Armand-Byrd v. Paik

Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of New York

Armand-Byrd v. Paik

216 A.D.2d 261, 627 N.Y.S.2d 978, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5989

CourtAppellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York

DecidedJune 5, 1995

StatusPublished

This text of 216 A.D.2d 261 (Armand-Byrd v. Paik) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of the State of New York primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Armand-Byrd v. Paik, 216 A.D.2d 261, 627 N.Y.S.2d 978, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5989 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1995).

Pincite

Opinion

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Meehan, J.), dated March 21, 1994, which, upon the granting by the court of the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judg[262]*262ment as a matter of law, and upon a jury verdict as to damages, is in favor of the plaintiff Ericka L. Armand-Byrd and against it in the principal sum of $80,000.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, we conclude that a jury could not find for the defendant by any rational process. Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not err in granting the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law (see, Rhabb v New York City Hous. Auth., 41 NY2d 200; Reynolds v Morford, 124 AD2d 978). We reject the defendant’s contention that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for an adjournment in order to produce a witness to the accident. The proposed witness’s testimony would only have been cumulative and immaterial. Sullivan, J. P., Miller, Copertino, Joy and Friedmann, JJ., concur.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, etc., the defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Rockland County (Meehan, J.), dated March 21, 1994, which, upon the granting by the court of the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judg[262]*262ment as a matter of law, and upon a jury verdict as to damages, is in favor of the plaintiff Ericka L. Armand-Byrd and against it in the principal sum of $80,000.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, with costs.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant, we conclude that a jury could not find for the defendant by any rational process. Accordingly, the Supreme Court did not err in granting the plaintiffs’ motion pursuant to CPLR 4401 for judgment as a matter of law (see, Rhabb v New York City Hous. Auth., 41 NY2d 200; Reynolds v Morford, 124 AD2d 978). We reject the defendant’s contention that the Supreme Court improvidently exercised its discretion in denying the defendant’s motion for an adjournment in order to produce a witness to the accident. The proposed witness’s testimony would only have been cumulative and immaterial. Sullivan, J. P., Miller, Copertino, Joy and Friedmann, JJ., concur.

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)

216 A.D.2d 261, 627 N.Y.S.2d 978, 1995 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 5989, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/armand-byrd-v-paik-nyappdiv-1995.

Opinion

Related

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack