Armstrong v. Director, Office of Worker's Compensation Programs

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: May 22, 2025
• Docket: 24-1492
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 22 2025 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JESSE ARMSTRONG, No. 24-1492 Agency No. 22-0279 Petitioner, Benefits Review Board v. MEMORANDUM*

DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION PROGRAMS; DINAH LIZBETH SOSA; ALL-STAR CLEANING & PRESERVATION, INC.,

Respondents.

On Petition for Review of an Order of the Benefits Review Board

Submitted May 19, 2025** San Francisco, California

Before: FRIEDLAND, BRESS, and MENDOZA, Circuit Judges.

Jesse Armstrong petitions for review of a Benefits Review Board (BRB)

decision affirming an Administrative Law Judge’s (ALJ) denial of benefits under

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. § 901,

et seq. We have jurisdiction under 33 U.S.C. § 921(c), and we deny the petition for

review.

Under the LHWCA, when a claimant makes a prima facie showing that he

“suffered a harm” and that “a workplace condition could have caused, aggravated,

or accelerated the harm,” he triggers a statutory presumption that the harm was

caused by the workplace condition. Haw. Stevedores, Inc. v. Ogawa, 608 F.3d 642,

651 (9th Cir. 2010). His employer may then rebut the presumption by “presenting

substantial evidence that is ‘specific and comprehensive enough to sever the

potential connection between the disability and the work environment.’” Id.

(quoting Ramey v. Stevedoring Servs. of Am., 134 F.3d 954, 959 (9th Cir. 1998)). If

the employer carries that burden, “the presumption in favor of the claimant falls out

of the case” and the ALJ weighs the evidence as a whole to determine “whether the

claimant has established the necessary causal link between the injury and

employment.” Id. (quotations omitted).

The BRB must “accept the ALJ’s findings ‘unless they are contrary to the law,

irrational, or unsupported by substantial evidence.’” Id. at 648 (quoting Rhine v.

Stevedoring Servs. of Am., 596 F.3d 1161, 1163 (9th Cir. 2010)). We review the

BRB’s decision for “errors of law and for adherence to the statutory standard

governing the BRB’s review.” Id. (brackets omitted) (quoting Rhine, 596 F.3d at

2 24-1492 1163). We conclude that the BRB’s decision is free of legal error and that substantial

evidence supports the denial of benefits.

First, Armstrong’s employers presented substantial evidence to rebut the

statutory presumption that Armstrong’s work as a tank cleaner caused or aggravated

his knee arthritis and meniscus tear. The employers put forward a report and

testimony from Dr. Sabahi, whose opinions were “specific and comprehensive

enough to sever the potential connection between the disability and the work

environment.” Id. at 651 (quoting Ramey, 134 F.3d at 959). Dr. Sabahi opined,

based on medical literature and record evidence, that Armstrong’s knee issues were

attributable to genetics and age and not to the cumulative impact of Armstrong’s

work as a tank cleaner. Among other things, Dr. Sabahi cited (1) the lack of medial

osteophytes, which would have been present in injuries related to overuse; (2) the

fact that the knee arthritis was “symmetrical” and average for Armstrong’s age; and

(3) Armstrong’s well-preserved patellofemoral joint spaces, which Dr. Sabahi would

have expected to be damaged based on Armstrong’s claims of cumulative work-

related injury. Dr. Sabahi further explained that the tasks involved in tank cleaning

might have exacerbated knee pain on a temporary basis, but would not have

worsened the underlying osteoarthritis, and any pain would have dissipated. These

opinions were soundly based on record evidence and sufficiently supported.

Armstrong’s claims of legal errors are similarly unavailing. The BRB’s

3 24-1492 decision does not conflict with Parsons Corporation of California v. Director, Office

of Workers’ Compensation Programs, U.S. Department of Labor, 619 F.2d 38 (9th

Cir. 1980). While in Parsons we noted that the employer had presented a “paucity”

of evidence, id. at 42, here the employers presented substantial evidence in the form

of Dr. Sabahi’s testimony. See id. at 41 (“Substantial evidence as used in the Act is

such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a

conclusion.” (quotations omitted)).

Second, the BRB did not err in concluding that the ALJ’s denial of benefits

was supported by substantial evidence, based on the ALJ’s consideration of the

record as a whole. See Haw. Stevedores, 608 F.3d at 651. Armstrong’s arguments

to the contrary largely center around certain facts and counterarguments that he

believes undermine Dr. Sabahi’s testimony. But the ALJ found Armstrong and his

doctors’ testimony less credible than Dr. Sabahi’s, and Dr. Sabahi unequivocally

opined, based on medical imaging and other reliable sources, that Armstrong’s

injuries were not work-related. In reviewing the agency’s conclusions, “our task is

not to reweigh the evidence, but only to determine if substantial evidence supports

the ALJ’s findings.” Rhine, 596 F.3d at 1165 (quoting Lockheed Shipbuilding v.

Dir., Off. of Workers’ Comp. Programs, U. S. Dep’t of Lab., 951 F.2d 1143, 1146

(9th Cir. 1991)). That is the case here. And although Armstrong maintains that knee

replacements are not typical for persons of his age, Armstrong does not address Dr.

4 24-1492 Sabahi’s opinion that reduced pain tolerance from opioid addiction can support

earlier intervention through knee replacements.

PETITION DENIED.

5 24-1492