Armour Grain Co. v. Industrial Commission

153 N.E. 699, 323 Ill. 80
CourtIllinois Supreme Court
DecidedOctober 28, 1926
DocketNo. 16649. Judgment affirmed.
StatusPublished
Cited by16 cases

This text of 153 N.E. 699 (Armour Grain Co. v. Industrial Commission) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Illinois Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Armour Grain Co. v. Industrial Commission, 153 N.E. 699, 323 Ill. 80 (Ill. 1926).

Opinion

Mr. Justice Duncan

delivered the opinion of the court:

Patrick Fitzmorris, defendant in error, (herein referred to as defendant,) was awarded compensation of $15 per week for 71 weeks for total temporary incapacity, against plaintiff in error, (herein referred to as plaintiff,) by an arbitrator, for an accidental injury received by him on March 19, 1921, while employed by plaintiff to blow cinders and pull fires at its grain elevator. The Industrial Commission affirmed the award, and on certiorari proceedings in the circuit court of Cook county the award was set aside and the cause remanded to the commission for further hearing. Additional evidence was heard by the commission and an award entered in favor of the defendant, finding that as a result of the injury he was wholly and permanently incapacitated for work, the award being $15 per week for 266 and two-thirds weeks and a pension for life of $26.67 Per month, and $301.55 for medical services. Plaintiff sued out a writ of certiorari, and the superior court of Cook county confirmed the second award of the Industrial Commission and quashed the writ. This court allowed a writ of error to review the record.

Under paragraph (a) of section 8 of the Compensation act the employer is required to provide the necessary first aid, medical and surgical services and all necessary hospital services during the period for which compensation may be payable; all necessary medical and surgical services for a period of not longer than eight weeks, not exceeding an amount of $200, and in addition such medical or surgical services in excess of such limits as may be necessary during the time such hospital services are furnished. All of such services shall be limited to those which are reasonably required to cure and relieve from the effects of the injury. The employee may elect to secure his own physician, surgeon or hospital service at his own expense. It is the contention of plaintiff that the evidence shows that the defendant in error elected to secure his own physician, surgeon and hospital service, and that plaintiff is not liable in any sum therefor. The evidence shows that the employer had due notice of defendant’s injury just after the accident and took no step to furnish any of such services for defendant.

Dr. Schussler testified that he was sent by an insurance company of the plaintiff, two days after the accident, to treat defendant; that he treated a cut on defendant’s finger and prescribed liniment for his left shoulder and for soreness in his spine; that he called again, two days later and took defendant to the hospital in his car and had made X-ray pictures of him; that he told defendant that he would operate on him as soon as the bruises disappeared and after the nervous condition resulting from the shock of the explosion had subsided; that the defendant did not return to his office or to the hospital for such services, and that he again called on the defendant, did not find him at home and learned that he had consulted another doctor, and he did not give any further treatment to defendant. He positively denied that he told defendant to get or employ his own doctor.

The defendant testified that he was at home five days after the explosion when Dr. Schussler called on him and was just regaining consciousness. Schussler did not give him any treatment and told him to use the treatment prescribed by the doctor he had gotten before he saw Dr. Schussler. Schussler told him to come out to the hospital the following Monday if he was able. He and his wife went to the hospital but the doctor was not there. He again went to the hospital on Tuesday and the doctor was not there. The nurse at the hospital made an X-ray picture of him and told him to go home and call his own doctor. He then called his own doctor, who performed an operation for him and treated him from that time on. Dr. Schussler came to his house the evening of the operation and never gave him any treatment and told him to have his own doctor treat him.

Drs. Alfred J. Mitchell, Milton J. Latimer and Sigmund Krumholz, of Chicago, testified for respondent that they made minute examinations of defendant, but they do not testify to giving him any treatment or at whose instance they examined him. These examinations were made by Dr. Mitchell August 2, 1922, by Dr. Krumholz on February 17, 1924, and every day from February 28 to March 4, 1924, and by Dr. Latimer on February 29, 1924, and were apparently made by them with a view of testifying in this case.

While the defendant was in the hospital a representative of the insurance company named Skindzier came there to pay him compensation. He asked the defendant how much it was costing him at the hospital, and he told him he did not know. He did not say anything to the defendant about having the company’s doctor to treat him, and did not inform the defendant that he would have to pay for his treatment if he used his own doctor and did not have the company’s doctor to treat him.

It is not the province of this court to weigh conflicting evidence and substitute its judgment for that of the commission unless we can say that the finding of the commission is clearly and manifestly against the weight of the evidence. (Keller v. Industrial Com. 302 Ill. 610.) If the testimony of the defendant is to be believed, he did not refuse to accept the services of the physician sent him by plaintiff or the insurance company but endeavored to accept them. Failing to meet Dr. Schussler he acted on the request of Dr. Schussler himself and of the nurse at the hospital to which Dr. Schussler had requested him to go for the purpose of an operation and for treatment. Under this evidence the commission was warranted in finding that he returned to his own doctor for such treatment and operation at the instance of the company’s doctor and who had been sent by the insurance company or the company to treat him or have him treated. There is no dispute on the question of whether or not the amount of the award is a reasonable charge for the services mentioned in the statute and obtained by the defendant. The amount of this award was properly allowed by the commission and confirmed by the court.

The evidence in this record, by the testimony of three physicians and the defendant and other witnesses who testified for him, is to the effect that he was able to do hard physical labor before he was injured but that he is now virtually a physical and mental wreck and unable to perform any kind of labor; that his condition is permanent and that there is no reasonable probability that hé will recover his physical and mental strength and his ability to perform any kind of work. To use his own expression, his legs and eyes are weak and he has pains when he walks and he cannot lift anything that is heavy. He has no control of his bowels and wears a diaper to prevent his soiling the bedclothes and his clothing, which he otherwise would do involuntarily. There is' a dispute among the medical experts who were called as witnesses as to whether or not the incontinence of the bowels is a functional or organic condition. The experts for the plaintiff testified that by elimination they could not find any organic condition which would cause the condition- claimed by the defendant. The experts called as witnesses for the defendant testified to some organic conditions found in their examination, and Dr.

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Bluebook (online)
153 N.E. 699, 323 Ill. 80, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/armour-grain-co-v-industrial-commission-ill-1926.