Armstrong Bros. Tool Co. v. United States
Opinion
This is an American manufacturers’ action brought pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1582(b) (1970), 28 U.S.C. § 2632(a) (Supp. V 1975) and 19 U.S.C. § 1516(c) (Supp. V 1975), involving the Anti-dumping Act of 1921, as amended (19 U.S.C. §§ 160, et seq.) (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (hereinafter Antidumping Act).
Plaintiffs challenge the negative injury determination of the United States Tariff Commission (now "United States International Trade Commission”) in investigation AA1921-141 relating to certain non-powered hand tools from Japan, as reported in 39 FR 38133-34 (1974). The jurisdictional uncertainty surrounding this action at the time issue was joined was recently resolved in SCM Corporation v. United States (Brother International Corporation, Party-in-Interest), 80 Cust. Ct. 226, C.R.D. 78-2 (1978), wherein Chief Judge Re held that the Customs Court has jurisdiction to review a negative injury determination by - the Commission in an American manufacturer’s action pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1516(c). See also my recent opinion in Armstrong Bros. Tool Co. et al. v. United States (Great Neck Saw Manufacturing, Incorporated, Party-in-Interest), 80 Cust. Ct. 160, C.D. 4751 (1978), following the rationale of SCM.
Here, after issue was joined, defendant instituted discovery by serving plaintiffs with interrogatories seeking, inter alia, “the facts” that constitute the bases for plaintiffs’ assertions in their complaint [251]*251that the Commission erred by misconstruing the relevant statutory language, misapplying the Antidumping Act, and rendering a decision that was arbitrary, unreasonable, not supported by substantial evidence, and without a rational basis.1 Plaintiffs responded to these interrogatories by objecting on the ground that they call for “legal argumentation”. Defendant now seeks an order compelling answers to the interrogatories in question pursuant to rule 6.5.
It appears that neither party contemplates a trial, but rather a judicial review predicated upon the administrative record (although the perimeters of such “record” are disputed).2 Plaintiffs’ position is that the Commission erred in reaching its negative injury determination as a matter of law. Further, plaintiffs contend that when the “record” has been made available to them, they will in due course file a motion for summary judgment, at which time defendant will be apprised of the facts that defendant presently seeks in its discovery.
Under these circumstances, I see no useful purpose to be served in requiring plaintiffs to analyze the administrative “record” made available to them at this juncture in order to simply give defendant a citation of those portions thereof upon which plaintiffs, in their motion for summary judgment, will rely in support of their legal contentions.3 Plainly, if discovery were compelled pursuant to defendant’s motion, plaintiffs’ response would largely be argumentative and contentious. In light of these considerations, the proper objectives of discovery would not be served. See generally 4A Moore’s Federal Practice § 33.17 (1975)
[252]*252Accordingly, defendant’s motion for an order compelling discovery is hereby denied. See order of Judge Maletz entered on May 26, 1978, similarly denying defendant’s motion for an order compelling discovery in ASG Industries, Inc. et al. v. United States, Court No. 77-5-00879; and also my opinion and order in Sprague Electric Company v. United States (Capar Components Corp., Party-in-Interest), 80 Cust. Ct. 254, C.R.D. 78-6 (1978), promulgated concurrently herewith.
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80 Cust. Ct. 250 (Armstrong Bros. Tool Co. v. United States) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.