Armendariz v. Renfro CA4/1

Opinion

Filed 8/17/26 Armendariz v. Renfro CA4/1 NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

ARTHUR ARMENDARIZ et al., D085598

Plaintiffs and Appellants, (Super. Ct. No. 37-2015-

00012429-CU-MC-NC)

v.

VALERIE SOWDER RENFRO, as trustee, etc. et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Cynthia A. Freeland, Judge. Affirmed.

Resnick & Louis, Michael M. Khalilpour; Greines, Martin, Stein & Richland, David E. Hackett and Kent W. Toland, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Law Offices of Daniel J. Williams and Daniel J. Williams, for Defendants and Respondents.

I. INTRODUCTION

This appeal concerns a long-simmering dispute between neighbors over invasive roots from 38 Ficus trees. In 2015, the parties settled a lawsuit by agreeing that the tree owners would remove 19 of the trees while

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maintaining the remaining 19 trees in a way that would minimize root encroachment onto the neighboring property. In 2018, the neighboring property owner sued again over invasive roots from the remaining 19 trees. After a six-day bench trial, the court issued a proposed statement of decision finding “that an order directing the removal of the . . . Ficus trees and their stumps and roots is warranted under the circumstances.” The proposed statement of decision concluded by “direct[ing]” the tree owners “to remove the remaining 19 Ficus trees.” When no party objected to the proposed statement of decision, the trial court reissued it as a final statement of decision.

On appeal, the tree owners — who neither objected to the trial court’s proposed statement of decision nor otherwise requested clarification from the trial court — argue only that the injunctive relief ordered in the final statement of decision is too vague and ambiguous to enforce as an injunction because it is unclear if the order “to remove the remaining 19 Ficus trees” includes those trees’ roots. Based on our independent review of the challenged ruling and the appellate record, we conclude this challenge is unpersuasive.

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s order.

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II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1

A. The Parties and Their Properties

In the early 1980s, Valerie Sowder Renfro purchased property in

Encinitas, which she later transferred to herself as trustee.2 We will refer to Valerie Sowder Renfro (in her individual and representative capacities) as “Sowder” because that is how she referred to herself in trial court proceedings. We will refer to her property as the “Sowder Property.”

In 2006, Sheri and Arthur Armendariz purchased property (the Armendariz Property) immediately east of the Sowder Property. When the Armendarizes purchased their property, it had a wood fence and 38 preexisting Ficus trees bordering the Sowder Property.

B. Sowder’s 2013 Lawsuit and Resulting Settlement

In 2013, Sowder sued the Armendarizes for negligence, nuisance, trespass, and damages arising from the encroachment of the Armendarizes’ Ficus trees and roots onto the Sowder Property. The parties resolved this lawsuit in 2014 by signing a Settlement and Release of All Claims (Settlement Agreement).

1 These facts are taken from the trial court’s statement of decision or are otherwise undisputed. (See Lopez v. Ledesma (2022) 12 Cal.5th 848, 853 [“Because no party disputes the trial court’s factual findings, we rely on the trial court’s statement of decision to summarize the pertinent facts in this case.”]; Chapala Management Corp. v. Stanton (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1532, 1535 [“The relevant facts are undisputed.”].)

2 The trust is the Valerie Sowder Renfro UIAID 10/19/87 Separate Property Trust.

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Under the Settlement Agreement, the Armendarizes agreed to

(1) remove 19 of the 38 Ficus trees;3 (2) construct a “root barrier” — a 100- foot long, 29-inch deep barrier — 10 feet into the Sowder Property adjacent to

the location of the remaining 19 Ficus trees;4 and (3) pay Sowder $78,500. In exchange, Sowder released all claims against the Armendarizes for the current encroachments. The Settlement Agreement specifically carved out any claim that “may arise in the future caused by . . . the 19 [F]icus trees remaining on the [Armendariz] property.”

As further required by the Settlement Agreement, Sowder and the Armendarizes also entered into a Tree Maintenance Agreement that specified a schedule by which the Armendarizes would maintain the remaining 19 Ficus trees. This agreement generally prohibited Sowder from trimming the Ficus trees or their roots, and from interfering with the Root Zone, unless the Armendarizes failed to comply with the agreed-upon schedule and Sowder provided them with notice and an opportunity to cure.

