Armstrong v. Jefferson
Opinion
USCA1 Opinion
United States Court of Appeals
United States Court of Appeals
For the First Circuit
For the First Circuit
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No. 94-1060
ROLAND L. ARMSTRONG AND REILOUS LATNEY,
Plaintiffs, Appellants,
v.
JEFFERSON SMURFIT CORPORATION
AND SMURFIT PENSION SERVICES COMPANY,
Defendants, Appellees.
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF MASSACHUSETTS
[Hon. Frank H. Freedman, Senior U.S. District Judge]
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Before
Cyr, Boudin and Stahl,
Circuit Judges.
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David A. Robinson with whom Jay N. Michelman and Michelman Law
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Offices were on brief for appellants.
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Michael L. Mulhern, with whom Deborah Gage Haude, Winston &
____________________ ___________________ __________
Strawn, John O. Mirick, and Mirick, O'Connell, DeMaillie & Lougee,
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were on brief for appellees.
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July 22, 1994
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Stahl, Circuit Judge. In this appeal, plaintiffs-
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appellants Roland L. Armstrong and Reilous Latney challenge
the district court's dismissal of their action brought
pursuant to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of
1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. We affirm.
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I.
I.
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STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BACKGROUND
STANDARD OF REVIEW AND BACKGROUND
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Because we are reviewing the grant of a Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, we will accept the
allegations of the complaint as true for purposes of our de
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novo review. See Vartanian v. Monsanto Co., 14 F.3d 697, 700
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(1st Cir. 1994). If, under any theory, these allegations are
sufficient to state a claim for which the relief sought can
be granted, we will reverse the district court's dismissal of
plaintiffs' complaint. See id.
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Plaintiffs are disabled retirees who participated
in an employee welfare benefit plan sponsored by defendant-
appellee Jefferson Smurfit Corporation and administered by
defendant-appellee Smurfit Pension and Insurance Services
Company. In early 1992, defendants made what plaintiffs
claim was a "highly unusual" offer of either (1) continuing
to participate in the existing retiree group medical
insurance program at new 1992 monthly premium costs, or (2)
discontinuing participation in the program in exchange for
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2
lump sum payments.1 In the course of making this offer,
defendants neither informed plaintiffs that the lump sum
payments were subject to taxation nor advised plaintiffs to
seek tax counsel in making their elections. Plaintiffs
elected to receive the lump sum payments. Subsequently, they
incurred substantial tax liabilities.2
Plaintiffs allege that defendants stood to gain
from plaintiffs' election of the lump sum payments, and that
defendants' failure to inform them of possible tax
implications was prompted by a desire to encourage such an
election. Plaintiffs further contend that they would not
have elected to receive the lump sum payments had they been
aware of the tax consequences. The theory of their case is
that defendants' failure either to inform them that the lump
sum payments would be subject to taxation or to advise them
to seek tax counsel constituted a breach of defendants'
ERISA-prescribed fiduciary duties, see section 404(1)(A) and
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(B), codified at 29 U.S.C. 1104(a)(1)(A) and (B),3 and
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1. Plaintiff Armstrong was offered a lump sum of $120,000.
Plaintiff Latney was offered a lump sum of $55,000.
2. Plaintiff Armstrong incurred over $37,000 in federal and
state tax liabilities. Plaintiff Latney incurred almost
$17,000 in federal and state tax liabilities.
3. Section 404(a)(1) directs fiduciaries of ERISA plans to
discharge their duties with respect to a plan "solely in the
interest of the participants and beneficiaries of the plans."
Subsection A of this provision instructs fiduciaries to act
"for the exclusive purpose of . . . (i) providing benefits to
participants and their beneficiaries; and (ii) defraying
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3
entitles them to recover the federal and state taxes they
paid on the lump sum payments. At oral argument, plaintiffs'
counsel made clear that reimbursement for the taxes paid by
plaintiffs -- the remedy requested in plaintiffs' complaint -
- is the only remedy sought in this case.
The district court rejected plaintiffs' argument on
two separate grounds. The court first ruled that plaintiffs'
allegations are insufficient to state a claim for breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA. It then held, in the
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