Armstrong v. Chapman

• Court: District Court, D. Nevada
• Decided: April 3, 2025
• Docket: 2:24-cv-00575
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

2 DISTRICT OF NEVADA

3 * * *

4 Steven Matthew Armstrong Case No. 2:24-cv-00575-GMN-BNW

5 Plaintiff, ORDER and REPORT and 6 v. RECOMMENDATION

7 Tyler Smith, et al.,

8 Defendants.

9 10 This Court screened pro se plaintiff Steven Armstrong’s complaint on August 5, 2024. 11 ECF No. 4. In that Report and Recommendation, this Court allowed certain claims to proceed, 12 dismissed certain claims with leave to amend, and recommended dismissal without leave to 13 amend as to others. Id. The district judge adopted the Report and Recommendation. ECF No. 11. 14 Plaintiff filed an amended complaint. This Court now screens plaintiff’s amended complaint. 15 I. Screening Standard 16 Federal courts must conduct a preliminary screening in any case in which a prisoner seeks 17 redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. See 28 18 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). In its review, the court must identify any cognizable claims and dismiss any 19 claims that are frivolous, malicious, fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or seek 20 monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1), 21 (2). In addition to the screening requirements under § 1915A, the Prison Litigation Reform Act 22 requires a federal court to dismiss a prisoner’s claim if it “fails to state a claim on which relief 23 may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2); accord Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). 24 Dismissal for failure to state a claim under § 1915(e)(2) incorporates the standard for 25 failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). Watison v. Carter, 668 26 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012). To survive § 1915 review, a complaint must “contain sufficient 27 factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” See Ashcroft 1 dismiss them “if it appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of 2 his claim which would entitle him to relief.” Nordstrom v. Ryan, 762 F.3d 903, 908 (9th Cir. 3 2014) (quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678). 4 In considering whether the complaint states a claim, all allegations of material fact are 5 taken as true and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Wyler Summit P’ship v. 6 Turner Broad. Sys. Inc., 135 F.3d 658, 661 (9th Cir. 1998) (citation omitted). Although the 7 standard under Rule 12(b)(6) does not require detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff must provide 8 more than mere labels and conclusions. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 9 (2007). A formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action is insufficient. Id. But unless it 10 is clear the complaint’s deficiencies could not be cured through amendment, a pro se plaintiff 11 should be given leave to amend the complaint with notice regarding the complaint’s deficiencies. 12 Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1106 (9th Cir. 1995). 13 Section 1983 creates a cause of action against a “person who, under color of any [state 14 law], subjects, or causes to be subjected, any [person] to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, 15 or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.” 42 U.S.C. § 1983. “Section 1983 does not 16 create any substantive rights; rather it is the vehicle whereby plaintiffs can challenge actions by 17 governmental officials.” Jones v. Williams, 297 F.3d 930, 934 (9th Cir. 2002). A plaintiff 18 bringing a claim under § 1983 must show that “(1) the action occurred ‘under color of state law’ 19 and (2) the action resulted in the deprivation of a constitutional right or federal statutory right.” 20 Id. (citation omitted). 21 II. Analysis 22 A. Claim No. 1: “False Arrest” 23 To state a claim for False Arrest, Plaintiff must allege facts establishing that Defendants 24 arrested them “without probable cause or other justification.” Dubner v. City & Cnty. of San 25 Francisco, 266 F.3d 959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001); see also Caballero v. City of Concord, 956 F.2d 26 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1992) (“Arrest by police officers without probable cause violates the Fourth 27 Amendment's guarantee of security from unreasonable searches and seizures, giving rise to a 1 Mr. Armstrong alleges that on September 26, 2023, Officer Smith arrested him for failure 2 to register as a convicted person. He alleges there was no probable cause for that arrest and that 3 the charge was denied. For screening purposes, he has sufficiently alleged Fourth Amendment 4 claim for False Arrest against Officer Smith. 5 He also explains that while booked on the case above, he was rebooked on charges 6 stemming from being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm for which there was no 7 probable cause.1 This was based on a gun that was found in the trunk of his wife’s car and that 8 belonged to her. He asserts he was found not guilty at trial. For screening purposes, he has 9 sufficiently alleged a Fourth Amendment claim for False Arrest for being a prohibited person in 10 possession of a firearm against Officer Smith. 11 B. Claim No. 2: “Illegal Search and Seizure” 12 The Fourth Amendment protects “[t]he right of people to be secure in their persons, 13 houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable search and seizure.” U.S. Const. Amend 4. 14 Police may conduct a warrantless search of a vehicle if there is probable cause to believe that it 15 contains contraband or evidence of a crime. United States v. Ewing, 638 F.3d 1226, 1231 (9th Cir. 16 2011). 17 Mr. Armstrong alleges that on September 26, 2023, Officer Valdez illegally searched the 18 car as “there was no probable cause because this was a traffic stop.” He also alleges that his wife 19 consented to the search of the car. For screening purposes, this Court assumes that the Fourth 20 Amendment violation complained of negated the consent provided by his wife. As such, this 21 Court finds Mr. Armstrong has sufficiently pled an illegal search claim for the search of his car 22 under the Fourth Amendment against Officer Valdez. 23 C. Claim No. 3: “Due Process” 24 “A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a violation of the Fourth 25 Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable cause or other justification.” Lacey v. 26 Maricopa Cnty., 693 F.3d 896, 918 (9th Cir. 2012). 27

