Arkansas Rice Growers Cooperative Ass'n v. United States

137 Ct. Cl. 442, 1957 WL 8295
United States Court of Claims·Decided March 6, 1957·No. No. 348-52; No. 349-52; No. 466-52; No. 473-52·Published·Cited by 3 cases

Opinion

Littleton, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiffs, millers of rice, seek to recover just compensation for rice alleged to have been taken by defendant for public use, as hereinafter set forth, during the period from September 16, 1946, through November 17, 1946. The rice in question was acquired by the defendant under War Food Order No. 10 which required rice millers to tender to or specifically set aside for defendant a certain specified percentage of all rice of certain grades milled each month. Plaintiffs had no choice in the matter. The order further provided that unless a miller had set aside the required [445] amount of rice for government use, he might not deliver any rice to his civilian customers. Violation of the order was punishable in civil and criminal proceedings.

The rice involved in these suits was set aside and delivered to the Government under such compulsory set-aside orders and was paid for at the then current OPA ceiling prices as contained in Amendment 17 to Second Revised Maximum Price Regulation 150 applicable to milled rice. This pricing order, issued September 24,1946, but effective September 16, 1946, was in the nature of an interim order intended to give the rice milling industry stopgap price relief pending issuance of a final ceiling price order pursuant to the provisions of section 6 of the Price Control Extension Act of July 25, 1946, 60 Stat. 664, 675, 50 U. S. C. App. § 906 (1946 ed.). Such final price order, known as Amendment 20 to 2nd Rev. MPR150, was issued on November 18,1946. But this price order was not made applicable to the set-aside or requisitions from September 16, 1946, through November 17, 1946.

It is plaintiffs’ contention (1) that the compulsory or mandatory set-aside and deliveries to defendant of the rice in question, pursuant to the above-mentioned set-aside orders, amounted to takings of their rice by the Government for public use, (2) that the amount paid for such rice in accordance with the ceiling prices contained in the interim price order of September 24, 1946, was less than just compensation, (8) that just compensation would have been the amount which plaintiffs would have received had the rice in question been paid for at the prices contained in the final price order of November 18,1946, and that, accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to recover the difference, plus an additional amount measured by interest, to compensate them for the long delay in payment.

It is defendant’s position that deliveries of rice to the Government under the set-aside orders did not amount to requisitions and takings within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, but were rather voluntary sales by plaintiffs. Defendant further says that if the court should hold that the rice was taken by the Government, plaintiffs received just compensation when they [446] were paid at the rates specified in the interim ceiling price order of September 24,1946.

Both of the above issues were, after careful consideration, decided favorably to plaintiffs’ contentions in Alexander Bienvenu Dore, et al. v. United States, 119 C. Cls. 560 (1951), involving identical claims of two rice milling companies.1 A somewhat more extensive record, and one which we think is more favorable to plaintiffs, has been made in the instant cases and, for the first time, the court’s attention has been called to the fact that the two price orders in question were issued pursuant to the Price Control Extension Act of July 25, 1946, 60 Stat. 664, rather than under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, 56 Stat. 23, as amended. Defendant contends that the additional facts contained in the present record, and a consideration of the Price Control Extension Act of 1946, requires the court to reconsider its previous opinion and to reach a different result. Plaintiffs urge that the additional facts established in this record and a proper consideration of the 1946 Act in relation thereto, serve to strengthen and confirm the correctness of the earlier decision of the court.

There is nothing in the present record nor in the law to which defendant refers which persuades us that the set-aside orders were other than requisitions, as we specifically held in the Dore case. Defendant makes the suggestion that the court inferred a taking from the fact that neither of the plaintiffs in the Dore case made any sales to private or civilian customers during the period in suit, whereas most of the plaintiffs in the instant suit did sell some rice in excess of the requisitions to their civilian customers. Defendant also states that the court apparently relied on the fact that plaintiffs in the Dore case protested when required to deliver the rice in question, whereas some of the present plaintiffs did not.

We are of the opinion that a reading of the court’s opinion will reveal that neither the lack of civilian sales nor the presence of protests was a ground for the court’s conclusion that the mandatory deliveries amounted to takings. [447] It was the mandatory nature of the set-aside order itself, with its provisions for criminal and civil sanctions in the event of noncompliance, which persuaded the court that the so-called sales were requisitions or takings, citing Safeway Stores, Inc. v. United States, 118 C. Cls. 73, cert. den., 341 U. S. 953; Lord Manufacturing Co. v. United States, 114 C. Cls. 199, cert. den. 339 U. S. 956, rehearing denied 340 U. S. 846, and Edward P. Stahel & Co. Inc. et al., v. United States, 111 C. Cls. 682, cert. den., 336 U. S. 951.

That protests were made by Dore and International was merely a fact of record and not one on which we relied as important or controlling in concluding that deliveries to the Government under set-aside orders amounted to takings. Any such inference from the fact of protest would seem to place some sort of premium on recalcitrance when the millers really had no choice about complying. Accordingly, we adhere to our previous holding that the rice delivered to the Government pursuant to the set-aside orders was taken by the Government for public use and that the owners of the rice so taken were entitled to receive such amount as would constitute just compensation therefor.

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