Armour & Co. v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad

41 R.I. 361
CourtSupreme Court of Rhode Island
DecidedJune 19, 1918
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 41 R.I. 361 (Armour & Co. v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Armour & Co. v. New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad, 41 R.I. 361 (R.I. 1918).

Opinion

Sweetland, J.

This is a suit in equity brought by the Providence and Worcester Railroad Company, Armour and Company, Swift and Company, and C. C. Hall against The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company, the members of the Pawtucket and Central Falls Grade Crossing Commission and the city of Pawtucket to enjoin the removal of a certain spur track in the city of Pawtucket which crosses Pine and Dexter streets at- grade.

The complainants, in their second amended bill of complaint, in substance state among other things that The New York, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company is the lessee and operator of the Boston and Providence Railroad and the Providence and Worcester Railroad; that the Providence and Worcester Railroad Company is the owner of an undivided half of the land on which the tracks operated by the respondent railroad company are laid; that adjacent to its main tracks said defendant railroad company operates the spur track in question; that adjoining said spur track is land occupied by the complainants Armour and Company, Swift and Company and C. C. Hall;- that on the land so occupied by them the said complainants have fitted up warehouses and expended large sums of money, relying upon [364]*364the custom and agreement of the defendant railroad company, somewhat indefinitely stated in the bill, to furnish and maintain spur track facilities to merchants and the owners of industries who should locate along its tracks; that the respondents, the members of the Pawtucket and Central Falls Grade Crossing Commission derive their authority from Chapter 896 of the Public Laws, approved April 29, 1912, entitled "An Act Providing for the Abolition of Certain Grade Crossings in the Cities of Pawtucket and Central Falls;” that said commission has authorized and employed The New Y<5rk, New Haven & Hartford Railroad Company to do the work contemplated by said act in accordance with a certain plat and decision of said commission approved by the Superior Court; that the respondents intend to enter upon said spur track and remove it and break the connection between said spur track and the main tracks of the respondent railroad company; that the respondents have made no plan to provide for spur track facilities in the future to replace those which they intend to destroy and if no substituted facilities are provided the action of the respondents will result in irreparable injury and loss to the complainants; wherefore the complainants ask that the respondents be restrained temporarily and permanently from removing or in any way interfering with said spur track or any part thereof. To the second amended bill of complaint the respondents severally demurred, and have respectively set out like grounds of demurrer. Said demurrers were heard before Mr. Justice Barrows in the Superior Court and were sustained upon the third and fourth grounds of demurrer. The third and fourth grounds are as follows:

"3. By the laws of the State of Rhode Island these defendants constitute the Pawtucket & Central Falls Grade Crossing Commission, and in that capacity are under obligation to remove certain grade crossings in the amended bill mentioned and to remove the grade crossing caused by the maintenance of the spur track in said bill of complaint mentioned.
[365]*365“4. That said defendants, as the Pawtucket & Central Falls Grade Crossing Commission as aforesaid, are under obligation to remove so much of the spur track in said amended bill of complaint mentioned, as crosses at grade the highways in the City of Pawtucket known as Pine Street and Dexter Street.” A decree was entered in the Superior Court dismissing said second amended bill and the cause is before us upon the complainants’ appeal from said decree.

The complainants contend that Chapter 896 of the Public Laws neither requires nor empowers the Grade Crossing Commission to elimináte the spur track in question and further if the act does empower the elimination of said spur track it is unconstitutional.

(1) Said Chapter 896 in our opinion, as its title indicates, was an act in the interest of public safety for the purpose of abolishing grade crossings on Pine, Dexter and Broad streets in the city of Pawtucket. The complainants in their argument have laid considerable stress upon the following language in the first section of the act, “In order that the safety of the public may be assured the grade crossings at Pine street, Dexter street and Broad street, in the city of Pawtucket . . . shall be eliminated and altered.” The complainants urge that from this language the intent of the General Assembly appears that the commission created by the act should either eliminate or alter the grade crossings on the designated streets in a manner reasonably to secure the safety of the public. At the time of the passage of the act Pine street and Dexter street each crossed said spur track and two through tracks of the defendant railroad at grade. The complainants in the course of their argument appear to consider the crossing of each of said tracks by Pine and Dexter streets respectively as constituting a separate grade crossing, i. e., that on Pine street there were three grade crossings and on Dexter street there were also three grade crossings. The complainants urge that while the safety of the public might require that the grade crossings at the through tracks on Pine and Dexter streets [366]*366should be eliminated, the grade crossings at the spur track on those streets might well be allowed to remain because of the more infrequent use of- said track; and that the grade crossings at said spur track might be “altered” by some change in the manner of its use. In our opinion the construction thus given to the act, in the particulars referred to, is not warranted. A grade crossing in the ordinary sense, and as that expression is used in the act, refers to the crossing of a railroad location by a highway on the level of the railroad, whatever be the number of tracks laid upon the railroad roadbed at the point of crossing. On Dexter street and on Pine street respectively there was but one grade crossing. If the word “altered” in the first section of the act is used in the sense of a change in a grade crossing without its destruction then the expression “eliminate and alter” is ambiguous; for it would be impossible for the commission to both eliminate the grade crossing on either of the designated streets and also to change it without destroying its identity. In this uncertainty we may look to the other provisions of the act and even to its title, if thereby aid is furnished in determining what was the intent of the legislature. From the title of the act it appears that the-General Assembly intended to provide for the abolition of grade crossings in Pawtucket on the streets named. The act also declares that said grade crossings are to be “eliminated and altered” in order that the safety of the public may be “assured,” i. e., made certain and put beyond doubt. While it may be true that in the operation of said railroad its use of the through tracks at grade has more elements of danger and is a greater menace to the safety of the public than attends the use of said spur track at grade, nevertheless the operation of any steam railroad track across a city street on the same level is by no means free from peril; and the safety of the public cannot be said to be “assured” when such a situation exists.

[367]*367(2) [366]

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Bluebook (online)
41 R.I. 361, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/armour-co-v-new-york-new-haven-hartford-railroad-ri-1918.