1 1 Mr. Armstrong alleges that on September 26, 2023, he was booked on charges stemming 2 out of being a felon and not registering and bring in possession of a firearm. As alleged in Claim 3 No. 1, Mr. Armstrong contends there was no probable cause for an arrest on either of those 4 charges. While booked on those two charges, ATF Detective Chapman “rebooked him” in Case 5 No. C-23-378525 but never requested the issuance of a warrant for his arrest. In addition, he 6 alleges that the basis for his arrest on Case No. C-23-378525 is fruit of the poisonous tree. While 7 Mr. Armstrong alleges this is a violation of his Fourteenth Amendment due process right, it 8 appears he is contending that he was arrested without a warrant or probable cause, in violation of 9 his Fourth Amendment right. 10 This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that Mr. Armstrong previously alleged that he 11 had been convicted in this case. See ECF No. 1-1. As explained in previous orders, a civil action 12 “is barred if success in the action would ‘necessarily require the plaintiff to prove the 13 unlawfulness of his conviction or confinement.’” Lemos v. County of Sonoma, 40 F.4th 1002, 14 1005 (9th Cir. 2022) (en banc) (quoting Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck bars a 15 civil action when the plaintiff's “criminal conviction is fundamentally inconsistent with the 16 unlawful behavior” for which damages are sought. Smith v. City of Hemet, 394 F.3d 689, 695 (9th 17 Cir. 2005) (en banc). To put it another way, Heck bars a civil claim if the plaintiff’s success on 18 that claim “would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence.” Heck, 512 U.S. 19 at 487. As a result, before a plaintiff may pursue an action in which the claim arose from “harm 20 caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render [his] conviction or sentence invalid,” the 21 plaintiff must first prove he had his conviction vacated or otherwise favorably terminated. Id. at 22 486–87. Given Mr. Armstrong was convicted in case No. C-23-378525, the conviction would be 23 “fundamentally inconsistent with the unlawful behavior.” As a result, this Court recommends that 24 the illegal arrest claim for Case No. C-23-378525 under the Fourth Amendment be dismissed 25 without leave to amend as barred under Heck. 26 D. Claim No. 4: “Unfair Jury Selection” 27 Deputy district attorneys enjoy prosecutorial immunity. Such immunity protects eligible 1 “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 2 U.S. 409, 430 (1976); see also Kalina v. Fletcher, 522 U.S. 118, 124-26 (1997). Such immunity 3 applies regardless of allegations of malice, bad faith, or conspiracy. See Ashelman v. Pope, 4 793F.2d 1072, 1077-78 (9th Cir. 1986) (en banc). 5 Here, Mr. Armstrong contend that District Attorneys Afshar and Jaramillo violated his 6 Sixth Amendment right based on choices they made during jury selection. It is clear that the acts 7 in question were being performed as part of their official role as District Attorneys at trial. This 8 Court recommends that this claim be dismissed with prejudice. 9 E. Claim No. 5: “Excessive Bail” 10 The Eighth Amendment states “Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines 11 imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.” U.S. Const. Amend. 8. But a district 12 attorney is absolutely immune from suit under § 1983 where the claims are related to conduct that 13 is “intimately associated with the judicial phase of the criminal process.” Van de Kamp v. 14 Goldstein, 555 U.S. 335, 343 (2009) (citation omitted). 15 Here, Plaintiff alleges he was held with no bail in Case No. 23-379540 for six months and 16 was eventually found not guilty at trial. But he does not name a defendant in connection with this 17 allegation. As explained above (and in the previous order) prosecutors are immune from a civil 18 claim based on these facts. In addition, so are judges. Olsen v. Idaho State Bd. of Med., 363 F.3d 19 916, 922 (9th Cir. 2004) (“Absolute immunity is generally accorded to judges . . . functioning in 20 their official capacities.”). Thus, while it is unlikely Mr. Armstrong can assert a claim based on 21 these facts, this Court will give him leave to amend. 22 III. Conclusion 23 IT IS ORDERED that the Fourth Amendment claim for False Arrest based on failure to 24 register as a felon may proceed against Officer Smith. 25 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Fourth Amendment claim for False Arrest based 26 on being a prohibited person in possession of a firearm may proceed against Officer Smith. 