The parties agreed that the Settlement Agreement and the Tree Maintenance Agreement would “run with the land” and the agreements were recorded with the county recorder. The parties treated these recorded documents as having granted the Armendarizes an easement on the Sowder Property.

3 The Settlement Agreement gave the Armendarizes the right to remove the remaining 19 Ficus trees if they so desired, in which case the agreement required Sowder to “provide access to the [Sowder] property as needed for such removal of trees, with reasonable notice.”

4 This 10-foot strip between the root barrier and the property boundary is referred to in trial court proceedings as the “Root Zone.”

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In around February 2015, the Armendarizes installed a “BioBarrier root control system” along the perimeter of the Root Zone on the Sowder Property. The BioBarrier system was a fabric mesh infused with rootinhibiting herbicide.

Sowder dismissed her lawsuit in February 2015.

C. The Armendarizes’ 2015 Lawsuit and Resulting Settlement

In April 2015, a few months after the parties entered the Settlement

Agreement, the Armendarizes sued Sowder and her husband, James Renfro,5 for breaching the Settlement Agreement by trimming the remaining Ficus trees.

In July 2015, the trial court entered a stipulated permanent injunction prohibiting Sowder and Renfro from cutting or trimming the Ficus trees or their roots, and from interfering with the root barrier system.

D. Sowder’s 2018 Lawsuit

In September 2017, Sowder noticed “cracking and bulging” of the ground on her property outside the Root Zone. She had her gardener “excavate, by shovel, a trench that was 100 feet long by 10 feet wide by 20 inches deep.” The parties and their respective arborists and counsel met at the trench several times to assess the root encroachment and potential remedies. As of October 2017, “root growth could be seen over the top of, through, and under the BioBarrier and onto the Sowder Property outside the Root Zone,” heading “toward [a] shed and garage structures on the Sowder Property.” (Fn. omitted.) By January 2018, “it was clear that the BioBarrier

5 Although Renfro did not own the Sowder Property, he signed the Settlement Agreement and Tree Maintenance Agreement.

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had not contained the Ficus tree roots, which . . . could be seen extending approximately [20] feet onto the Sowder Property outside the Root Zone.” Many of the roots were live roots.

In September 2018, after the parties were unable to agree on a remedy for the encroaching roots, Sowder sued the Armendarizes for negligence, nuisance, trespass, and damages. Sowder’s complaint prayed for “injunctive relief, including an abatement of the ongoing encroachment . . . with an order to [the Armendarizes] to remove the 19 [F]icus trees and tree roots.” The Armendarizes filed a cross-complaint against Sowder and Renfro for breach of the Settlement Agreement, negligence, trespass, and damages. The trial court consolidated this 2018 case with the Armendarizes’ 2015 case that led to the stipulated injunction.

In 2021, Sowder sued the Armendarizes for breaching the Settlement Agreement and Tree Maintenance Agreement by failing to adhere to the prescribed maintenance schedule, and for a variety of tort and privacy claims (e.g., allegedly installing cameras aimed into, and throwing rat carcasses onto, the Sowder Property).

While these lawsuits were pending, the parties continued attempting to resolve their disputes, albeit unsuccessfully. In one attempt, the Armendarizes hired a contractor to remove the roots encroaching beyond the Root Zone. But rather than remove the roots, the contractor used a grinder that pulverized the roots — along with the BioBarrier, its herbicide, and an irrigation line — into the Sowder Property’s soil. After the contractor pulverized about 20 feet of material, Sowder instructed the contractor to stop working.

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E. Phase 1 Trial on Sowder’s Nuisance and Trespass Claims

In September 2024, the trial court held a “Phase 1” bench trial on Sowder’s nuisance and trespass claims; a “Phase 2” trial on damages would follow. The Phase 1 trial lasted six court days. “At trial, it was undisputed that [the Armendarizes’] Ficus trees, which are nearly [60] feet tall, have an extensive root system that significantly has encroached upon the Sowder Property. Indeed, there was no dispute at trial that the BioBarrier . . . failed, and the live roots of [the Armendarizes’] Ficus trees . . . have invaded the Sowder Property, in some places extending more than 40 feet [beyond] the BioBarrier . . . . [I]t also was undisputed that Ficus roots are aggressive, invasive, and capable of destroying asphalt and concrete structures, a fact acknowledged by Mrs. Armendariz herself and the numerous tree experts who testified during trial.”

