ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES INC. v. BD. OF COUNTY COMM'RS OF OKLA. COUNTY
Opinions
¶ 1 Armor Correctional Health Services, Inc., sued the Board of County Commissioners of Oklahoma County (County) for payment of medical services provided to prisoners and detainees in the Oklahoma County Jail. County admitted that Armor provided the medical services in - question pursuant to a contract for the period January 1, 2014 to June 30, 2014, and an extension of this contract for the period July 1, 2014 to June 30, 2015. County did not dispute the accuracy of Armor’s monthly invoices for such services and admitted it had not paid some invoices totaling $3,302,297.04.
¶ 2 Despite these admissions, County argued that judgment could not be entered because Armor had not provided proof of the availability of funds as required by 62 O.S. 2001, §§ 3621 and 3632. In reply, Armor argued that the County’s obligation to pay for the medical services to the prisoners and detainees was not a claim founded on contract alone that is subject to the provisions of 362 and 363. Armor also argued that the obligation was not “indebtedness” as addressed in Article 10, § 263 of the Oklahoma [726] Constitution. Armor asserted the County’s obligation to pay the medical services provided to prisoners and detainees was incurred in fulfillment of a governmental function mandated by the Oklahoma Constitution. As such, the County’s obligation was exempt from Article 10, § 26 as well as §§ 362 and 363.
¶ 3 The trial court ruled that Articlé 10, § 26 did apply, but that Armor’s summary judgment materials made a prima facie case1 of the availability of funds. The trial court concluded that- the burden shifted to the County- and that the County’s excuse of a revenue failure within the Sheriffs budget did not bar payment. In so ruling, the trial judge said “whenever there’s a failure of revenue within a particular department the County Commissioners look to their general revenue and do what they need to do in order to compensate vendors who are out there that they have legal obligations to.”
¶ 4 The trial court granted summary judgment to Armor in the amount of $3,302,297.04 and County has appealed. We have retained this appeal for de novo review of the summary judgment and the important constitutional issue presented. See Wathor v. Mutual Assurance Administrators, Inc., 2004 OK 2, ¶ 4, 87 P.3d 569, 561. Upon review, we affirm the summary judgment in favor of Armor, albeit for a different reason than given by the trial court.
¶ 5 Article 17, § 2 of the Oklahoma Constitution established the office of sheriff for each of the seventy-seven counties, and Article 25, § 18 prescribed the duties of that office by reference to and incorporation of the duties of that office under territorial law.4 Smartt v. Board of County Commissioners of Craig County, 1917 OK 690, ¶¶ 3 and 4, 67 Okla. 141, 169 P. 1101, 1101. One such constitutional duty imposed upon a sheriff was “[t]he keeping of prisoners confided to his custody.” Id. at ¶ 4, 169 P. at 1102. Performance of this and other constitutionally prescribed duties “are made mandatory because necessary for the protection and well-being of the people composing the state.” Id. at ¶ 6, 169 P. at 1102.
¶ 6 In' the Smartt case, this Court held that expenses “incurred in the necessary discharge of his duties imposed ... by the imperative mandate of law, are not within the limitation imposed by section 26, art. 10.” Id. This Court, explained this holding by observing that “[i]n many instances the amount necessary for a proper performance of such duties could not be reasonably foreseen, for [727] it is not always possible to tell in advance how much will be required.” Id. at ¶ 20, 169 P. at 1104.
¶ 7 Financial obligations for the fulfillment of constitutionally mandated functions are termed “compulsory” debts, as distinguished from those . based on contract alone. Board of County Commissioners of Caddo County v. Lawrence, 1938 OK 173, ¶ 11, 182 Okla. 485, 78 P.2d 669, 671. The appropriation of funding for such obligations occurs by the “force and vigor” of thé Oklahoma Constitution, and does not require'further fiscal action to be effective, although the better practice is to observe the formal appropriation process. Edwards v. Carter, 1934 OK 46, ¶¶ 20-21, 167 Okla. 287, 29 P.2d 610, 613. The only limitation upon either an appropriation or a judgment directing payment for constitutionally mandated functions is that “the items and amounts are reasonable, proper, and necessary to the conduct of the government in accordance with [the pertinent] constitutional provisions.” Little v. County Excise Board of Marshall County, 1932 OK 833, ¶ 9, 161 Okla. 40, 16 P.2d 1080, 1082.
¶ 8 Nothing in the record suggests that the medical services provided by Armor for the prisoners and detainees in the Oklahoma County Jail were not “reasonable, proper, and necessary.” As those services and the charges therefor were in fulfillment of the sheriffs constitutional duty for “the keeping of prisoners confided to his custody,” Armor is entitled to a judgment in the amount of $3,302,297.04.
AFFIRMED
Footnotes
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2017 OK 49 (ARMOR CORRECTIONAL HEALTH SERVICES INC. v. BD. OF COUNTY COMM'RS OF OKLA. COUNTY) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.