2 3 JS-6
11 ARMANDO RAMOS, Case No. 2:25-cv-01696-CV-KES
12 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING ACTION 13 v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR LACK
14 COLLETTE PETERS, et al., OF PROSECUTION
15 Respondents.
18 I.
20 On February 20, 2025, Petitioner Armando Ramos (“Petitioner”) 21 constructively filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal 22 Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. 1.) He paid the filing fee. (Id.) On 23 March 6, 2025, the Court dismissed the Petition with leave to amend because his 24 claims for relief were uncertain and unexhausted. (Dkt. 4.) The Court ordered 25 Petitioner to file his First Amended Petition by April 4, 2025. (Id.) Despite 26 extending this deadline two additional times (Dkt. 5, 6), Petitioner has failed to file 27 a First Amended Petition or otherwise prosecute his case. For the reasons 28 1 discussed below, the Court dismisses this action without prejudice for failure to 2 prosecute. 3 II. 5 Based on Petitioner’s BOP registration number (59392-298), his underlying 6 conviction occurred in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California 7 case no. 3:16- cr-02829-MMA-1. Petitioner pled guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. 8 §§ 841(a), 846 (conspiracy to distribute controlled substances). In November 9 2021, he was sentenced to 12 years in BOP custody. Petitioner alleges that while 10 in custody, he earned 12 months of First Step Act (“FSA”) credits and 14.2 months 11 of Second Chance Act (“SCA”) credits, which added together total 26.2 months. 12 (Id.) Petitioner seems to be alleging that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) should 13 have applied these credits and calculated a release date in February 2025, but for 14 some reason (perhaps as part of disciplinary proceedings) failed to do so. (Id.) 15 The Court dismissed the Petition with leave to amend. (Dkt. 4.) The Court 16 requested that, on or before April 4, 2025, Petitioner either file a First Amended 17 Petition (“FAP”) or file a notice of intent to proceed with the Petition. (Id.) The 18 Court informed Petitioner that if he were to fail “to timely respond to this order by 19 exercising one of these two options, this action may be dismissed for lack of 20 diligent prosecution.” (Id. (emphasis omitted).) On April 22, the Court sua sponte 21 extended this deadline to May 2, 2025. (Dkt. 5.) The Court again informed 22 Petitioner that a failure to respond would result in a recommendation that the 23 Petition be dismissed. (Id.) On May 7, the Court noted that Petitioner was 24 transferred to Residential Reentry Management in Long Beach. (Dkt. 6 at 1.) The 25 Court thus extended Petitioner’s deadline a final time to May 30, 2025. (Id. at 2.) 26 The Court informed Petitioner that if he failed to respond, “the Court [would] 27 likely dismiss his case for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court- 28 ordered deadlines.” (Id.) As of the date of this order, the Court has not received 1 any further filings from Petitioner. 4 A district court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute, failure to 5 follow court orders, or failure to comply with the federal or local rules. See Fed. 6 R. Civ. P. 41(b); Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962); Ghazali v. 7 Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Central District of California 8 Local Rule 41-1 provides, “Civil suits which have been pending for an 9 unreasonable period of time without any action having been taken therein may, 10 after notice, be dismissed for want of prosecution.”1 11 The Court has discretion to dismiss the action with or without prejudice. 12 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (“[u]nless the dismissal order states otherwise,” or certain 13 exceptions apply, a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) 14 “operates as an adjudication on the merits”); Local Rule 41-2 (“[u]nless the Court 15 provides otherwise, any dismissal pursuant to [Local Rule] 41-1 shall be without 16 prejudice”); Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Dismissal 17 with prejudice and default on counterclaims, for willful and inexcusable failure to 18 prosecute, are proper exercises of discretion under Federal Rules of Civil 19 Procedure 41(b), 16(f), and the inherent power of the court.”). 20 In determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute or failure to 21 comply with court orders, the Ninth Circuit has instructed district courts to 22 consider the following five factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious 23 resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of 24 prejudice to the respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic sanctions; and 25
26 1 The Local Rules of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 27 California are available online at: https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/court- procedures/local-rules. 28 1 (5) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits. In re 2 Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 3 2006). The test is not “mechanical,” but provides a “non-exhaustive list of things” 4 to “think about.” Valley Eng’rs v. Elec. Eng’g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 5 1998). 6 IV. 8 Here, the first two factors favor dismissal. The first factor—the public’s 9 interest in the expeditious resolution of litigation—“always favors dismissal.” 10 Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). The second factor— 11 the Court’s need to manage its docket—favors dismissal here because Petitioner’s 12 “noncompliance has caused [this] action to come to a complete halt, thereby 13 allowing [him] to control the pace of the docket rather than the Court.” Id. 14 (internal quotations marks omitted). 15 The third factor—prejudice to Respondents—weighs in favor of dismissal, 16 although less than some of the other factors. Because this Court dismissed the 17 Petition with leave to amend upon screening, Respondents have not yet appeared. 18 See Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We have previously 19 recognized that pendency of a lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial in and of itself 20 to warrant dismissal.”); Hunter v. Sandoval, No. 17-cv-09257-CJC-SHK, 2018 21 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210543 at *5, 2018 WL 6570870 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2018) 22 (finding no prejudice to a defendant who had not yet been served). A rebuttable 23 presumption of prejudice to the defendants arises when a plaintiff unreasonably 24 delays prosecution of an action, In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1994), 25 and unnecessary delay “inherently increases the risk that witnesses’ memories will 26 fade and evidence will become stale.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643. 27 The fourth factor—availability of less drastic sanctions—favors dismissal. 28 The Court’s prior orders warned Petitioner that failure to respond might result in a 1 | dismissal of this action. (Dkt. 4,5, 6.) See Ferdik v.