Witnesses testified that the Armendarizes’ Ficus roots had damaged the Sowder Property. The damage included cracking a concrete slab in a garage, uplifting the earthen floor of a shed, wrapping around and bending underground electrical conduits, and strangling to death an apricot tree.

Several expert witnesses testified that the Ficus trees and their roots should be removed entirely. Hoping for a different outcome, “Mrs. Armendariz offered testimony about what she perceived to be a pattern of cooperation and compliance. The court, respectfully, did not find this testimony credible.”

About a month after the close of evidence, the parties submitted extensive written closing arguments. The court took the matter under submission on October 18, 2024.

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F. The Trial Court’s Statement of Decision

About six weeks later, on December 2, 2024, the trial court issued a 25-

page proposed statement of decision. The court gave the parties 15 days to object to the proposed statement of decision. Neither party did. Accordingly, the court issued its final statement of decision on December 24, 2024.

1. The Trial Court’s Findings

The trial court found that Sowder met her burden to establish that the Armendarizes’ Ficus trees and roots constituted a nuisance and were trespassing on the Sowder Property. The court then addressed Sowder’s requests for injunctive relief requiring (1) the Armendarizes to remove the Ficus trees, roots, and contaminated pulverized soil; (2) the Armendarizes to repair the damage that the Ficus roots caused to the Sowder Property and structures on it; and (3) the extinguishment of the Root Zone easement on the Sowder Property. After weighing the “relative hardship” to the parties of granting Sowder her requested relief, the court made its “findings.”

In weighing the requested injunctive relief against the Armendarizes’

offer of ongoing cooperation, the court “respectfully [did] not agree that there was a historical pattern of cooperation that would support the proposition that the Parties can cooperatively work together to prevent any future trespass or nuisance created by the Ficus trees and/or their roots.” The court made the following findings about the benefits of removing the Ficus trees and their roots:

[A]n order directing the removal of the remaining 19 Ficus trees (inclusive of the stumps and roots) would be a one-time cost (as opposed to annual maintenance costs that would be incurred in connection with any proposed “fix” by [the

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Armendarizes], and it would obviate the need for ongoing maintenance of the Ficus trees and the Root Zone and would obviate the need for removal of any roots traversing whatever proposed new barrier is installed. Additionally, and of significance to the Parties, removal of the Ficus trees would bring peace without the threat of unending future litigation (at least as it relates to the Ficus tree/root issues). Consequently, the court concludes that an order directing the removal of the remaining 19 Ficus trees and their stumps and roots is warranted under the circumstances. (Italics added.)

Regarding Sowder’s request that the court order the Armendarizes “to repair the damage to the Sowder Property and structures on the Sowder Property that was caused by the Ficus trees/roots,” the court denied the request, finding that “monetary damages . . . can serve as an adequate remedy.”

Finally, as to Sowder’s request to extinguish the easement for the Root Zone, the court found that by allowing the roots to encroach beyond the Root Zone, the Armendarizes had “engaged in conduct that is incompatible with the nature of the easement.” “Given this, and given that the court has concluded that the only equitable remedy in this case is an order directing the removal of [the Armendarizes’] 19 Ficus trees, the court concludes that the easement as granted by the Settlement Agreement shall be and is extinguished.”

2. The Trial Court’s Order

The trial court formally set forth its order in the “conclusion” section of the final statement of decision, which reads in relevant part:

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In light of the foregoing, the court makes the following rulings in connection with the Phase I Trial of [Sowder’s] nuisance and trespass claims:

(1) [The Armendarizes] hereby are directed to remove the remaining 19 Ficus trees within ninety (90) days of service of the Final Statement of Decision;

(2) [Sowder’s] request for a mandatory injunction requiring [the Armendarizes] to repair the damage to the Sowder Property and structures on the Sowder Property that was caused by the Ficus trees is denied because [Sowder] ha[s] not demonstrated that monetary damages to account for such issues would be inadequate; and

(3) the easement as granted by the Settlement Agreement, which served to enable the creation of the Root Zone, shall be and is extinguished. (Italics added.)

