Armstrong v. Barrow Steamship Co.

73 F. 878, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 1853
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit·Decided April 7, 1896·Published·Cited by 4 cases

Opinion

LACOMBE, Circuit Judge.

The opinion of the district judge is exhaustive, and sets forth in detail the movements of the respective vessels. Inasmuch as there is less dispute than usual on this branch of the case; and the appellant’s argument practically charges error in the findings of fact only in those particulars which relate to the position of the schooner’s forestay sail, it is unnecessary to discuss the testimony in detail. The schooner was sailing on the port tack, on a course of about S. W., with the wind two points abaft the beam. The wind was light to moderate, estimated by her officers as about a six-knot breeze, although she had since 6:30 p. m. covered a distance which would make her speed for the three hoursi preceding the collision considerably higher. The steamer was going at a speed of about 11 knots, on a compass course of E. f S. The schooner first sighted the steamer’s xvhite light and red light on her starboard bow at a distance of two miles or more. This indicated that the steamer was crossing the Daylight's bow. No change being made in the steamer’s course, and the vessels draw[879] ing nearer together, the schooner burned a flash light, and just as it expired, the distance between the vessels being then a quarter of a mile or less, put. her helm hard a-porl. The steamer had one lookout on the stem, one on the lookout bridge, and the chief and third officer, who had charge of the navigation, on the main bridge, besides the quartermaster at the wheel underneath the main bridge. They did not perceive the schooner until she burned her flash light. After the dazzling effect of the flash had passed away, — a very few seconds only, — a green light was seen, which the steamer’s witnesses say appeared “dull,” “dim,” or “glimmering.” This was undoubtedly a very short time before collision, and as soon as it was seen orders were given to starboard the helm, and to stop the engines, and to put the same full speed astern. We need not discuss the evidence bearing upon the question as to which vessel first changed direction, or as to the ensuing maneuvers. The fault of neither vessel lies there. It lies much further back, and arose when the steamer failed to detect the presence of the schooner while the distance between the two was still sufficient to admit of such a change in the steamer’s course as would give timely notice' to tin* Daylight that her course was known, and would not he intersected by the Circassia. In other words, the vital question in the case is, “Why was not the schooner’s green light seen in time?” It was a proper and sufficient light. All parties concede that. The appellant contends that all of the persons on (lie deck of the Circassia— lookouts, navigators, and wheelsman — failed to see it because they were not vigilant or attentive. They all testified and all insisted that they were vigilant. The steamer contends that the schooner’s green light was obscured by the forestay sail. The witnesses from the schooner’s deck all testified arid all insisted that it was not so obscured. She was sailing on a course which would naturally bring her forestay sail as near as its cut, rig, and tackle would allow to the starboard light. Testimony was taken in the district court as. to measurements and experiments made subsequently, and the judge reached the following conclusion:

“There were live persons on the steamer who were in a position to see the schooner’s groen light, four of whom ought to have seen it, if U was visible, before the torch light was exhibited. The interval was a considerable one. The nighf; was not bad for seeing lights; and, if it was visible, nothing but simple negligence conld have prevented its being seen. There1 is nothing to indicate that the officers were not reasonably vigilant and attentive to tlieir duties. Under such circumstances, failure to see 1he light has been frequently held to be strong evidence that the light was not visible, and this ought to be deemed sufficient where, as in Unis case, there appears to have been a reasonable and sufficient cause for the obscuration of the light. The length of the forestay sail boom and the spread of the staysail were such that, with a list of the vessel to starboard, and the bellying of the sail, the green light might have been obscured when the vessels were in such relative positions as these. The only check to the obvious tendency to obscure the light would be scant'play allowed the staysail sheet. But, even ,as the evidence stands upon that point, it does not seem to me that this would necessarily prevent obscuration.”

The conflict of evidence necessarily left the case to he determined upon its inherent probabilities, and it seemed to the district judge [880] much more probable that the staysail did obscure the light to distant observers, than that all those on the deck of the steamer navigating directly across what was well known to be the track of a large fleet of coasting vessels were continuously negligent for a considerable space of time. This is an entirely reasonable' disposition of the question, unless something which was overlooked in the case below, or something which is to be found in the new proofs, is persuasive to a different conclusion.

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Armstrong v. Barrow Steamship Co., 73 F. 878, 1896 U.S. App. LEXIS 1853 (2d Cir. 1896).

73 F. 878 (Armstrong v. Barrow Steamship Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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