Arithus Dushawn Anderson v. Commonwealth of Virginia

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: July 7, 2026
• Docket: 0994254
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Record No. 0994-25-4

ARITHUS DUSHAWN ANDERSON v. COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

Present: Judges O’Brien, Friedman and Frucci Opinion Issued July 7, 2026*

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY Stephen E. Sincavage, Judge

(Eric Weathers, Assistant Public Defender; Virginia Indigent Defense Commission, on briefs), for appellant.

(Jay Jones, Attorney General; Kimberly A. Hackbarth, Senior Assistant Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

MEMORANDUM OPINION BY JUDGE MARY GRACE O’BRIEN

A jury convicted Arithus Dushawn Anderson of felony eluding. On appeal, Anderson

argues that the circuit court erred by excluding evidence, rejecting his proposed jury instructions,

and finding the evidence sufficient to support the conviction. Finding no error, we affirm.1

BACKGROUND

“Consistent with the standard of review when a criminal appellant challenges the

sufficiency of the evidence, we recite the evidence below ‘in the “light most favorable” to the

Commonwealth, the prevailing party in the trial court.’” Hammer v. Commonwealth, 74

* This opinion is not designated for publication. See Code § 17.1-413(A). 1 Having examined the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly without merit.” See Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). Va. App. 225, 231 (2022) (quoting Commonwealth v. Cady, 300 Va. 325, 329 (2021)). In doing

so, we discard any evidence that conflicts with the Commonwealth’s evidence, and regard as true

all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all inferences that can be fairly

drawn from that evidence. Cady, 300 Va. at 329.

While on patrol, Leesburg Police Detective Justin Roberts saw a car traveling at over 60

mph in an area where the posted speed limit was 35 mph. Roberts activated his emergency

lights, and the other car, driven by Anderson, pulled into a gas station. Roberts told Anderson

that he had been speeding and asked for Anderson’s license and registration.

While Roberts was checking the license, Anderson sped away via a four-lane road that

was bordered by sidewalks and businesses. Side streets intersect the road, and several cars

merged on and off it via entrance and exit ramps. Roberts started pursuing Anderson. During

the pursuit, Anderson’s speed approached 80 mph, including in an area where the posted speed

limit was 25 mph. Roberts told a police dispatcher that he was ending the pursuit, but he

continued to follow Anderson. For several minutes, Anderson exceeded the posted speed limits

by more than 30 mph and turned onto a road near a supermarket in a densely populated area.

Pedestrians were walking on the sidewalk next to the road. Eventually, Roberts lost sight of

Anderson’s car and stopped following him. Anderson was later arrested for felony eluding.

Leesburg Police Department regulations require an officer’s supervisor to meet with the

officer to review pursuits. According to the regulations, an officer could continue following a

vehicle once a pursuit ends, but if the officer disobeyed traffic laws, the officer would be

personally liable for any consequences. Roberts met with a Leesburg Police Lieutenant to

review his pursuit of Anderson. The lieutenant advised Roberts to drive with caution when

following cars at high speeds. Roberts did not receive a written reprimand but felt he had gotten

in trouble. Since the meeting, Roberts has been promoted to detective.

-2- The Commonwealth moved in limine to prevent Anderson from cross-examining Roberts

at trial if any administrative actions resulted from him continuing to follow Anderson because

Roberts’s compliance with departmental regulations was irrelevant and risked confusing the jury.

Anderson argued that the evidence bore on Roberts’s credibility because he could have had an

incentive to exaggerate Anderson’s driving behavior to justify following him and avoid

punishment. The court granted the Commonwealth’s motion, finding that Roberts’s compliance

with departmental procedures was irrelevant to the charge against Anderson and that any link

between his compliance and credibility was significantly outweighed by prejudice to the

Commonwealth and possible confusion for the jury.

At trial, Roberts testified that when Anderson drove away after the initial traffic stop, he

was “spinning the wheels out,” which caused a “squealing” sound, and during the pursuit,

Anderson was weaving in and out of traffic. The Commonwealth also played dash camera

footage from Roberts’s car showing Anderson’s evasion.

Anderson moved to strike, arguing that the Commonwealth had not shown that his

driving endangered anyone because he had only sped. He contended that he had not otherwise

driven recklessly, and he had not gotten into an accident. The court denied the motion.

Anderson did not present evidence and unsuccessfully renewed his motion to strike.

The court gave several jury instructions, including Jury Instruction 8, which required the

jury to make the following findings before it could convict Anderson:

(1) That Mr. Anderson received a visible or audible signal from law-enforcement to bring his motor vehicle to a stop; and

(2) [t]hat Mr. Anderson drove such motor vehicle in a willful and wanton disregard of such signal; and

(3) [t]hat in doing so, Mr. Anderson interfered with or endangered the operation of the law-enforcement vehicle, or endangered a person.

-3- Anderson requested two additional jury instructions. Proposed Instruction A stated, “One

acting wantonly may be creating no greater risk of harm, but he is not trying to avoid it and is

indifferent to whether harm results or not. Wanton conduct has properly been characterized as

‘vicious’ and rates extreme in the degree of culpability.” Anderson argued that the instruction

quoted Bazemore v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 203 (2004). The court refused the instruction,

finding that it could confuse the jury because “wanton” behavior related to the second element of

the offense and “risk of harm” related to the third element.