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
2 3 JS-6
11 ARMANDO RAMOS, Case No. 2:25-cv-01696-CV-KES
12 Petitioner, ORDER DISMISSING ACTION 13 v. WITHOUT PREJUDICE FOR LACK
14 COLLETTE PETERS, et al., OF PROSECUTION
15 Respondents.
18 I.
20 On February 20, 2025, Petitioner Armando Ramos (“Petitioner”) 21 constructively filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus by a Person in Federal 22 Custody pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241. (Dkt. 1.) He paid the filing fee. (Id.) On 23 March 6, 2025, the Court dismissed the Petition with leave to amend because his 24 claims for relief were uncertain and unexhausted. (Dkt. 4.) The Court ordered 25 Petitioner to file his First Amended Petition by April 4, 2025. (Id.) Despite 26 extending this deadline two additional times (Dkt. 5, 6), Petitioner has failed to file 27 a First Amended Petition or otherwise prosecute his case. For the reasons 28 1 discussed below, the Court dismisses this action without prejudice for failure to 2 prosecute. 3 II. 5 Based on Petitioner’s BOP registration number (59392-298), his underlying 6 conviction occurred in U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California 7 case no. 3:16- cr-02829-MMA-1. Petitioner pled guilty to violating 21 U.S.C. 8 §§ 841(a), 846 (conspiracy to distribute controlled substances). In November 9 2021, he was sentenced to 12 years in BOP custody. Petitioner alleges that while 10 in custody, he earned 12 months of First Step Act (“FSA”) credits and 14.2 months 11 of Second Chance Act (“SCA”) credits, which added together total 26.2 months. 12 (Id.) Petitioner seems to be alleging that the Bureau of Prisons (“BOP”) should 13 have applied these credits and calculated a release date in February 2025, but for 14 some reason (perhaps as part of disciplinary proceedings) failed to do so. (Id.) 15 The Court dismissed the Petition with leave to amend. (Dkt. 4.) The Court 16 requested that, on or before April 4, 2025, Petitioner either file a First Amended 17 Petition (“FAP”) or file a notice of intent to proceed with the Petition. (Id.) The 18 Court informed Petitioner that if he were to fail “to timely respond to this order by 19 exercising one of these two options, this action may be dismissed for lack of 20 diligent prosecution.” (Id. (emphasis omitted).) On April 22, the Court sua sponte 21 extended this deadline to May 2, 2025. (Dkt. 5.) The Court again informed 22 Petitioner that a failure to respond would result in a recommendation that the 23 Petition be dismissed. (Id.) On May 7, the Court noted that Petitioner was 24 transferred to Residential Reentry Management in Long Beach. (Dkt. 6 at 1.) The 25 Court thus extended Petitioner’s deadline a final time to May 30, 2025. (Id. at 2.) 26 The Court informed Petitioner that if he failed to respond, “the Court [would] 27 likely dismiss his case for failure to prosecute and failure to comply with court- 28 ordered deadlines.” (Id.) As of the date of this order, the Court has not received 1 any further filings from Petitioner. 4 A district court may dismiss an action for failure to prosecute, failure to 5 follow court orders, or failure to comply with the federal or local rules. See Fed. 6 R. Civ. P. 41(b); Link v. Wabash R. Co., 370 U.S. 626, 629-30 (1962); Ghazali v. 7 Moran, 46 F.3d 52, 53 (9th Cir. 1995) (per curiam). Central District of California 8 Local Rule 41-1 provides, “Civil suits which have been pending for an 9 unreasonable period of time without any action having been taken therein may, 10 after notice, be dismissed for want of prosecution.”1 11 The Court has discretion to dismiss the action with or without prejudice. 12 See Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(b) (“[u]nless the dismissal order states otherwise,” or certain 13 exceptions apply, a dismissal pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(b) 14 “operates as an adjudication on the merits”); Local Rule 41-2 (“[u]nless the Court 15 provides otherwise, any dismissal pursuant to [Local Rule] 41-1 shall be without 16 prejudice”); Al-Torki v. Kaempen, 78 F.3d 1381, 1385 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Dismissal 17 with prejudice and default on counterclaims, for willful and inexcusable failure to 18 prosecute, are proper exercises of discretion under Federal Rules of Civil 19 Procedure 41(b), 16(f), and the inherent power of the court.”). 20 In determining whether to dismiss a case for failure to prosecute or failure to 21 comply with court orders, the Ninth Circuit has instructed district courts to 22 consider the following five factors: (1) the public’s interest in expeditious 23 resolution of litigation; (2) the court’s need to manage its docket; (3) the risk of 24 prejudice to the respondents; (4) the availability of less drastic sanctions; and 25
