Armando Sustaita v. Precision Drilling, L.P

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: December 12, 2024
• Docket: 01-24-00384-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

Opinion issued December 12, 2024

In The

Court of Appeals For The

First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-24-00384-CV ——————————— ARMANDO SUSTAITA, Appellant V. PRECISION DRILLING, L.P., Appellee

On Appeal from the 151st District Court Harris County, Texas Trial Court Case No. 2023-64155

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant Armando Sustaita attempts to appeal an interlocutory order

compelling arbitration and staying the underlying case during the pendency of the

arbitration. Appellee Precision Drilling Company, L.P. has filed a motion to dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, asserting that the order is not an appealable

interlocutory order. We grant the motion and dismiss the appeal.

Generally, appeals may be taken only from final judgments. Lehmann v. Har-

Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 195 (Tex. 2001). When orders do not dispose of all

pending parties and claims, the orders remain interlocutory and unappealable until

final judgment is rendered unless a statutory exception applies. Bally Total Fitness

Corp. v. Jackson, 53 S.W.3d 352, 352 (Tex. 2001).

“Because orders compelling arbitration do not dispose of all parties and

issues, but instead contemplate continuing resolution through the arbitration process,

orders compelling arbitration are interlocutory per se.” Koontz v. Citibank (South

Dakota), N.A., No. 01-05-01140-CV, 2007 WL 1299674, at *1 (Tex. App—Houston

[1st Dist.] May 3, 2007) (citing Brook v. Pep Boys Auto. Supercenters, Inc., 104

S.W.3d 656, 660 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2003, no pet.)). Courts may,

however, review an order compelling arbitration if the order also dismisses the

underlying litigation so that it is final rather than interlocutory. In re Gulf Expl., LLC,

289 S.W.3d 836, 839 n.14 (Tex. 2009) (quoting Perry Homes v. Cull, 258 S.W.3d

580, 586 n.13 (Tex. 2008)). The order at issue in this case is interlocutory because it

compelled arbitration and stayed the case pending arbitration.

Here, the order compelling arbitration is an interlocutory order and neither the

Texas Arbitration Act (TAA) nor the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) provide for an

2 interlocutory appeal from it. See Chambers v. Quinn, 242 S.W.3d 30, 31–32 (Tex.

2007) (providing the TAA is “one-sided, allowing interlocutory appeals solely from

orders that deny arbitration” and the FAA “makes no provision for interlocutory

appeals from an order compelling arbitration.”); see also TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM.

CODE § 171.098(a) (omitting orders granting motion to compel arbitration from list

of appealable orders relating to arbitration).

Appellant filed a response to the dismissal motion asserting that, because the

Federal Arbitration Act applies to the arbitration agreement, Section 51.016 of the

Texas Rules of Civil Procedure allows an appeal of the court’s interlocutory order

compelling arbitration and staying the case. But Appellant fails to acknowledge that

Rule 51.016 only permits an appeal “under the same circumstances that an appeal

from a federal district court’s order or decision would be permitted by 9 U.S.C.

Section 16.” TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE § 51.016. Title 9, Section 16 of the

United States Code permits appeals from “an order . . . denying an application . . .

to compel arbitration,” and specifically states that “an appeal may not be taken from

an interlocutory order (1) granting a stay of any action . . . [or] (3) compelling

arbitration . . . .” 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1)(C), (b)(1), (b)(3). Thus, contrary to Appellant’s

assertion, an appeal of the arbitration order in this case is not authorized.

Appellant also responds that the appeal concerns whether the trial court failed

to hold a hearing to determine disputed facts regarding the validity of the arbitration

3 agreement. But the issue appellant seeks to raise does not create a basis for appeal

when an appeal of the interlocutory order at issue is not authorized.

Accordingly, we grant appellee’s motion and dismiss the appeal for lack of

jurisdiction. Any other pending motions are dismissed as moot.

PER CURIAM

Panel consists of Justices Goodman, Landau, and Countiss.