Arlen Foster v. Tom Vilsack

820 F.3d 330, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6538, 2016 WL 1399365
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
DecidedApril 11, 2016
Docket14-3887
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 820 F.3d 330 (Arlen Foster v. Tom Vilsack) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arlen Foster v. Tom Vilsack, 820 F.3d 330, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6538, 2016 WL 1399365 (8th Cir. 2016).

Opinion

BYE, Circuit Judge.

Arlen and Cindy Fostér brought this action to challenge the United States Department of Agriculture’s (USDA’s) determination that a portion of the Fosters’ farmland is a wetland within the meaning of the pertinent federal statutes and regulations. The district court 1 granted summary judgment in favor of the USDA after concluding the agency’s final decision was not arbitrary, capricious," or contrary to the law. We affirm.

■ I

Arlen and Cindy Foster own and farm land in Miner County, South Dakota. Miner County is located within what is generally referred to as the Prairie Pothole Region covering some of South Dakota, North Dakota, Minnesota, and parts of three Canadian provinces. The USDA uses its own nomenclature to describe various land areas within the United States; under that nomenclature larger Land Resource Regions (LRRs) are subdivided.into Major Land Resource Areas (MLRAs). The Fosters’ farm is located within LRR F, or the Northern Great Plains Spring Wheat- Region, and more specifically within an MLRA called the Southern Black Glaciated Plains. For purposes of this appeal, the MLRA where the Fosters’ farm is located is'relevant for determining the types of soils found within the MLRA, which in turn is relevant for determining what types of vegetation would exist when a particular soil is in its natural state, including vegetation which would naturally be found in a wetland.

In 1985, Congress passed the Food Security Act of 1985 which contains *332 “Swampbuster provisions authorizing] the USDA to. make determinations as to whether certain lands qualify as wetlands and whether wetlands that have been manipulated qualify as converted wetlands.” Clark v. United States Dept. of Agric., 537 F.3d 934, 935 (8th Cir.2008). Swampbuster was passed “[i]n order to combat the disappearance of wetlands through then-conversion into crop lands[.]” Gunn v. United States Dep’t of Agric., 118 F.3d 1233, 1235 (8th Cir.1997). Significantly, “a person determined to have converted wetlands may become ineligible to receive farm program payments” from the federal government. Clark, 537 F.3d at 935.

This appeal concerns a wetland determination made by the USDA affecting just under an acre (0.8 acres) of the Fosters’ farm, a prairie pothole 2 which the parties call Site 1. On June 3, 2002, Arlen Foster initially sought a wetlands determination from the Natural Resource Conservation Service (NRCS), an agency within the USDA, for a larger tract of land which included Site 1. After, a number of intermittent agency proceedings not relevant to this appeal, the NRCS ultimately certified Site 1 as a wetland on June 23, 2011. The Fqsters appealed the June 2011 determination to the USDA National Appeals Division (NAD), a separate agency vyithin the USDA established to address certain claims and disputes, including wetland determinations. ,

In the first, step of the NAD appeal, the Fosters bore the burden of proving the NRCS’s determination “was erroneous by a preponderance of the evidence.” 7 C.F.R. § 11.8(e). Both the Fosters and the NRCS were permitted to present evidence and conduct cross-examination at a hearing held in October 2011. On January 10, 2012, the NAD hearing officer issued a detailed fourteen-page decision determining the NRCS followed the proper procedures and had appropriately found that Site 1 was a wetland, and that the Fosters had not met their burden of proving the NRCS’s determination was erroneous. Appellants App. at 4-17.

In the second step of the NAD appeal, the Fosters sought review of the hearing officer’s decision by the NAD director’s office pursuant to 7 C.F.R. § 11.9. On July 16,2012, the NAD director’s office issued a decision upholding the hearing officer’s decision, which in relevant part held the NRCS proved the presence of the three controlling criteria for a wetland determination by showing that Site 1:

(a) had a predominance of hydric soils, (b) was inundated or saturated by surface or groundwater at a frequency and duration sufficiént to support a prevalence of hydrophytic vegetation typically adapted for life in saturated soil conditions, and • (c) under ' normal circumstances would support a prevalence of hydrophytic vegetation.

Appellarit’s App. at 33; see also 16 U.S.C. § 3801(a)(27); 7 C.F.R. § 12.2 (setting forth the three criteria used to determine whether a specific area of land qualifies as a wetland under federal law). The NAD director’s office also held the Fosters “did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the [NRCS] decision was erroneous.”. Appellant’s App. at 34. The decision from the NAD director’s office constituted the USDAis final, agency decision on the matter.,. ,

In May 2013, the Fosters filed a complaint in federal district court seeking judicial review of the USDA’s final agency *333 decision. Both parties filed motions for summary judgment. In the summary judgment proceedings, the Fosters did not dispute that Site 1 contains a predominance of hydric soils 3 (the first of the three relevant criteria), but challenged the final agency decision with regard to whether Site l had the requisite hydrology 4 to qualify as ■ a wetland and- whether its soil would support a prevalence of hydrophytic vegetation 5 under normal circumstances (the last two of the three relevant criteria).

The district court granted USDA’s motion for summary judgment and denied the Fosters’ motion for summary judgment. The district court concluded ' the NATI’s factual findings were supported by substantial (at times, uncontroverted) evidence and the record supported the NAD’s legal conclusions. The district court therefore determined the Fosters had failed to show the USDA’s final agency decision was arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to the law. This timely appeal followed.

II

We review the district, court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Doud v. Toy Box Dev. Co., 798 F.3d 709, 712 (8th Cir.2015). The issue before the district court was whether the USDA’s final agency decision was proper under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA), '5 U.S.C. § 706.

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820 F.3d 330, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 6538, 2016 WL 1399365, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arlen-foster-v-tom-vilsack-ca8-2016.