Armando Calvo Rodriguez v. Warden, Florida Soft Side South Detention Center, US Attorney General

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA FORT MYERS DIVISION

ARMANDO CALVO RODRIGUEZ,

Petitioner, Case No. 2:26-cv-1400-KCD-NPM

v.

WARDEN, FLORIDA SOFT SIDE SOUTH DETENTION CENTER, US ATTORNEY GENERAL,

Respondents. /

ORDER Petitioner Armando Calvo Rodriguez has filed a pro se habeas corpus petition challenging his detention by U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement. (Doc. 1.)1 As best the Court can tell, he claims that his continued detention violates the Fifth Amendment. (Id. at 7-8.) Respondents oppose the petition. (Doc. 10.) For the reasons below, the petition is DENIED. I. Background Rodriguez illegally entered the United States in 1980 and was released on parole. He later adjusted his status to lawful permanent resident. After a criminal conviction for an aggravated felony, he was ordered removed in 2001. He was not deported at that time and instead placed on supervision.

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all internal quotation marks, citations, case history, and alterations have been omitted in this and later citations. On December 25, 2025, ICE encountered Rodriguez and detained him to execute the removal order. (Doc. 10-1 at 5.) On April 10, 2026, ICE

attempted to remove him to Mexico, but he allegedly refused. (Id.) This habeas petition followed. II. Legal Framework The federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2241, provides authority to

issue writs of habeas corpus when an individual is “[i]n custody in violation of the Constitution or law or treaties of the United States.” Id. § 2241(c)(3). “At its historical core, the writ of habeas corpus has served as a means of reviewing the legality of Executive detention, and it is in that context that its

protections have been strongest.” I.N.S. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001). “Section 2241 authorizes federal courts to hear challenges to immigration detention.” Grigorian v. Bondi, No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 2604573, at *2 (S.D. Fla. Sept. 9, 2025).

III. Discussion The statutory framework for removal works like this: when a noncitizen’s removal order becomes final, like here, the government has 90 days to effectuate removal. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(a)(1)(A). During that period,

detention is mandatory. Id. § 1231(a)(2)(A). If the 90 days pass and the noncitizen is still here, the statute gives the government a choice: release the individual on supervision or keep them detained. Id. § 1231(a)(6). But as the Supreme Court explained in Zadvydas, the authority to detain does not stretch into infinity. To avoid serious constitutional problems,

the Court read an implicit limitation into the statute: the government may detain a noncitizen only for a period “reasonably necessary” to secure his removal. 533 U.S. at 659. And to make that rule workable, the Court established a presumption. For the first six months, detention is

presumptively reasonable. Id. at 701. After that period has passed and the alien “provides good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future,” the burden then shifts to the government to provide evidence sufficient to rebut that showing. Akinwale v.

Ashcroft, 287 F.3d 1050, 1052 (11th Cir. 2002). Thus, “in order to state a claim under Zadvydas, the alien not only must show post-removal order detention in excess of six months but also must provide evidence of a good reason to believe that there is no significant likelihood of removal in the

reasonably foreseeable future.” Id. Applied here, Rodriguez cannot satisfy the initial temporal requirement. ICE took him into custody on December 25, 2025. Because he has been detained for less than six months, he remains within the window in

which his detention is presumptively reasonable. Seemingly recognizing this, the habeas petition jumps to the burden-shifting framework, arguing that his removal is not likely. (Doc. 1 at 7.) But that argument puts the cart before the horse. Until the six-month Zadvydas period concludes, detention is presumptively reasonable, and any due process claim is not ripe. See, e.g., Grigorian v. Bondi, Case No. 25-CV-22914-RAR, 2025 WL 1895479, at *8 (S.D. Fla. July 8, 2025); Lopez v. Dir. of Enft and Removal Operations, Case No. 3:25-cv-1313-JEP-SJH, 2026 WL 261988, at *12 (M.D. Fla. Jan. 26, 2026); Guerra-Castro v. Parra, Case No. 25-cv-22487-GAYLES, 2025 WL 1984300 at *4 (S.D. Fla. July 17, 2025) (finding habeas petition “premature” because “Petitioner has not been detained for more than six months”). Rodriguez’s due process claim under Zadvydas is not yet ripe, so the habeas petition is DENIED WITHOUT PREJUDICE to him refiling a new petition should his current detention be unimpeded, exceed the six-month mark, and he can demonstrate there is no significant likelihood of removal in the reasonably foreseeable future. The Clerk is DIRECTED to enter judgment accordingly, terminate any pending motions and deadlines, and close the case. ORDERED in Fort Myers, Florida on May 27, 2026.

Kyle C. Dudek os ot United States District Judge