G. Notice of Appeal

On January 31, 2025, the Armendarizes filed a notice of appeal from

the trial court’s December 24, 2024 final statement of decision.6

6 After requesting and receiving letter briefing from the parties on the issues, we are satisfied that the statement of decision is appealable as “an order granting . . . an injunction” (Code Civ. Proc., § 904, subd. (a)(6)) and that the appeal is not moot (i.e., the Ficus trees have not yet been removed because the pendency of this appeal stayed the trial court’s order) (see id., § 916, subd. (a); Daly v. San Bernardino County Bd. of Supervisors (2021) 11 Cal.5th 1030, 1035 (Daly) [“an injunction requiring the defendant to take affirmative action (a so-called mandatory injunction) is automatically stayed during the pendency of the appeal”]).

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H. Sowder Seeks Clarification from the Trial Court

After requesting and receiving two extensions of their filing deadline, the Armendarizes filed their opening brief here on September 25, 2025. As noted, the only issue the Armendarizes raise on appeal is the alleged ambiguity in the statement of decision arising from the fact that the trial court’s findings expressly state “that an order directing the removal of the remaining 19 Ficus trees and their stumps and roots is warranted under the circumstances,” yet the court’s conclusion and formal order states only that the Armendarizes must “remove the remaining 19 Ficus trees.” (Italics added.)

On October 22, 2025, less than a month after the Armendarizes filed their opening brief here, Sowder filed an ex parte application in the trial court asking the trial court to “correct” the “clerical error[]” in the statement of decision by clarifying in the conclusion section that the court’s order that the Armendarizes remove the Ficus trees includes removing the stumps and

roots, and to reinstate the Root Zone easement to accommodate this work.7 Sowder argued the court had the authority to amend the statement of decision at “any time before entry of judgment,” which had not yet occurred because the Phase 2 trial had not yet happened. (See Bay World Trading, Ltd. v. Nebraska Beef, Inc. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th 135, 141 (Bay World Trading) [“the court retains the power to change its findings of fact or conclusions of law until judgment is entered”].) Sowder further argued that

7 Although on appeal we generally do not review matters occurring after the challenged ruling, this rule is “somewhat flexible.” (Reserve Insurance Co. v. Pisciotta (1982) 30 Cal.3d 800, 813.) We find it appropriate to consider the information here because it sheds light on the Armendarizes’ motives in pursuing this appeal.

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the pendency of this appeal did not deprive the court of jurisdiction to make the clarification because the change was merely “clerical.” (See Bed, Bath & Beyond of La Jolla, Inc. v. La Jolla Village Square Venture Partners (1997) 52 Cal.App.4th 867, 883 [“[t]he perfection of plaintiff’s appeal did not deprive the court of its inherent power to remedy what was merely a clerical error”].)

The Armendarizes opposed Sowder’s ex parte request. They argued that no exigency warranted ex parte relief, the pendency of this appeal divested the trial court of jurisdiction to modify the statement of decision, and that Sowder’s requested change was substantive rather than clerical.

The trial court heard Sowder’s ex parte request on October 23, 2025.

The hearing was reported. The court began by announcing its tentative ruling:

My tentative is I have to deny this, but not because I think that there are no issues, to be clear. I don’t think there’s clerical errors. I think my statement of decision was very clear. On page 24, trees include – a tree is not separate from its stump or its roots, and I included that on page 24, lines 5 through 6. [¶] And the incorporation of everything into the conclusion is accomplished by “in the light of the foregoing,” which is on the very same page. A tree is not separate from its stump or its roots, so I think that’s clear.

The issue with the request of relief is this is already on appeal. And to the extent that there is doubt as to what was in the statement of decision, which was the subject of no objection by anyone, then that’s something you’ll deal with at the appellate court. They can tell me whether they disagree or not. [¶]

But to this Court, there is no clerical error. Page 24, lines 5 and 6 are clear, as is the definition of a tree. I’m not sure in what world a tree is separate from its roots or its stump. But there we are.