26 1 The Local Rules of the U.S. District Court for the Central District of 27 California are available online at: https://www.cacd.uscourts.gov/court- procedures/local-rules. 28 1 (5) the public policy favoring disposition of cases on their merits. In re 2 Phenylpropanolamine (PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1226 (9th Cir. 3 2006). The test is not “mechanical,” but provides a “non-exhaustive list of things” 4 to “think about.” Valley Eng’rs v. Elec. Eng’g Co., 158 F.3d 1051, 1057 (9th Cir. 5 1998). 6 IV. 8 Here, the first two factors favor dismissal. The first factor—the public’s 9 interest in the expeditious resolution of litigation—“always favors dismissal.” 10 Yourish v. Cal. Amplifier, 191 F.3d 983, 990 (9th Cir. 1999). The second factor— 11 the Court’s need to manage its docket—favors dismissal here because Petitioner’s 12 “noncompliance has caused [this] action to come to a complete halt, thereby 13 allowing [him] to control the pace of the docket rather than the Court.” Id. 14 (internal quotations marks omitted). 15 The third factor—prejudice to Respondents—weighs in favor of dismissal, 16 although less than some of the other factors. Because this Court dismissed the 17 Petition with leave to amend upon screening, Respondents have not yet appeared. 18 See Pagtalunan v. Galaza, 291 F.3d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 2002) (“We have previously 19 recognized that pendency of a lawsuit is not sufficiently prejudicial in and of itself 20 to warrant dismissal.”); Hunter v. Sandoval, No. 17-cv-09257-CJC-SHK, 2018 21 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 210543 at *5, 2018 WL 6570870 at *2 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2018) 22 (finding no prejudice to a defendant who had not yet been served). A rebuttable 23 presumption of prejudice to the defendants arises when a plaintiff unreasonably 24 delays prosecution of an action, In re Eisen, 31 F.3d 1447, 1452-53 (9th Cir. 1994), 25 and unnecessary delay “inherently increases the risk that witnesses’ memories will 26 fade and evidence will become stale.” Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643. 27 The fourth factor—availability of less drastic sanctions—favors dismissal. 28 The Court’s prior orders warned Petitioner that failure to respond might result in a 1 | dismissal of this action. (Dkt. 4,5, 6.) See Ferdik v. Bonzelet, 963 F.2d 1258, 2 | 1262 (9th Cir. 1992) (“a district court’s warning to a party that his failure to obey 3 || the court’s order will result in dismissal can satisfy the “consideration of 4 | alternatives’ requirement’) (citation omitted). 5 The fifth factor—public policy favoring a disposition of an action on its 6 || merits—arguably weighs against dismissal here. Pagtalunan, 291 F.3d at 643. 7 | However, the effect of this factor is somewhat mitigated by the facts that (1) the 8 || Petition failed to allege facts sufficient to support a claim for relief for the reasons 9 | explained in the Court’s March 6, 2025 dismissal order (Dkt. 4) and (2) Petitioner 10 | has already been transferred to Residential Reentry Management, thereby 11 | obtaining part or all of the relief he was seeking. 12 Given that the enumerated factors largely support dismissal, this action will 13 || be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) and Local Rule 41-1. Considering all of the 14 | circumstances, and in particular given that Petitioner is proceeding pro se, the 15 |} dismissal shall be without prejudice. 16 V. 18 IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that this action is dismissed without 19 || prejudice for failure to prosecute. 20 DATED: __ 6/23/25 Cyathio. Valenzuela C IA VALENZUELA UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 23 Presented by: 24 | AowsE Spot) KAREN E. SCOTT 26 | UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE 27 28