vartanian v. Monsanto Company
14 F.3d 697 (First Circuit, 1994)