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So that’s my tentative. Unfortunately, I can’t make that more clear. I think it was clear in the statement of decision. [The] appellate court can tell me I was wrong. But I don’t think I can do anything on an ex parte basis.

After hearing argument from counsel, the trial court denied Sowder’s ex parte request. The court apologized that the issue “has been plaguing the parties since . . . 2013.” “But,” the court added, “I can’t do anything about my statement of decision, which I, frankly, believe is clear and was clear at the time so as to elicit no objections by any party. [¶] And I will take guidance from the appellate court if they disagree with my definition of a tree.”

I. Sowder Moves to Dismiss the Appeal

On October 27, 2025, a few days after the ex parte hearing in the trial court, Sowder filed a motion in this court seeking to dismiss the Armendarizes’ appeal because they never asked the trial court to clarify the supposed ambiguities in its ruling that are the sole basis for the Armendarizes’ appeal. Sowder argues this circumstance implicates the doctrines of invited error and implied findings. (See, e.g., Diaz v. Professional Community Management, Inc. (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th 1190, 1203–1204 [“ ‘Under the doctrine of invited error, when a party by its own conduct induces the commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the judgment should be reversed because of that error.’ ”]; In re Marriage of Arceneaux (1990) 51 Cal.3d 1130, 1132 [under the traditional appellate presumption of correctness and the doctrine of implied findings, “a litigant who fails to bring to the attention of the trial court alleged deficiencies in the court’s statement of decision waive[s] the right to complain of such errors on appeal”].)

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The Armendarizes opposed Sowder’s motion to dismiss. They argue the motion fails procedurally because it requires us to review the appellate record and to consider the merits of the appeal. (See, e.g., Gogerty v. Coachella Val. Jr. College Dist. (1962) 57 Cal.2d 727, 729 [“On a motion to dismiss an appeal where it is necessary to review the record, . . . the motion will be denied”]; Reed v. Norman (1957) 48 Cal.2d 338, 342 [stating “the general rule that the merits of a case should not be considered on a motion to dismiss the appeal; it should be determined on the appeal itself”]; but see Zimmerman v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc. (1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 153, 162 [“under appropriate circumstances,” “a motion to dismiss which necessitates a review of the record . . . will be entertained”].) The Armendarizes also argue the motion fails on the merits.

We notified the parties that we would consider Sowder’s motion to dismiss concurrently with the appeal. Having now considered the motion, and having determined that it requires review of the appellate record and consideration of factual and procedural issues that are intertwined with the merits of the appeal, we deny the motion. (See People ex rel. Lockyer v. Brar (2004) 115 Cal.App.4th 1315, 1319 [“ ‘[W]e deem it appropriate to affirm the judgment rather than to dismiss the appeal as frivolous. Once the record has been reviewed thoroughly, little appears to be gained by dismissing the appeal rather than deciding it on its merits.’ ”], quoting People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436, 443.)

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III. DISCUSSION

A. The Statement of Decision Unambiguously Requires the Armendarizes to Remove the Ficus Trees and Their Stumps and Roots

The Armendarizes argue that the statement of decision is unenforceable for two reasons. First, they argue it is too vague as to whether they must remove only the Ficus trees or whether they must also remove the trees’ stumps and roots. Second, assuming they must also remove the stumps and roots, the Armendarizes claim the order is too vague about how they must remove the roots. Neither argument is convincing.

1. Relevant Legal Principles

“The interpretation of a judgment or decree is a question of law subject to a court’s de novo review.” (Dow v. Lassen Irrigation Co. (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 308, 326.) “ ‘ “[T]he same rules apply in ascertaining the meaning of a court order or judgment as in ascertaining the meaning of any other writing.” ’ ” (Ibid.)

“When interpreting [instruments], courts must first determine whether the language is ambiguous, or, in other words, whether it is reasonably susceptible to the interpretation urged by a party.” (Oakland-Alameda County Coliseum Authority v. Golden State Warriors, LLC (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 807, 816; Bay Cities Paving & Grading, Inc. v. Lawyers’ Mutual Ins. Co. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 854, 867 (Bay Cities) [an instrument “is ambiguous when it is capable of two or more constructions both of which are reasonable”].) Mere “ ‘[d]isagreement concerning the meaning of a phrase,’ ” or “ ‘ “the fact that a word or phrase isolated from its context is susceptible of more than one meaning,” ’ ” does not make the word or phrase ambiguous.