Proposed Instruction B provided: “The intentional violation of a traffic law, without

more, will not support a finding of willful and wanton conduct.” Anderson argued that the

instruction defined “willful and wanton conduct” and was also a direct quote from Bazemore.

The court refused the instruction, finding that it did not correctly recite the law applicable to

felony eluding because Bazemore actually described “willful and wanton negligence,” not

“conduct,” quoting a civil case.

The jury convicted Anderson of felony eluding. The court sentenced him to three years’

incarceration, with two years suspended. Anderson appeals.

ANALYSIS

I. The circuit court properly excluded evidence about Roberts’s compliance with departmental regulations.

Determining the ‘“admissibility of evidence is within the discretion of the trial court,’ and

an appellate court will not reject such decision absent an ‘abuse of discretion.’” Williams v.

Commonwealth, 71 Va. App. 462, 487 (2020) (quoting Tirado v. Commonwealth, 296 Va. 15, 26

(2018)). “When evaluating whether a trial court abused its discretion, the appellate court

‘considers only whether the record fairly supports the trial court’s actions.’” Davis v.

Commonwealth, 73 Va. App. 500, 507 (2021) (quoting Grattan v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 602,

620 (2009)). “Only when reasonable jurists could not differ can [the appellate court] say an -4- abuse of discretion has occurred.” Bista v. Commonwealth, 303 Va. 354, 370 (2024) (quoting

Commonwealth v. Swann, 290 Va. 194, 197 (2015)).

Generally, “relevant evidence is admissible.” Va. R. Evid. 2:402(a). But relevant

evidence “may be excluded if . . . the probative value of the evidence is substantially outweighed

by . . . its likelihood of confusing or misleading the trier of fact.” Va. R. Evid. 2:403. A trial

court may consider the evidence’s tendency to “distract [a jury] to irrelevant considerations.”

Lambert v. Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 740, 755 (2019) (quoting Clay v. Commonwealth, 33

Va. App. 96, 107 (2000) (en banc)).

Anderson argues that the court should have allowed him to question Roberts about his

compliance with departmental regulations because it was relevant to show that Roberts had

motivation to exaggerate Anderson’s driving behavior. We disagree.

The regulations only made officers personally liable for the potential consequences of

exceeding speed limits while following a vehicle after ending a pursuit. They did not forbid

speeding. Further, a supervisor had already reviewed Roberts’s actions. Roberts was not

reprimanded. In fact, Roberts later received a promotion. Additionally, Roberts’s dash cam

footage bore witness to Anderson’s driving as he fled. The jury watched the dash cam footage,

preventing Roberts from embellishing Anderson’s driving behavior. Thus, allowing Anderson to

question Roberts about his compliance with the regulations could have distracted the jury from

its actual task to evaluate Anderson’s behavior. Id. Accordingly, the court did not abuse its

discretion in prohibiting Anderson from cross-examining Roberts about the topic.

II. The court properly refused Anderson’s proposed jury instructions.

“A reviewing court’s responsibility in reviewing jury instructions is ‘to see that the law

has been clearly stated and that the instructions cover all issues which the evidence fairly

raises.’” Conley v. Commonwealth, 74 Va. App. 658, 674-75 (2022) (quoting Fahringer v.

-5- Commonwealth, 70 Va. App. 208, 211 (2019)). “We review a trial court’s decisions in giving

and denying requested jury instructions for abuse of discretion.” Holmes v. Commonwealth, 76

Va. App. 34, 53 (2022) (quoting Conley, 74 Va. App. at 675); see also Coppola v.

Commonwealth, 220 Va. 243, 254 (1979) (finding that it was within the circuit court’s discretion

to determine the advisability of explaining statutory language).

When reviewing a court’s refusal to give a proffered jury instruction, “we view the

evidence in the light most favorable to the proponent of the instruction.” Dandridge v.

Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 669, 676 (2021) (quoting Lienau v. Commonwealth, 69 Va. App.

254, 260 (2018), aff’d upon rehearing en banc, 69 Va. App. 780 (2019)). But the proponent

must “satisfy the trial court that the proposed language is a correct statement of the law,

applicable to the facts of the case on trial, and expressed in appropriate language.” Miller v.

Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 527, 547 (2015) (quoting Shaikh v. Johnson, 276 Va. 537, 546

(2008)).

“A statement made in the course of a judicial decision is not necessarily proper language

for a jury instruction.” Yeager v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 761, 766 (1993). As a result,

“Virginia courts have often cautioned against lifting the ‘language of a specific opinion’ for a

jury instruction given that an appellate opinion ‘is meant to provide a rationale for a decision—

and may not translate immutably into jury instructions.’” Drexel v. Commonwealth, 80 Va. App.

720, 743 (2024) (quoting Seaton v. Commonwealth, 42 Va. App. 739, 753 (2004)).

