Armando Jauregui v. Huntington Beach California Police Department

CourtDistrict Court, C.D. California
DecidedAugust 9, 2019
Docket2:11-cv-09182
StatusUnknown

This text of Armando Jauregui v. Huntington Beach California Police Department (Armando Jauregui v. Huntington Beach California Police Department) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, C.D. California primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Armando Jauregui v. Huntington Beach California Police Department, (C.D. Cal. 2019).

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 ARMANDO JAUREGUI, ) Case No: 2:11-cv-09182-AB-FFM 12 ) ) AMENDED PROTECTIVE ORDER 13 Plaintiff, ) ) PURSUANT TO STIPULATION 14 ) vs. ) 15 ) ) 16 HUNTINGTON BEACH POLICE ) DEPARTMENT, READ PARKER ) 17 ) and TRENT TUNSTALL, ) 18 ) 19 Defendants. ) 20 1. PURPOSES AND LIMITATIONS 21 Discovery in this action is likely to involve production of confidential, 22 proprietary or private information for which special protection from public 23 disclosure and from use for any purpose other than pursuing this litigation may be 24 warranted. Accordingly, the parties hereby stipulate to and petition the Court to 25 enter the following Stipulated Protective Order. The parties acknowledge that this 26 Order does not confer blanket protections on all disclosures or responses to 27 discovery and that the protection it affords from public disclosure and use extends 28 / / / 1 1 only to the limited information or items that are entitled to confidential treatment 2 under the applicable legal principles. 3 2. GOOD CAUSE STATEMENT 4 Defendants City of Huntington Beach, Read Parker and Trent Tunstall 5 (“Defendants”) contend that there is good cause and a particularized need for a 6 protective order to preserve the interests of confidentiality and privacy in peace 7 officer personnel file records and associated investigative or confidential records 8 for the following reasons. 9 First, Defendants contend that peace officers have a federal privilege of 10 privacy in their personnel file records: a reasonable expectation of privacy therein 11 that is underscored, specified, and arguably heightened by the Pitchess protective 12 procedure of California law. See Sanchez v. Santa Ana Police Dept., 936 F.2d 13 1027, 1033-1034 (9th Cir. 1990); Hallon v. City of Stockton, 2012 U.S. Dist. 14 LEXIS 14665, 2-3, 12-13 (E.D. Cal. 2012) (concluding that “while “[f]ederal law 15 applies to privilege based discovery disputes involving federal claims,” the “state 16 privilege law which is consistent with its federal equivalent significantly assists in 17 applying [federal] privilege law to discovery disputes”); Soto v. City of Concord, 18 162 F.R.D. 603, 613 n. 4, 616 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (peace officers have 19 constitutionally-based “privacy rights [that] are not inconsequential” in their police 20 personnel records); cf. Cal. Penal Code §§ 832.7, 832.8; Cal. Evid. Code §§ 1040- 21 1047. Defendants further contend that uncontrolled disclosure of such personnel 22 file information can threaten the safety of non-party witnesses, officers, and their 23 families/associates. 24 Second, Defendants contend that municipalities and law enforcement 25 agencies have federal deliberative-executive process privilege, federal official 26 information privilege, federal law enforcement privilege, and federal attorney- 27 client privilege (and/or attorney work product protection) interests in the personnel 28 files of their peace officers – particularly as to those portions of peace officer 2 1 personnel files that contain critical self-analysis, internal deliberation/decision- 2 making or evaluation/analysis, or communications for the purposes of obtaining or 3 rendering legal advice or analysis – potentially including but not limited to 4 evaluative/analytical portions of Internal Affairs type records or reports, 5 evaluative/analytical portions of supervisory records or reports, and/or reports 6 prepared at the direction of counsel, or for the purpose of obtaining or rendering 7 legal advice. See Sanchez, 936 F.2d at 1033-1034; Maricopa Audubon Soc’y v. 8 United States Forest Serv., 108 F.3d 1089, 1092-1095 (9th Cir. 1997); Soto, 162 9 F.R.D. at 613, 613 n. 4; Kelly v. City of San Jose, 114 F.R.D. 654, 668-671 (N.D. 10 Cal. 1987); Tuite v. Henry, 181 F.R.D. 175, 176-177 (D. D.C. 1998); Hamstreet v. 11 Duncan, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 89702 (D. Or. 2007); Admiral Ins. Co. v. United 12 States Dist. Ct., 881 F.2d 1486, 1492, 1495 (9th Cir. 1988). Defendants further 13 contend that such personnel file records are restricted from disclosure by the public 14 entity’s custodian of records pursuant to applicable California law and that 15 uncontrolled release is likely to result in needless intrusion of officer privacy; 16 impairment in the collection of third-party witness information and statements and 17 related legitimate law enforcement investigations/interests; and a chilling of open 18 and honest discussion regarding and/or investigation into alleged misconduct that 19 can erode a public entity’s ability to identify and/or implement any remedial 20 measures that may be required. 21 Third, Defendants contend that, since peace officers do not have the same 22 rights as other private citizens to avoid giving compelled statements, it is contrary 23 to the fundamental principles of fairness to permit uncontrolled release of officers’ 24 compelled statements. See generally Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal.3d 25 822, 828-830 (1985); cf. U.S. Const., amend V. 26 Finally, Defendants contend that recent amendments to state law enacted by 27 Senate Bill 1421, do not diminish the fundamental privacy interests in the 28 categories of material described above. They further contend that the information 3 1 required to be released pursuant to Senate Bill 1421 is subject to strict redaction 2 requirements, whereby the information available under Senate Bill 1421 is not 3 coextensive with the information available through a Pitchess motion for 4 discovery. See Cal. Pen. Code § 832.7(b)(5). Moreover, the statute expressly 5 provides that it “does not affect the discovery of disclosure of information” 6 pursuant to the statutory Pitchess procedure for discovery. 7 Accordingly, Defendants contend that, without a protective order preventing 8 such, dissemination of confidential records in the case can and will likely 9 substantially impair and harm defendant public entity’s interests in candid self- 10 critical analysis, frank internal deliberations, obtaining candid information from 11 witnesses, preserving the safety of witnesses, preserving the safety of peace 12 officers and peace officers’ families and associates, protecting the privacy officers 13 of peace officers, and preventing pending investigations from being detrimentally 14 undermined by publication of private, sensitive, or confidential information – as 15 can and often does result in litigation. 16 Plaintiff Armando Jauregui (“Plaintiff”) does not agree with and does not 17 stipulate to Defendants’ contentions herein above. 18 The parties acknowledge and agree that nothing in this Stipulation or its 19 associated Order shall resolve the parties’ disagreement, or bind them, concerning 20 the legal statements and claimed privileges and privacy interests set forth above. 21 However, Plaintiff agrees that there is Good Cause for a Protective Order so 22 as to preserve the respective interests of the parties without the need to further 23 burden the Court with such issues. Specifically, the parties jointly contend that, 24 absent this Stipulation and its associated Protective Order, the parties' respective 25 privilege and/or privacy interests, and/or privacy interests of third parties, may be 26 impaired or harmed, and that this Stipulation and its associated Protective Order 27 may avoid such harm by permitting the parties to facilitate discovery with reduced 28 / / / 4 1 risk that privileged and/or sensitive/confidential information will become matters 2 of public record. 3 The parties jointly contend that there is typically a particularized need for 4 protection as to any medical and psychotherapeutic records, because of the privacy 5 interests at stake therein.

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Armando Jauregui v. Huntington Beach California Police Department, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/armando-jauregui-v-huntington-beach-california-police-department-cacd-2019.