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(Foster-Gardner, Inc. v. National Union Fire Ins. Co. (1998) 18 Cal.4th 857, 868.) Rather, “language in a contract must be construed in the context of that instrument as a whole, and in the circumstances of that case, and cannot be found to be ambiguous in the abstract.” (Bank of the West v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1254, 1265 (Bank of the West); see Civ. Code, § 1641 [“The whole of a contract is to be taken together, so as to give effect to every part, if reasonably practicable, each clause helping to interpret the other.”]; Alameda County Flood Control & Water Conservation Dist. v. Department of Water Resources (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1163, 1179 (Department of Water Resources) [“an ambiguity cannot be created by parsing words outside their context”].) “The proper question is whether the word is ambiguous in the . . . circumstances of this case.” (Bay Cities, at p. 868.) “ ‘Courts will not adopt a strained or absurd interpretation in order to create an ambiguity where none exists.’ ” (La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, Inc. v. Industrial Indemnity Co. (1994) 9 Cal.4th 27, 37 (La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club).)

An ambiguous injunction violates due process and is, therefore, unenforceable. (Midway Venture LLC v. County of San Diego (2021) 60 Cal.App.5th 58, 65; In re Berry (1968) 68 Cal.2d 137, 156.) “ ‘An injunction must be sufficiently definite to provide a standard of conduct for those whose activities are to be proscribed, as well as a standard for the court to use in ascertaining an alleged violation of the injunction.’ ” (People ex rel. Gascon v. HomeAdvisor, Inc. (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 1073, 1082 (HomeAdvisor).) The “governing test” of whether an injunction is so ambiguous as to violate due process is “whether the directive at issue is set forth ‘ “in terms so vague that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application.” ’ ” (People v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 266, 316 (Uber Technologies); see City of Redlands v. County

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of San Bernardino (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 398, 415 (City of Redlands) [the enjoined party “must be able to determine from the order what he may and may not do”].) “[I]n determining whether the defendant has been given sufficient notice of the conduct proscribed or compelled, the language of the injunction must be interpreted in light of the record which discloses the kind of conduct that is sought to be enjoined.’ ” (City of Redlands, at pp. 415–416.) “In California ‘resort may be had to the findings of fact and conclusions of law to clarify any uncertainty or ambiguity’ in an injunction.” (City of Vernon v. Superior Court (1952) 38 Cal.2d 509, 514 (City of Vernon).)

2. Analysis

Based on our independent review of the trial court’s statement of decision and the entire appellate record, we conclude that the order “to remove the remaining 19 Ficus trees” unambiguously includes those trees’ stumps and roots.

Preliminarily, we clarify that we reach this conclusion without applying the doctrine of implied findings. (See In re Marriage of Arceneaux, supra, 51 Cal.3d at p. 1132 [“a litigant who fails to bring to the attention of the trial court alleged deficiencies in the court’s statement of decision waive[s] the right to complain of such errors on appeal”].) Although the spirit of this doctrine applies to the Armendarizes’ appellate claim of ambiguity, we decline to apply the doctrine because it usually applies to factual findings, whereas the Armendarizes have characterized their appellate challenges as legal challenges to the validity of the injunctive relief. (Duarte Nursery, Inc. v. California Grape Rootstock Improvement Com. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 1000, 1012 [the doctrine of implied findings does not apply “when the party attacks the legal premises” of the trial court’s decision].) Nevertheless, as we

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now explain, we conclude under traditional contract-interpretation principles that the trial court’s order unambiguously requires the Armendarizes to remove the Ficus trees and their stumps and roots.

To support their argument that the statement of decision is ambiguous, the Armendarizes observe that some sentences in the statement of decision refer separately to “trees,” “stumps,” and “roots,” thereby suggesting each “independent word[]” has a distinct meaning. From this, the Armendarizes reason that the trial court’s “command to remove only the ‘trees’ (without mentioning anything else) would . . . seem to exclude any command for removal of the stumps/roots.” Otherwise, they argue, the court’s separate uses of “stumps” and “roots” would violate the canon of construction that courts should “give effect to every part” of a writing. (Civ. Code, § 1614.) Although this reading is possible, we do not find it reasonable or plausible.