27 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Fourth Amendment claim based on the illegal 1 IT IS RECOMMENDED that the Fourth Amendment claim based on the illegal arrest in 2 Case No. C-23-378525 against Detective Chapman be dismissed without leave to amend. 3 IT IS FURTHER RECOMMENDED the Sixth Amendment claim based on unfair jury 4 selection against District Attorneys Afshar and Jaramillo be dismissed with prejudice. 5 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Eighth Amendment claim for excessive bail is 6 dismissed with leave to amend. 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that if Plaintiff wishes to file a second amended complaint 8 in this case to add the Eighth Amendment claim, he must do so by May 6, 2025. Plaintiff is advised 9 that if he files a second amended complaint, the amended complaint (ECF No. 9) no longer serves 10 any function in this case. As such, the second amended complaint must be complete in and of itself 11 without reference to prior pleadings or other documents. The Court cannot refer to a prior pleading 12 or other documents to make Plaintiff’s amended complaint complete. 13 V. Service instructions 14 IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to issue summonses to: 15 (1) METRO Officer Tyler Smith and (2) METRO Officer Valdez. 16 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to deliver the 17 summonses and 2 copies of the amended complaint filed at ECF No. 9 to the United States 18 Marshals Service (“USMS”) for service. 19 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Clerk of Court is kindly directed to send Plaintiff 20 2 copies of Form USM-285.7 21 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff must complete a USM-285 form for each 22 Defendant against whom Plaintiff’s claims are proceeding and provide an address where each 23 Defendant can be served with process. Once completed, Plaintiff must provide the completed 24 USM-285 forms to the U.S. Marshals Service. Plaintiff shall have until May 5, 2025, to furnish 25 the U.S. Marshals Service with the required form. 26 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that upon receipt of the issued summonses, the USM-285 27 forms, and the copies of the operative complaint—and pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 1 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, within twenty-one days after receiving from the U.S. 2 || Marshals Service a copy of the form USM-285 showing whether service has been accomplished, 3 || Plaintiff must file a notice with the Court identifying whether the Defendants were served. If 4 || Plaintiff wishes to have service again attempted on a Defendant, he must file a motion with the 5 || Court identifying the Defendant and specifying a more detailed name and/or address for that 6 || Defendant or whether some other manner of service should be attempted. 7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall have until July 2, 2025, to accomplish 8 || service on Defendants under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). 9 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that from this point forward, Plaintiff shall serve upon the 10 || Defendants, or, if appearance has been entered by counsel, upon the attorney(s), a copy of every 11 || pleading, motion, or other document submitted for consideration by the Court. Plaintiff shall 12 || include with the original papers submitted for filing a certificate stating the date that a true and 13 || correct copy of the document was mailed to Defendants or counsel for Defendants. The Court 14 || may disregard any paper received by a district judge or magistrate judge that has not been filed 15 || with the Clerk, and any paper received by a district judge, magistrate judge, or the Clerk that fails 16 || to include a certificate of service. 17 Notice 18 This report and recommendation is submitted to the United States district judge assigned 19 || to this case under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). A party who objects to this report and recommendation 20 || may file a written objection supported by points and authorities within fourteen days of being 21 || served with this report and recommendation. Local Rule IB 3-2(a). Failure to file a timely 22 || objection may waive the right to appeal the district court’s order. Martinez v. Ylst, 951 F.2d 1153, 23 || 1157 (9th Cir. 1991). 24 25 DATED: April 3, 2025 26 EK pr La WCE □ BRENDA WEKSLER 27 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 28