Arkansas Labeling Inc v. Proctor

District Court, E.D. Arkansas·Decided May 20, 2022·No. 4:19-cv-00773·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF ARKANSAS CENTRAL DIVISION

ARKANSAS LABELING, INC. PLAINTIFF

v. Case No. 4:19-cv-00773-KGB

TIM PROCTOR, LABEL EDGE, LLC, GARY PARR, and GP LABELS UNLIMITED, LTD. DEFENDANTS

ORDER Before the Court are two motions related to discovery in this matter. Separate defendants Tim Proctor and Label Edge, LLC (collectively, “Proctor Defendants”), filed a motion to compel discovery (Dkt. No. 88). Plaintiff Arkansas Labeling, Inc. (“ALI”), responded in opposition to the motion (Dkt. No. 93). The Proctor Defendants requested a hearing on the pending motion (Dkt. No. 93). The Proctor Defendants also filed a supplement to their motion to compel (Dkt. No. 107). The Court understands that supplement to include additional exhibits upon which the Proctor Defendants intended to rely during the hearing on their motion to compel. Separate defendants Gary Parr and GP Labels Unlimited, Ltd. (“GP Labels”) (collectively, “Parr Defendants”), filed a motion to dismiss as discovery sanction and, alternatively, motion to compel discovery (Dkt. No. 95). ALI responded in opposition to the motion (Dkt. No. 97). The Parr Defendants requested a hearing on the pending motion (Dkt. No. 99).1 The Court conducted a hearing on these motions on April 28, 2022 (Dkt. No. 108). In addition to the oral rulings announced by the Court during that hearing, the Court rules as follows: (1) the Court denies, in part, and grants, in part, the Proctor Defendants’ motion to compel and supplement to the motion to compel (Dkt. Nos. 88, 107);

1 The Court acknowledges that the Parr Defendants filed a second motion to compel (Dkt. No. 110). The Court will address that second motion to compel in a separate Order. (2) the Court denies the Parr Defendants’ motion to dismiss as a discovery sanction (Dkt. No. 95) (3) the Court denies as moot the Parr Defendants’ motion to compel with regard to ALI’s Initial Disclosures (Dkt. No. 95); and

(4) the Court denies, in part, and grants, in part the Parr Defendants’ motion to compel with respect to Interrogatory Nos. 1–18 and Requests for Production Nos. 1–17 (Dkt. No. 95). The Court makes these rulings for the following reasons. Legal Standard Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(1) provides that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case . . . .” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1). Rule 26 is construed broadly to encompass “any matter that bears on, or that reasonably could lead to other matter that could bear on, any issue that is or may be in the case.” Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders, 437 U.S. 340, 351 (1978) (construing the same language that appeared in a prior version of Rule 26); see

also Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc., 981 F.2d 377, 380 (8th Cir. 1992) (Rule 26 “is liberal in scope and interpretation, extending to those matters which are relevant and reasonably calculated to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence”). The spirit of Rule 26(a) is that discovery be self- effectuating, without need to resort to the Court, and that its scope be liberal, extending to all matters reasonably calculated to lead to admissible evidence. This standard is well-ensconced and is generally known and understood by civil practitioners. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947); Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Miller, 402 F.2d 134 (8th Cir. 1968); Carlson Cos. v. Sperry and Hutchinson Co., 374 F. Supp. 1080, 1100 (D. Minn. 1974); National Organization for Women, Inc. (NOW), St. Paul Chapter v. Minnesota Min. & Mfg. Co., 73 F.R.D. 467 (D.C. Minn. 1977); see also Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways, 103 F.R.D. 22 (D.C. Cir. 1984). “Discovery rules are to be broadly and liberally construed in order to fulfill discovery’s purposes of providing both parties with ‘information essential to the proper litigation of all

relevant facts, to eliminate surprise, and to promote settlement.’” Rollscreen Co. v. Pella Products, 145 F.R.D. 92, 94 (S.D. Iowa 1992); see also Davis v. Union Pacific R.R. Co., Case No. 4:07-cv-000521 BSM, 2008 WL 3992761, at *2 (E.D. Ark. 2008) (“A request for discovery should be considered relevant if there is ‘any possibility’ that the information sought may be relevant to the claim or defense of any party.”); Moses v. Halstead, 236 F.R.D. 667, 671 (D. Kan. 2006) (same). Nevertheless, “there must be at least a ‘threshold showing of relevance’ before parties ‘are required to open wide the doors of discovery and to produce a variety of information which does not reasonably bear upon the issues in the case.’” Kampfe v. Petsmart, Inc., 304 F.R.D. 554, 557 (N.D. Iowa 2015) (quoting Hofer, 981 F.2d at 380). Proctor Defendants’ Motion To Compel

The Proctor Defendants ask the Court to compel ALI to: (1) provide a calculation of its damages under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 and (2) respond fully to the following discovery requests: (a) First Amended Request for Production No. 7 and Request for Production Nos. 24 and 25; (b) evidence demonstrating defendants’ alleged use of ALI’s files, which they argue is responsive to First Amended Request for Production No. 5 and First Amended Interrogatory No. 12; and (c) documents produced to Cheryl Shuffield, at least some of which should, they argue, have been produced with ALI’s initial disclosures and in response to Amended Request for Production No. 5 (Dkt. No. 88, ¶ 8). The Proctor Defendants represent that they have provided ALI with detailed accounts of these deficiencies in two good-faith letters, communicated with counsel for ALI on multiple occasions through email and telephone, and even met with counsel for ALI in person (Id., ¶ 6). Damages Calculation Rule 26(a)(1)(iii) requires a plaintiff to provide, without awaiting a discovery request, “a

computation of each category of damages claimed” and “the documents or other evidentiary material . . . on which each computation is based, including materials bearing on the nature and extent of injuries suffered.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(a)(1)(A). Initial disclosures are intended to “avoid surprise and minimize prejudice.” Henry v. Pemiscot Mem’l Health Sys., Case No. 1:05-cv-00075- ERW, 2006 WL 2850550, at * 5 (E.D. Mo. Oct. 3, 2006); see also U.S. v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (recognizing that discovery “make[s] a trial less a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent”). Initial disclosures pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1) must be based upon information then reasonably available to the disclosing party. Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(g), the

attorney or party making the Rule 26(a)(1) disclosures must sign those disclosures, “thereby certifying that ‘to the best of the signer’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after a reasonable inquiry, the disclosure is complete and correct as of the time it is made.’” Sender v.

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Related

Hickman v. Taylor
329 U.S. 495 (Supreme Court, 1947)
United States v. Procter & Gamble Co.
356 U.S. 677 (Supreme Court, 1958)
Oppenheimer Fund, Inc. v. Sanders
437 U.S. 340 (Supreme Court, 1978)
Greyhound Lines, Inc., a Corporation v. Delta Miller
402 F.2d 134 (Eighth Circuit, 1968)
Gaylon Hofer v. Mack Trucks, Inc.
981 F.2d 377 (Eighth Circuit, 1993)
Southwestern Energy Co. v. Eickenhorst
955 F. Supp. 1078 (W.D. Arkansas, 1997)
Carlson Companies, Inc. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co.
374 F. Supp. 1080 (D. Minnesota, 1974)
Sender v. Mann
225 F.R.D. 645 (D. Colorado, 2004)
Moses v. Halstead
236 F.R.D. 667 (D. Kansas, 2006)
Kampfe v. Petsmart, Inc.
304 F.R.D. 554 (N.D. Iowa, 2015)
Laker Airways Ltd. v. Pan American World Airways
103 F.R.D. 22 (District of Columbia, 1984)