The Armendarizes’ approach ignores the overall context of this lawsuit.

(See Bay Cities, supra, 5 Cal.4th at p. 868 [“The proper question is whether the word is ambiguous in the . . . circumstances of this case.”].) Sowder sued to abate a nuisance created by trespassing roots. Her complaint expressly sought “an order to [the Armendarizes] to remove the 19 [F]icus trees and tree roots.” (Italics added.) And much of the evidence adduced at trial related to damage the roots caused to the Sowder Property and the structures on it. In this context, reading the trial court’s order as requiring removal of the trees but not their roots would be unreasonable.

The trial court’s detailed findings in the statement of decision further support this. (See City of Vernon, supra, 38 Cal.2d at p. 514 [“ ‘findings of fact and conclusions of law [can] clarify any uncertainty or ambiguity’ in an injunction”].) The trial court expressly found that the Armendarizes’ Ficus trees and roots constituted a nuisance and were trespassing on the Sowder

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Property. The court’s findings also expressly and repeatedly reference Sowder’s request for an injunction ordering the removal of the trees and their roots. And, most significantly, after weighing the relative hardships to the parties of granting Sowder’s requested injunctive relief, the trial court expressly found “that an order directing the removal of the remaining 19 Ficus trees and their stumps and roots is warranted under the circumstances.” (Italics added.)

The trial court’s critical finding appears on page 24 of the court’s 25-

page statement of decision. On the same page, the trial court’s conclusion begins with the phrase, “In light of the foregoing, the court makes the following rulings in connection with the . . . nuisance and trespass claims.” This signals that the orders that follow this prefatory statement must be construed “in light of” the findings the court just expressed. This necessarily includes the trial court’s finding on the same page “that an order directing the removal of the remaining 19 Ficus trees and their stumps and roots is warranted under the circumstances.” (Italics added.)

The Armendarizes’ proffered reading of the court’s ruling would improperly have us ignore the court’s most significant finding. (See Bank of the West, supra, 2 Cal.4th at p. 1265 [“language in a contract must be construed in the context of that instrument as a whole, and in the circumstances of that case, and cannot be found to be ambiguous in the abstract”].) We “ ‘will not adopt a strained or absurd interpretation in order to create an ambiguity where none exists.’ ” (La Jolla Beach & Tennis Club, supra, 9 Cal.4th at p. 37; Department of Water Resources, supra, 213 Cal.App.4th at p. 1179 [“an ambiguity cannot be created by parsing words outside their context”].)

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As an aside, we observe that our interpretation of the statement of decision is anchored in the trial court’s “objective intent, as evidenced by the words of the” statement of decision, “rather than the subjective intent” of the trial court. (Founding Members of the Newport Beach Country Club v. Newport Beach Country Club, Inc. (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 944, 956.) Additionally, our interpretation is consistent with the trial court’s explanation at the posttrial ex parte hearing that the trial court intended for the order to require the Armendarizes to also remove the Ficus trees’ stumps and roots. The Armendarizes argue that the very fact that Sowder asked the trial court to clarify its order proves that even Sowder recognizes that the order is fatally ambiguous. We disagree. It is apparent to us that Sowder sought clarification from the trial court only to avoid enduring the Armendarizes’ drawn-out appellate strategy.

Accordingly, we conclude the trial court’s statement of decision unambiguously requires the Armendarizes to remove the 19 remaining Ficus trees and those trees’ stumps and roots.

The Armendarizes next argue that, even if we conclude the trial court’s order requires removal of the roots, the injunction is still too ambiguous to enforce as to how the Armendarizes must remove the roots. We are not persuaded.

As one example of a purported ambiguity, the Armendarizes assert that because the trial court’s order also extinguished the Root Zone easement, the Armendarizes are uncertain if they may enter the Sowder Property to perform the court-ordered nuisance abatement. This claim is unconvincing in several respects. First, by ordering the Armendarizes to remove the roots from the Sowder Property, the trial court authorized them to enter that property. Second, Sowder acknowledges in her appellate briefing that “by

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seeking an injunction directing that [the Armendarizes] remove the Ficus trees and roots, [she] thereby consented to [the Armendarizes’] entry upon the [Sowder] property to perform the removal.” Finally, the Settlement Agreement from Sowder’s 2013 lawsuit requires Sowder to “provide access to the [Sowder] property as needed for . . . removal” of the remaining 19 Ficus trees.

