Arik Bennett v. Mark Brnovich

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 11, 2024
• Docket: 22-16386
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 11 2024 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

No. 22-16386 ARIK BENNETT, D.C. No. 2:20-cv-01945-SPL Plaintiff-Appellant,

v. MEMORANDUM*

MARK BRNOVICH, Attorney General; et al.,

Defendants-Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Stephen P. Logan, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted June 11, 2024**

Before: WALLACE, FERNANDEZ, SILVERMAN, Circuit Judges.

Arik Bennett appeals from the district court’s dismissal, under the case

screening process pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2), of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983

unlawful arrest claim against Defendant Detective Gerardo Sandoval and the

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). arresting officers (“Doe Defendants”) for failure to state a claim.1 We have

jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

We review de novo dismissals pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (order).

As the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of this

case, we need not recount it here. We reverse.

1. The district court erred in dismissing the unlawful arrest claim against

Detective Sandoval. “A claim for unlawful arrest is cognizable under § 1983 as a

violation of the Fourth Amendment, provided the arrest was without probable

cause or other justification.” Dubner v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 266 F.3d

959, 964 (9th Cir. 2001). “Probable cause for a warrantless arrest arises when the

facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge are sufficient to warrant a

prudent person to believe that the suspect has committed an offense.” Lingo v.

City of Salem, 832 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2016). “The facts must be such that a

prudent person would conclude that there was a ‘fair probability’ the individual

committed the crime.” Id. at 960. “As a predicate to section 1983 liability, each

public official must integrally participate in the unlawful seizure[].” Reynaga

Hernandez v. Skinner, 969 F.3d 930, 941 (9th Cir. 2020).

1 Detective Sandoval filed a Notice of Intent Not to File an Answering Brief. Dkt. 17.

2 In Reynaga Hernandez, we held that a defendant who ordered the plaintiff to

be “picked up,” resulting in the plaintiff’s unlawful stop and detention, was an

“integral participant” for purposes of a Fourth Amendment claim under section

1983. 969 F.3d at 942. Here, Bennett sufficiently alleged that Defendant Sandoval

was an integral participant of Bennett’s arrest by alleging that “[t]he Doe

Defendants seized and arrested [Bennett], at the direction and order of

Sandoval . . . .” As alleged, Defendant Sandoval was certainly “more than a mere

bystander,” id. at 941, given that Bennett’s arrest was a “reasonably foreseeable

consequence,” id. at 942, of his order.

Bennett further alleged that Detective Sandoval knowingly relied on an

untrustworthy informant for the statement that Bennett knew the phones he

obtained were fraudulent, and that, absent the informant’s statement, the remaining

observations by law enforcement were consistent with legal electronic buyback

and trading of electronics. Such allegations support an inference that Detective

Sandoval ordered Bennett arrested without probable cause. Accordingly, we

reverse the district court’s dismissal of the unlawful seizure claim against

Detective Sandoval.

2. The district court erred in dismissing the unlawful arrest claim against the

Doe Defendants. The district court found Bennett’s allegations against the Doe

Defendants insufficient because Bennett did not specify what each defendant failed

3 to do. But Bennett alleged that the Doe Defendants arrested him without probable

cause. Although “as a general rule, the use of ‘John Doe’ to identify a defendant is

not favored . . . . where the identity of the alleged defendant is not known prior to

the filing of a complaint, the plaintiff should be given an opportunity through

discovery to identify the unknown defendants, unless it is clear that discovery

would not uncover the identities, or that the complaint would be dismissed on other

grounds.” Wakefield v. Thompson, 177 F.3d 1160, 1163 (9th Cir. 1999). It is

certainly possible that Bennett would uncover the identities of the arresting officers

through discovery.

As for dismissal on other grounds, the district court erred in holding that

Bennett failed to state an unlawful arrest claim against the Doe Defendants. In

doing so, the district court found that the First Amended Complaint (FAC) made

no allegations that the Doe Defendants knew the search warrant lacked probable

cause. But whether there was probable cause for the search is a different inquiry

than whether the Doe Defendants had probable cause for the arrest. Compare

United States v. Grubbs, 547 U.S. 90, 95 (2006) (“Probable cause [for a search]

exists when ‘there is a fair probability that contraband or evidence of a crime will

be found in a particular place’”) with Reynaga Hernandez, 969 F.3d at 938

(probable cause for an arrest “must be based on reasonably trustworthy information

sufficient to warrant a prudent person in believing that the accused had committed

4 or was committing an offense”). That is because “[t]he critical element in a

reasonable search is not that the owner of the property, or in this case the person, to

be searched is suspected of crime.” Bill v. Brewer, 799 F.3d 1295, 1301 (9th Cir.

2015) (quotation marks and citation omitted). “Rather, probable cause to search

. . . concerns the connection of the items sought with crime and the present location

of the items.” Id.

As stated above, Bennett alleged Detective Sandoval ordered the Doe

Defendants to arrest him. “When there has been communication among agents,

probable cause can rest upon the investigating agents’ collective knowledge.”

Garcia v. Cnty. of Merced, 639 F.3d 1206, 1211 (9th Cir. 2011) (internal quotation

marks omitted). Having concluded, however, that Bennett sufficiently alleged that

Detective Sandoval lacked probable cause to order the arrest because of his

reliance on an untrustworthy informant, it logically follows that the Doe

Defendants cannot rely on Detective Sandoval’s knowledge as a basis for probable

cause. Furthermore, “although a police officer is entitled to rely on information

obtained from fellow law enforcement officers, this in no way negates a police

officer’s duty to reasonably inquire or investigate these reported facts.”

Mendocino Envtl. Ctr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 192 F.3d 1283, 1293 n.16 (9th Cir.

1999) (internal citations omitted). Liberally construing the FAC in Bennett’s

favor, Bennett has sufficiently alleged that the Doe Defendants did not have

5 probable cause to arrest him based on Detective Sandoval’s order.

REVERSED.