Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. United States

154 Ct. Cl. 654, 40 P.U.R.3d 178
CourtUnited States Court of Claims
DecidedJuly 19, 1961
DocketNo. 151-55
StatusPublished

This text of 154 Ct. Cl. 654 (Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. United States) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering United States Court of Claims primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. United States, 154 Ct. Cl. 654, 40 P.U.R.3d 178 (cc 1961).

Opinion

Durfee, Judge,

delivered the opinion of the court:

The only issues to be decided in this case are those raised by the defendant’s counterclaim, since it has been agreed that plaintiff is entitled to judgment on its claim for amounts due under a contract to supply natural gas to a certain Government ordnance plant. The counterclaim is based on alleged rate discrimination against the defendant through violation of a common provision in several gas supply contracts which represented that the rates set forth were not in excess of the lowest rates then available to any other customer under like conditions of service.

The plaintiff is an integrated gas company, which means that it produces, processes, gathers, transports, and sells natural gas at retail. During the years covered by defendant’s counterclaim, 1942 to 1950, the largest percentage of plaintiff’s sales were made to customers in the State of Arkansas. The customers included residential, commercial, and industrial users. The industrial customers ranged widely in the matters of size and required service from small dry cleaners and laundries to large power companies and aluminum processers. The five Government chemical and ordnance plants, located in Arkansas, Louisiana, and Texas, and supplied by the plaintiff under the agreements now before us, fell between the extremes. Plaintiff gas company, as a public utility, is subject to regulation by the appropriate state agency in the tri-state area which it serves. Although the Arkansas Public Service Commission had the authority during this period to regulate rates to customers outside city distribution plants, like the defendant, it did not do so. The principal demand on plaintiff’s supply system was centered [656]*656south of Little Kock between Hot Springs and Pine Bluff, Arkansas. The principal sources of plaintiff’s gas were wells in east Texas and northern Louisiana. During the early part of the contract period plaintiff utilized gas from certain fields in south central Arkansas to supply its customers.

Two of the Government installations supplied were located in Arkansas and were served under what was known as the 3-B industrial rate, the same as that available to any large industrial customer in Arkansas. This rate was higher, however, than the rate offered to a number of oil refineries in that state. Two of the remaining Government plants were located near Texarkana, Texas and one in Louisiana. In general, the rates for industrial customers in Louisiana were less than those in effect in Arkansas because of proximity to the source of supply. Both interruptible and noninterruptible gas service was contemplated by the contracts between plaintiff and defendant; the counterclaim, however, is concerned only with the rates and conditions of service under which interruptible gas was supplied to the Government plants and other industrial customers. “In-terruptible” service means that the company has the right to curtail gas service to such an industrial user during periods of high demand, usually the winter heating season, when necessary in order to provide service to its “firm” or “non-interruptible” customers. During an interval of less than one year within this period, the plaintiff also furnished in-terruptible service to the Lone Star Steel Company which, like the defendant’s plants and the oil refineries, was a mainline customer off the gas company’s high pressure transmission lines at that time. However, effective in July 1945, a special contract was negotiated between the steel company and the gas company which resulted in firm gas service at rates lower than those offered certain of the Government installations for interruptible service.

The defendant contends that it did not get the benefit of the lowest rate available to any other customer under like conditions of service, particularly emphasizing the lower rates offered to the several Arkansas oil refineries and the Lone Star Steel Company in Texas. Since these rates are admitted to have been lower than those offered the Govern[657]*657ment, the issues are reduced to a single question, namely, whether like conditions prevailed as to the services performed in supplying the Government installations and in supplying the refineries and the steel company. Because of the unusual circumstances surrounding the plaintiff’s contract with the Lone Star Steel Company, the conditions of service for that customer will be considered separately from these of the refineries and the Government installations.

Neither party has excepted to the characteristics or conditions of service which the trial commissioner has found to affect the rates charged to plaintiff’s customers. These characteristics are: the level or consistency of use throughout the year; the distance the gas is transported; the continuity of service; the state in which the service is rendered; and the type of gas required. The defendant argues that some of these conditions were comparable as they apply to the defendant’s plants and to the oil refineries and that others of the conditions as to which there was a difference are not of significance in this case.

The trial commissioner has found that it is impractical for the plaintiff to determine costs of serving any particular customer and that, consequently, classes of customers are generally set forth in separate schedules. The grouping of oil refineries together in one class because of the similar service requirements which may be significantly different from other industrial concerns is a reasonable one. Within the states it served, like any public utility operating in any state, the plaintiff was required not to discriminate as between customers having like conditions of service. And each of the contracts entered into with the defendant provided for higher or lower rate schedules if the state regulatory commission authorized it or if a different, applicable rate schedule would be more advantageous to the defendant. Moreover, the rates in the several contracts conform to the industrial rates in effect in the state where the particular Government installation was located.

We cannot agree with the position of the defendant that unless each customer in any class (in this case the oil refineries) differs in each of the conditions of service from any of the conditions of the various Government plants the Gov[658]*658ernment must get the benefit of the lower rate offered the whole class. In other words, because of the plaintiff’s obligation not to discriminate, which can only be practicably accomplished by utilizing class rates, the conditions of service of the refinery class as a whole may properly be compared with those of the defendant’s plants in order to determine whether like conditions prevailed as between the two.

The defendant quite correctly points out that some of the conditions of the service provided the Government plants were comparable to the conditions at the refineries and the steel company. Since the counterclaim relates only to the rates involved in interruptible service, the continuity factor was the same as to all customers. Also, the type of gas supplied, with the exception of that supplied to the steel company after July 1, 1945, which situation will be discussed below, was the same to all customers.

However, the other characteristics were not the same for all customers and the differences are significant to a greater or lesser degree in determining whether like conditions of service obtained.

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Related

Public Util. Comm'n of Cal. v. United States
355 U.S. 534 (Supreme Court, 1958)
Hughes Transportation, Inc. v. United States
168 F. Supp. 219 (Court of Claims, 1958)
Alabama Highway Express, Inc. v. United States
175 F. Supp. 143 (Court of Claims, 1959)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
154 Ct. Cl. 654, 40 P.U.R.3d 178, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/arkansas-louisiana-gas-co-v-united-states-cc-1961.