As another example, the Armendarizes argue the trial court’s order is “vague as to how the Armendarizes are to remove roots growing under or inside of structures” on the Sowder Property. But the court’s order denied Sowder’s request that the court order the Armendarizes “to repair the damage to the Sowder Property and structures on the Sowder Property”

because “monetary damages [can] account for such issues.”8 The court’s order makes it clear that the Armendarizes need not remove the roots growing under or in any structures on the Sowder Property.

Relatedly, the Armendarizes claim the court’s order is vague about how they are supposed to remove roots that are “wrapped around electrical lines and irrigation pipes” on the Sowder Property. For example, the Armendarizes wonder if they “are entitled to (i) touch the conduits and pipes, (ii) move them, and (iii) disable them if necessary to remove the roots safely.” The trial exhibits the Armendarizes cite in support of these supposed uncertainties do not suggest there is a meaningful risk that these concerns will arise.

8 The fact that the statement of decision explains why the Armendarizes were not required to fix the structures on the Sowder Property — but made no similar explanation for why the Armendarizes were not required to remove the roots — further demonstrates that the statement of decision unambiguously requires the Armendarizes to remove the roots.

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In another example, the Armendarizes wonder “how the[y] . . . are supposed to remove” the “mulch”-like root remnants that remain on the Sowder Property after the Armendarizes’ contractor began “pulverizing” some of the roots. The Armendarizes acknowledge that the trial court’s order “discusses the evidence” regarding this issue. But, they claim, “as with the intact roots, [the order] is silent on whether those fragments must now be removed.” We have already rejected the Armendarizes’ claim that the trial court’s order is silent as to the intact roots. We likewise reject the claim as to the pulverized roots — roots are roots. (See, e.g., Uber Technologies, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at p. 316 [“We do not demand the detail of an engineer’s instruction manual, only that the injunction provide ‘ “reasonable specificity” ’ ”]; HomeAdvisor, supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 1083 [an “injunction need not etch forbidden actions with microscopic precision, but may instead draw entire categories of proscribed conduct”].)

Finally, the Armendarizes complain that the court’s order is too vague to provide an objectively verifiable means of determining whether the Armendarizes have complied. Not so. The parties’ demonstrated history of extensive excavation and investigation indicates to us that the parties and the trial court can reasonably determine whether all the roots have been removed. (See, e.g., Ekstrom v. Marquesa at Monarch Beach Homeowners Assn. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1125 [rejecting the appellant homeowners’ association’s argument that a mandatory injunction ordering the association “ ‘to utilize every enforcement mechanism available to it under the CC & Rs and the law in order to” enforce a view-protection provision was “void because it is too broad and too vague”].)

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B. Conclusion

As the trial court found, “the undisputed evidence elicited during the Phase 1 Trial was that the Ficus trees have been a source of consternation for the Parties since at least 2013.” The court also disagreed with the Armendarizes ”that there was a historical pattern of cooperation that would support the proposition that the Parties can cooperatively work together.” The Armendarizes’ appellate strategy — unnecessarily pursuing a lengthy appellate process purportedly aimed only at seeking clarification that they could promptly have obtained directly from the trial court — substantiates the trial court’s finding. (See Bonde v. Bishop (1952) 112 Cal.App.2d 1, 4 [“Apparently this is one of those rows between neighbors in which the defendants are standing on what they erroneously believe to be their strict legal rights to the exclusion of any consideration of the fair, decent, neighborly and legal thing to do.”].)

The trial court optimistically viewed injunctive relief as a means of disentangling the parties and resolving their root dispute once and for all. But we wonder whether the trial court’s optimism will bear out. Therefore, although we affirm the trial court’s order in full, we note that the trial court is free to modify its order at any time until the court enters judgment.

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IV. DISPOSITION

The order is affirmed. Respondents are entitled to their costs on appeal.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

BUCHANAN, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.