Here, proposed Instruction A quoted Bazemore to define “acting wantonly” in relation to

the risk of harm. But the Court in Bazemore did not hold that the quote was “proper language for

a jury instruction.” Yeager, 16 Va. App. at 766. And the instruction could have caused the jury

to conflate the second element of the offense, which requires showing willful and wanton

-6- conduct, with the third element, which requires demonstrable endangerment.2 As a result,

Anderson did not convince the court that the instruction was “expressed in appropriate

language.” Miller, 64 Va. App. at 547. Anderson’s proposed Instruction B also came “directly”

from Bazemore, but in that case, this Court described “willful and wanton negligence,” not

“willful and wanton conduct,” quoting a civil case. 42 Va. App. at 223 (quoting Alfonso v.

Robinson, 257 Va. 540, 545 (1999)). Accordingly, the court reasonably questioned whether the

language correctly stated the law applicable to felony eluding. Drexel, 80 Va. App. at 743.

Thus, the court did not abuse its discretion in refusing proposed Instructions A and B.

III. The evidence was sufficient to convict Anderson of felony eluding.

“When faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal

conviction, an appellate court is faced with the limited task of determining ‘whether any rational

trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”

Cuffee v. Commonwealth, __ Va. __, __ (Apr. 16, 2026) (quoting Commonwealth v. Garrick, 303

Va. 176, 182 (2024)). “The judgment of the trial court is presumed correct and will not be

disturbed unless it is ‘plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Pijor v. Commonwealth,

294 Va. 502, 512 (2017) (quoting Code § 8.01-680). Thus, “[i]f there is evidentiary support for

the conviction, a trial court’s judgment stands.” Reed v. Commonwealth, 85 Va. App. 196, 207

(2025).

Any person who, having received a visible or audible signal from any law-enforcement officer to bring his motor vehicle to a stop, drives such motor vehicle in a willful and wanton disregard of such signal so as to interfere with or endanger the operation of the

2 This was significant because it was a waterfall instruction, telling the jury that if they found the Commonwealth had proved the first and second element, they should find Anderson guilty of disregarding a signal by law-enforcement to stop—a misdemeanor—and if they found the Commonwealth had proved all three elements, then Anderson was guilty of disregarding a signal by law-enforcement with endangerment—a felony. -7- law-enforcement vehicle or endanger a person is guilty of a Class 6 felony.

Code § 46.2-817(B).

Anderson does not dispute that he received a signal to stop or that he continued to drive

at a high speed. He argues only that his driving endangered no one. The record does not

support that contention.

As used in Code § 46.2-817(B), “endanger” means “to ‘expose to danger, harm, or

loss.’” Williams v. Commonwealth, 82 Va. App. 639, 655 (2024) (quoting Coleman v.

Commonwealth, 52 Va. App. 19, 24 (2008)). “Hence, conduct that raises the specter of

endangerment is the evil contemplated and proscribed by the statute.” Tucker v.

Commonwealth, 38 Va. App. 343, 347 (2002). “To require the threat to be imminent would

engraft an element to the offense, thereby permitting the dangerous operation of motor vehicles

until a person is actually imperiled, an absurd result that subverts the salutary purposes of the

statute.” Id. The fact that “the exposure to danger does not result in any actual harm is a

welcome fortuity, but not a legal defense.” Coleman, 52 Va. App. at 24. “The object of the

endangerment can be the driver himself, the police officer, or anyone else on the road that could

be put at risk from the driver’s eluding.” Id.; see also Phelps v. Commonwealth, 275 Va. 139,

142 (2008) (“Because the term ‘a person’ means any individual human being, the term

encompasses the entire universe of people, including the defendant.”).

Anderson sped away from Roberts at the gas station, with his tires squealing. On a busy

four-lane road where cars were merging into and out of traffic, Anderson exceeded the posted

speed limit by more than 30 mph, while driving near a supermarket and a heavily populated

area. During that time, he weaved in and out of traffic. The dash cam footage showed

numerous other motorists, and even pedestrians, near Anderson as he fled. Anderson’s “acts of

eluding ‘endanger[ed]’ any number of ‘person[s].’” Williams, 82 Va. App. at 656 (alterations in -8- original). The mere fortuity that Anderson ultimately did not harm anyone does not minimize

his culpability. Coleman, 52 Va. App. at 24.

Anderson contends that speeding alone cannot prove endangerment by citing several

cases in which the defendant not only sped but also engaged in a variety of other risky driving.

See, e.g., Tucker, 38 Va. App. at 344-45 (defendant sped, drove in the opposite lane of travel,

ran a red light, and crashed his vehicle). But in affirming the convictions in those cases, we

merely recited the particular facts which happened to include behavior other than speeding.

See, e.g., id. at 347. None of the cited cases held that speeding alone is insufficient for a felony

eluding conviction. Additionally, the evidence here, including the dash cam footage, permitted

the jury to find that Anderson not only sped but rapidly accelerated and swerved in and out of

traffic, thereby endangering “himself, the police officer, [and] anyone else on the road.”

Coleman, 52 Va. App. at 24. Thus, sufficient evidence supported Anderson’s conviction.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s judgment.

Affirmed.

-9-